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                                                         Abstract 
 
 
 
 
The onshore tank farm operations has become more useful and handy, as a result of increased 
international sea-borne trade, particularly, the unprecedented higher volume of petroleum products and 
hazardous chemicals traffic globally. The onshore tank farm is a facility used for safe discharge, loading 
and storage of petroleum products and other hazardous chemicals at the ports. It has become an 
important element in the supply chain system because of the increased universal energy demand and the 
fact that large number of modern tanker vessel is busy and efficiently moving cargo to different 
destinations around the world. The tank farm serves as a back-up facility to the ports. However, it has 
high degree of system-wide challenges of potential major incidents/accidents, as evidenced in various 
tank farm recorded accidents, which occurred at different times with estimated losses valued in millions 
of US dollars. The accidents could be catastrophic, leading to deaths, extensive damages and adverse 
impact on environment. To eliminate or minimize the risk of major incident/accidents, as well as 
minimize the magnitude and severity, it is acutely urgent to uncover and assess all potential hazards, 
with a view to adopt the best preventive/mitigative policy direction in the management of this strategic 
facility. 
 
This thesis presents multiple safety/risk assessment approaches, uncertainties treatments and decision 
making techniques that are capable of finding optimal solutions that will ensure safety of tank farm 
operations. The standard tools of analysis employed in this tank farm operational risk assessment are 
Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), Faulty Tree Analysis (FTA), fuzzy logic, Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS). 
Firstly, the FMEA-Fuzzy Rule Based (FRB) is applied in Hazard Identification (HAZID) and risk 
evaluation of tank farm operations. The methodology is utilized to discover five possible causes of 
catastrophic accidents in tank farm operations. The causes/hazards are described as the automatic shut-
down oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic tank gauge system 
failure, leak detection device system failure, and secondary containment monitoring system failure. In 
the risk assessment conducted, the leak detection system failure was identified as the riskiest hazard 
using expected utility theory.  
 
iv 
 
Consequent upon the need for further investigation, another technique, Fuzzy Fault Tree (FFT), as novel 
model is used successfully to investigate and understand the causes of the leak detection system failure. 
The main aim of these two exercises is to assess risks and facilitate proper manage of these risks in tank 
farm operations, in order to forestall accidents that could cause damage to the facility, workers and the 
port environment. Nevertheless, the tank farm operations need to be optimized by ensuring the 
efficiency and safety of all systems and sub-systems through the adoption of best safety management 
decisions, which is achieved by employing AHP-TOPSIS model. This method is used to solve a 
complex multi-criteria decision-making problem such as selection of best Safety Control Design (SCD) 
among various SCDs identified. Finally, the results produced from the developed models and 
frameworks are summarized and other areas where they can effectively make impacts in HAZID, risk 
assessment and safety improvement are defined.  
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                                              Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, the background analysis, aim, objectives, hypothesis and challenges of 
conducting the research are discussed. The research methodology, justification of research and 
scope of the thesis are detailed, followed by the research contributions and descriptions of the 
structure of the thesis for better understanding of how to address and investigate tank farm risk-
based problems.  
 
 
 
1.1. Background Analysis 
 
 
The safety of tank farms cannot be compromised because of its importance and strategic 
positions in storage of the petroleum, chemical and hazardous flammable liquid. The main 
function of tank farm is to store transported petroleum and chemical products from pipelines, 
ships or refineries in a cost effective manner. Petroleum products demand is on the high side and 
will continue being high in the future. This will result in a continuous increase in constructions 
and use of tank farms for storage of petroleum products. There should be continuous review and 
assessment of the safety of tank farm operations, evidenced from various major accidents that 
have occurred.  
 
These accidents are still shocking the world due to system, environmental and personnel loss. 
The values of these losses are in millions of dollars. For instance, in 1997, 37 people died, 100 
injured and 15 loaded storage tanks destroyed, when LPG ignited during loading operations of a 
tank from a ship in Vishakhapatnam, India (Chang and Lin, 2006). Also in Naples, Italy, 24 
tanks farms at a marine petroleum products terminal were lost due to fire inferno caused by 
overfilling of the tank. This further destroyed the terminal buildings, industrial and residential 
structures (Chang and Lin, 2006; Clark et al., 2001). This is another important and bitter lesson. 
Other catastrophic tank farm accidents can be found in Chang and Lin (2006).  
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These accidents have attracted questions on how safety is reviewed in tank farm operations. 
Every safety regulations should aim at ensuring that risk associate with any operations under 
investigation has been reduced to the level of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and 
cost effective control measure recommended and implemented. Notable organizations such as 
American Petroleum Institute (API), International Maritime Organisation (IMO), American 
Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) have been improving on tank farm safety via 
recommendation of rules and regulations aimed at addressing previous accidents. However, 
accidents still happen and will continue to occur if proactive risk assessment is not practiced in 
tank farm operations. Therefore, the way tank farm safety is assessed and managed should be 
proactive manner rather than reactive manner.  
 
This approach is facilitated in marine and oil industries by the introduction of safety regulations 
such as Safety Case Regulations (SCR) and Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). Use of the 
proactive approach is the advantage of this thesis. In this study, there is focus on major hazards 
of the tank farm operations for the risk/safety assessment processes. The risk/safety assessment 
processes are HAZID and risk evaluation, risk analysis and management/control. A generic tank 
farm is used to facilitate an understanding of the subject under study and can help identify major 
hazards, since various tank farms (i.e. fixed or cone roof tank, open top floating roof tank and 
fixed roof tanks with internal floating roof) have similar operational features.  
 
The work proactively tackled risk assessment of major tank farm operational hazards under 
uncertainty using advanced computing techniques. The step by step risk/safety assessment 
processes are used in this study. Firstly, the Failure Mode Effect Analysis – Fuzzy Rule Based 
(FMEA-FRB) models are used in tank farm HAZID and risk evaluation. The second step is the 
use of Fuzzy Fault Tree (FFT) model in further risk analysis of riskiest tank farm hazard (s). The 
final step is the use of the Analytical Hierarchical Process-Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to the Ideal Solution (AHP-TOPSIS) technique for selection of tank farm safety/risk 
control measure. 
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1.2. Research Objectives and Hypothesis 
 
 
The primary aim of this research is to generate a methodology for risk assessment of tank farms 
under uncertainties and test with case studies. This will be beneficial to the industries because it 
ensure oversight of safety on tank farm operations and pollution prevention to the environment. 
The proactive nature of this research in the investigation and management of the major tank farm 
operational hazards can only be successful if the objectives described below are met. 
 
 Carry out a comprehensive literature search on various tank farm accidents, regulations, 
standards and codes related to tank farm safety and constructions. 
 Carry out literature search and adoption of a brainstorming technique to reveal major 
hazards of the tank farm operations. 
 Conduction of risk evaluation and ranking of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure, 
pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, leak detection 
device/system failure and secondary containment monitoring system failure, which are the 
identified major tank farm operational hazards under uncertainties using the FMEA-FRB 
methodology. 
 Carry out investigation of the causes of the leak detection system failure using the Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) method. The leak detection system failure is the riskiest hazard of the tank 
farm operations.  
 Conduction of the investigation of the failure probabilities of the leak detection system 
failure and their causes under uncertainties using the FFT model. 
 Conduction of the identification of the best safety improvement measure that can ensure 
optimal operations of the tank farm using the AHP-TOPSIS technique and experts‟ 
judgement. 
  
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 will be used to implement the objectives of this research. The literature 
review of this research is detailed in Chapter 2, to facilitate the development of other chapters. 
Application of the FMEA-FRB method in HAZID exercise and risk evaluation is illustrated in 
Chapter 3. Enabling of the FFT model is illustrated in Chapter 4 with case study, while Chapter 5 
details how AHP-TOPSIS model reveals the best safety improvement measure.   
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The objectives are carried out on the hypothesis that an advanced computing technique such as 
fuzzy logic and decision making models such as AHP and TOPSIS methods can be explored in 
addressing challenges of obtaining optimal tank farm operations.   
 
 
 
1.3. Challenges of Conducting the Research in Realm of Uncertainties (Statement of    
Problem) 
 
 
Various challenges are encountered and subdued in the conduction of the HAZID and risk/safety 
evaluations, risk analysis and control of the tank farm operational hazards under uncertainties in 
this research. Advanced computing models are employed as tools that can address the challenges 
associated with the tank farm operational hazards. This will contribute immensely in the 
improvement of the tank farm operational safety. The notable challenges and how they can be 
addressed are described in Sub-sections 1.3.1 – 1.3.3.  
 
 
1.3.1. Uncertainties Treatment in HAZID and Risk Evaluation of Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
Revealing tank farm operational hazards and the associated risks, are not an easy task, especially 
when the process is proactively based. Proactive approach is used because the study is not all 
about investigation of a particular previous accident. Therefore, to overcome this challenge, 
thorough literature search in combination with experts‟ judgement in a brainstorming session are 
used to reveal major tank farm operational hazards. Risk evaluations and ranks of major tank 
farm operational hazards such as automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion 
protection system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, leak detection device/system 
failure and secondary containment monitoring system failure posed to be a challenge in realm of 
uncertainties. Use of the FMEA-FRB method and expert judgement in the investigation of each 
tank farm operational hazards revealed their riskiness and ranks.  
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1.3.2. Uncertainties Treatment in Risk Analysis of the Riskiest Tank Farm Operational 
Hazards 
 
 
Leak detection system failure is the riskiest tank farm operational hazard and its cause is yet 
unknown and can only be identified by understanding its operation, use of experts‟ experiences 
and a thorough literature search. This challenge is addressed using the FTA method. Its failure 
logic mechanism facilitated the identification of the causes of the leak detection system failure 
and their relationships with one another. The unavailability of data for estimation of the failure 
probability of the leak detection system failure via its causes is also a big challenge in this 
research. This problem is addressed by using the FFT model. The FFT model can be used to 
estimate and facilitate the conversion of the failure possibilities of the leak detection system 
failure and its causes to their respective failure probabilities.  
 
 
1.3.3. Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) on Safety Control Design (SCD) of the 
Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
A novel model is developed for selection of the best Safety Control Design (SCD). The selection 
of the best SCD is addressed as a multi-criteria decision making problem. This difficult task is 
tackled by adoption of the AHP-TOPSIS model. The AHP-TOPSIS model is used to estimate the 
weights of the identified SCDs. A SCD associated with the highest relative closeness to ideal 
solution, 
RC
 value is classed as the best one and vice versa.  
 
 
1.4. Research Methodology  
 
 
The research methodology is centered on how to achieve optimal tank farm operations in the 
realm of uncertainties using the overall safety/risk assessment framework. In view of this, the 
research methodology of this study focused on HAZID and risk/safety evaluations, risk analysis 
and control of the tank farm operational hazards. In this study, uncertainties treatments and 
MCDM models have been developed for ensuring optimal tank farm operations. The success of 
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the research methodology is described using various chapters. Thus, the research methodology is 
divided into three sections as evidenced in Fig. 1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
  
 
                                                  
                                       Figure 1.1: Thesis Research Methodology  
 
 
1.4.1. Hazard Identification (HAZID) and Risk Evaluation 
 
  
Major tank farm accidents and rules and regulations governing tank farm safety and 
constructions set by various organizations have been discussed in Chapter 2. Traditional 
safety/risk analysis, uncertainty treatments and decision making techniques are discussed and 
their impacts in risk assessment of various systems noted in Chapter 2, so as to facilitate 
adoption of some of them in the HAZID and risk evaluation of tank farm operational hazards. 
Experts‟ judgement, a brainstorming technique and conduction of literatures search exposed 
RISK ANALYSIS  
(Using FFTA Method) 
Labour 
Cost 
      RISK MANAGEMENT/CONTROL  
(Using MCDM Model such as AHP-TOPSIS Model) 
HAZID AND RISK EVALUATION            
(Using FMEA-FRB Method) 
Equipment 
Cost 
Company 
Organizational 
Strategy 
Company 
Structure  
Technology 
Management 
SCD #1 (i.e. Weekly 
maintenance) 
SCD #2 (i.e. Weekly 
visual inspections) 
SCD #3 (i.e. Use of 
experts in system 
operations) 
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automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic 
tank gauge system failure, leak detection device/system failure and secondary containment 
monitoring system failure as major hazards of tank farm operations. A FMEA technique is used 
to risk evaluate the hazards. Due to uncertainties associated with the values/scores of the 
parameters of FMEA such as Occurrence Likelihood of Hazard (OLH), Consequence Severity of 
Hazard (CSH), Detection of Hazard (DH) and Priority for Attention of Hazard (PAH) (i.e. Risk 
Priority Number (RPN)), the FRB method is incorporated in the risk evaluation and ranking of 
the aforementioned major tank farm operational hazards. The OLH, the CSH, the DH and the 
PAH are described with five linguistic terms each in fuzzy environment, so as to facilitate their 
applications together with the FRB method  in the subject being investigated. The linguistic 
descriptions of the OLH, CSH, DH and PAH are used to estimate fuzzy values of the major 
hazards of the tank farm operational hazards. The concept of FMEA-FRB methodology revealed 
the leak detection system failure as the highest priority tank farm operational hazard due to its 
riskiness. 
 
 
1.4.2. Risk Analysis 
 
 
In this safety/risk assessment phase, the concept of the FFT model is adopted in analyzing the 
causes of the riskiest tank farm operational hazards and estimations of their failure probabilities 
in Chapter 4. Revealing of the failure probabilities of the causes, will facilitate the estimation of 
the one of leak detection system failure. The FTA method is used to construct how leak detection 
system failed, thereby revealing the causes (i.e. BE and intermediate events) and the Top Event 
(TE) (i.e. leak detection system failure). Such a Fault Tree (FT) construction is effectively 
developed using experts‟ experiences and thorough literature search. Five linguistic terms in 
fuzzy environment is used to estimate the failure possibilities of the causes of the leak detection 
system failure, which are converted to their respective failure probabilities using mathematical 
concept of the FFT model. The failure probabilities of the causes are systematically combined in 
line with the principles of the FFT model to reveal the one of the TE. The failure probabilities of 
the BEs are used to rank them. The usefulness of the model is supported with result verification 
via sensitivity analysis.  
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1.4.3.  Risk Management/Control 
 
 
In the risk management/control phase, the AHP-TOPSIS model is used to identify the most 
efficient SCD among the three SCDs as evidenced in Chapter 5. The concept of the AHP model 
and experts judgement is used to estimate the weights of criteria associated with the SCDs. 
Eighteen linguistic terms are established but few relevance ones are used in the expert judgement 
of the pair-wise comparisons of the criteria. The revealed weights of the criteria are used to 
facilitate application of TOPSIS method in selection of the best SCD. Therefore, TOPSIS 
method revealed that the safety of tank farm operations can be improved by selection of a SCD 
with highest relative closeness to ideal solution, 
RC value as shown in Chapter 5. The one 
selected is SCD #1 (i.e. weekly maintenance). Other SCDs are SCD #2 (i.e. Daily Visual 
Inspections) and SCD #3 (i.e. Use of Experts in System Operations).  
 
 
 
1.5.  Justification of Research 
 
 
Increasing use of tank farms for storage of various flammable liquids and the number of storage 
tanks accidents is giving stakeholders, various organizations and the public concern. The 
operations of tank farms are associated with hazards that pose to be a threat to the environment 
and public. Identification of those hazards and their associated risks in time can help experts to 
plan on how to prevent them or provide mitigative measures, thereby making tank farm 
operations safer and efficient in certain and uncertain environment. In view of this, there is need 
for this research, since the idea of the study is to identify these high risk hazards using tools 
capable of handling uncertainty in combination with traditional safety/risk methods and manage 
those hazards using a MCDM tool.  This study will contribute in improving the low safety level 
of tank farm operations evidenced from the accidents in the industry. To address the problem, a 
proactive approach is used in the investigation, analysis and management of the risk associated 
with tank farm operational hazards under uncertainty. 
 
A proactive approach is used in risk assessment of failure of tank farm operational systems. The 
systems are leak detection device/system, pipe corrosion protection system, automatic tank 
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gauge system, automatic shut-down oil safety valve and secondary containment monitoring 
system. A combination of traditional safety/risk assessment technique such as FMEA and 
uncertainty treatment method such as FRB is used to facilitate the exercise. Such risk assessment 
exercise revealed leak detection device/system as the high risk one. Leak detection 
device/system is further investigated for detailed risk assessment exercise, so as to identify the 
causes of the system failures and quantify them, using a combination of another traditional 
safety/risk analysis technique (i.e. FTA) and fuzzy logic. The fuzzy logic addressed the problem 
associated with lack of failure rate data of the BEs. In addition, the challenges posed with 
improvement of the system safety, when various options are available were subdued using the 
AHP-TOPSIS model.  
 
 
 
1.6. Scope of Thesis 
 
 
In this research, overall safety/risk assessment processes is used to solve optimal operations 
challenges in tank farm. Step by step approach of safety/risk assessment processes such as 
HAZID and risk evaluation, risk analysis and risk control are fully utilized. This is because of the 
various accidents that have happened in tank farm operations. Risks of major hazards associated 
with the tank farm operations that could result to catastrophic consequences are estimated and 
controlled using the FMEA-FRB, FFTA and AHP-TOPSIS methodologies. The risk associated 
with the highest risk hazard is reduced to acceptable level.  
 
 
 
1.7. Research Contributions 
 
 
The uniqueness and novelty of this research makes it a vital and universal acceptable 
tool/platform for HAZID and risk/safety management of hazardous and dangerous 
systems/cargoes under uncertainty. In general, the main aim of this study was to conduct 
proactively a HAZID, risk/safety evaluation and control of tank farm operational hazards under 
uncertainty. It is achieved step by step as follows: 
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 Under uncertainty condition, a methodology of HAZID and risk evaluation of tank farm 
operational hazards is developed using the FMEA-FRB methodology and experts‟ 
judgements in Chapter 3. This methodology can be adopted by various industries in 
addressing HAZID and risk evaluation problems under uncertainty. 
 An uncertainty treatment and failure investigation methodology is developed in Chapter 4. 
The causes of the failure of the high risk tank farm operational hazard are revealed using the 
FTA method and their failure probabilities are estimated by adoption of the FFT method 
under uncertainty. The TE failure probability is found and is reasonable and acceptable. 
 A multi-criteria decision making model such as an AHP-TOPSIS model is developed in 
Chapter 5, for selection of most effective SCD. The AHP-TOPSIS model is used to facilitate 
risk reduction and safety improvement of tank farm operations via selection of the best SCD 
among the three SCDs. The SCD with the highest relative closeness to ideal solution, 
RC
values is identified and revealed as the best one.  
 
 
 
1.8. Structure of the Thesis 
 
 
The understanding of this research lies on its structure. In view of this, the research is made up of 
seven core chapters, including this introduction (Chapter 1). The titles of the chapters are shown 
in Table 1.1 and how they are linked together is demonstrated in Figure 1.1. In the Figure 1.2, 
Chapter 1 being the introduction of the thesis, serves as the chapter where information about the 
thesis started. This is followed by Chapter 2, which serves as background analysis of other 
chapters (i.e. Chapters 3, 4 and 5) and other relevant information related to the subject matter. 
Chapter 2 is linked to Chapter 3 as shown in Figure 1.1 and Chapter 3 is purposely for HAZID 
and risk evaluations and ranking of tank farm operational hazards. Chapter 3 is linked to Chapter 
4 and 5, while Chapter 4 is linked to Chapter 5. The primary aim of Chapter 4 is to investigate 
the causes of the riskiest hazard revealed in Chapter 3, while Chapter 5 provides the much 
needed solution for prevention of tank farm operational failures. Chapter 6 is linked to Chapters 
3, 4 and 5. It discusses the results produced in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, and the merits and demerits of 
the models used in those chapters. It also concludes the thesis and is linked to the model 
applications (i.e. Chapters 3, 4 and 5).   
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                       Table 1.1: Summary of the Chapters in this Research 
 
Chapter No. Title 
1 Introduction 
2 Literature Review 
3 Enabling Failure Mode Effect Analysis - Fuzzy Rule Based 
(FMEA-FRB)  Methodology in Risk Evaluation and Prioritization 
of Tank Farm Operational Hazards 
4 Incorporation of Fuzzy Fault Tree (FFT) Model to Failure Analysis 
of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm Operations 
5 Optimal Safety Improvement of Tank Farm Operations using an 
Analytic Hierarchy Process-Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to the Ideal Solution (AHP-TOPSIS) Model 
6 Discussions and Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
 
 
 
                                                    
                                       
                                        Figure 1.2: Structure of the Research  
 
 
                                
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Chapter 3 - Enabling Failure Mode Effect Analysis - Fuzzy Rule Based (FMEA-FRB) 
Methodology in Risk Evaluation and Prioritization of Tank Farm Operational Hazards 
Chapter 4 - Incorporation of Fuzzy Fault Tree (FFT) Model to Failure 
Analysis of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm Operations 
Chapter 5 - Optimal Safety Improvement of Tank Farm Operations using an 
Analytic Hierarchy Process-Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the 
Ideal Solution (AHP-TOPSIS) Model 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Chapter 6 – Discussion 
and Conclusions  
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                                                               Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, the literature related to the study is reviewed. The operations of tank farm in 
ports are discussed. The tank farm accidents, risk assessment of tank farm operations, rules and 
regulations governing tank farm operations and safety are detailed. Various safety/risk 
assessment techniques and uncertainty in risk assessment are explained. Uncertainty treatment 
and decision making techniques employed in the study are also described, and the need for the 
research is reported.   
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 
Rapid development of petroleum and chemical industries has attracted the use of large-scale 
atmospheric storage tanks (Bai & Liu, 1995; Jiang & Li, 2005; Li, 1996; Shuai et al., 2012). 
Safety of tank farms is very important, especially now the number of tank farms sited in port 
environment is increasing drastically. Tank farms are important storage facilities that can be used 
to store petroleum products and other hazardous chemicals in ports environment. These large-
scale tanks filled with highly flammable liquid have high potential risk and once there is leakage, 
the consequences are serious environmental pollution, fire and casualties (Shuai et al., 2012). 
Therefore, safety management of tank farms need urgent attention, in order to prevent 
catastrophic accidents. In this chapter, literature review is carried out to reveal the description of 
operations of tank farms in ports, and various tank farm accidents. Rules and regulation that 
contributed in tank farm safety is also discussed. The HAZID and risk assessment tools that can 
be used to ensure optimal tank farm operations are outlined and decision making techniques that 
can be employed for uncertainty treatment and safety design selection are detailed. Also, the 
literature review revealed why this research is necessary (i.e. justification of research). 
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Adoption of proactive approach in conduction of failure analysis of tank farm operations within 
the port environment under uncertainty and safety improvement of the systems and sub-systems 
of the tank farm are necessary. This will ensure optimal operations of the tank farm and 
reduction of catastrophic accident in port environment as low as reasonable practicable. 
Therefore, a combination of traditional safety/risk analysis and advanced computing techniques 
are adopted in this thesis, due to high level of uncertainties being addressed.  
 
Proactive risk-based approaches for safety management of tank farm operations are employed. A 
FMEA-FRB methodology is used for hazard identification and risk evaluation of tank farm 
operations, while failure of leak detection system that posed to be a treat in ensuring optimal 
operations of the tank farms is investigated using FFT model. The safety improvement of tank 
farm operations is ensured using AHP-TOPSIS methodology to identify the most efficient SCD. 
 
 
 
2.2. Operations of Tank Farm in Ports 
 
 
Tank farm operations are associated with high risk due to its content. The volume of a tank farm 
is over 100,000m
3 
(Shebeko et al., 2007).  The hazardous nature/quality of the cargo that the tank 
farm stores posed to be a treat to the system operational efficiency. The tank farm can store crude 
oil, oil products, gasoline/naphtha, petrochemicals, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), waste oil 
water, ammonia, hydrochloric acid, caustic soda, molten sulfur etc, classified as hazardous 
cargoes (Chang and Lin, 2006). Accidents may occur during loading of the tank content to a 
vessel or truck. It can also occur during the discharging of the vessel content to the tank farm or 
when there is no loading or discharging operations. Effective operations of the tank farm can be 
achieved by strictly adhering to the rules laid by API, AIChE, IMO, ASME and NFPA and local 
administration. To avoid risks in tank farm operations, the dynamics of the systems of tank farm 
need to be studied. Such studies can facilitate provision of mitigative measures for unforeseen 
hazards that can threaten proper operations of the tank farm. There are three main types of tank 
farms for storing combustible or flammable liquid hydrocarbon fuel. This includes 
(Argyropoulos et al., 2012; IChemE, 2008): 
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 Fixed or cone roof tanks. It is designed in line with API standard (API, 2001). The tank is 
made of a vertical cylinder side and a fixed cone-shaped roof that is welded to each other as 
evidenced in Figure 2.1. This type of tank is designed with a weak seam at joint, where the 
roof and sides become one to cope with an internal explosion (API, 2001; Argyropoulos et 
al., 2012). This makes the roof to separates from the tank without the containment and any 
fire accident is proliferated only on the surface of the fuel (Argyropoulos et al., 2012). The 
tank type is mainly use for storage of fuel-oils, asphalt (bitumen) and vacuum or 
atmospheric residue, therefore, the use of insulation, steam or coil heating in these types of 
tanks is necessary for the keeping of its content in a liquid state (Argyropoulos et al., 2012). 
 
 Open top floating roof tank (simple pontoon or double deck). It is also designed in line with 
API standard and is made up of a vertical, cylindrical above ground shell similar to the 
conical roof tank, but with a pontoon type roof as shown in Figure 2.1. The roof has the 
ability to rise and fall on the stored-fuel surface, in order to prevent the large volumes 
emittance of fuel-vapours (Argyropoulos et al., 2012). Moreover, there is a rim seal that 
covers the space between the floating roof and the tank shell, in the form of a rubber tube 
filled with kerosene, where most frequently a fire may start (Argyropoulos et al., 2012). The 
tank is used for storage of volatile liquid hydrocarbons such as crude oil and “white” light 
products (i.e. jet, diesel and gasoline). The tank is constructed in a way that it can prevent 
the dissemination of the oil-leakage to the surrounding installations with a major probability 
of ignition. 
 
 Fixed roof tanks with internal floating roof. This type of storage tank is a combination of 
cone roof tank and open top floating roof tank as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The tank consists 
of a conical roof with the addition of the internal floating roof or pan that floats directly on 
the fuel surface (Argyropoulos et al., 2012). The tank has internal floaters that can decrease 
the potential of ignition and prevention of initiation of tank fires (Argyropoulos et al., 2012). 
The tank can also be used to store volatile liquid hydrocarbons such as crude oil and “white” 
light products (i.e. jet, diesel and gasoline) and can prevent the dissemination of the oil-
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leakage to the surrounding installations with a major probability of ignition (Argyropoulos et 
al., 2012). 
 
 
 
 
                         Figure 2.1: Types of Tank Farms (Argyropoulos et al., 2012) 
  
 
 
2.2.1. Tank Farm Accidents 
 
 
More than 242 tank farm accidents/incidents have happened since the use of tank farm in storage 
of flammable liquid (Chang and Lin, 2006). In this study, 11 most catastrophic tank farm 
accidents are outline in Table 2.1. These various tank farm accidents that have happened in the 
past necessitated the conduct of this research. In view of this, proactive approach is used to 
identify major tank farm operational hazards and risks assess and control them under 
uncertainties as evidenced in Chapters 3-5.  
 
 
                              Table 2.1: Historical Largest Tank Farm Accidents 
 
No. Date Location Accident Description 
1 24/2/1986  Thessaloniki Greece 
 
Sparks from a flame cutting torch ignited fuel 
from a tank spill in a dyke of a fuel tank. The 
fire spread to other areas resulting in 
destruction of 10 out of 12 cruel oil tanks 
(Chang and Lin, 2006). 
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2 3/4/1977  
 
Umm said, Qatar  
 
A 260,000-barrel tank containing 236,000 
barrels of refrigerated propane at -45
o
F failure 
massively. An adjoining refrigerated butane 
tank and most of the process area were also 
destroyed by fire (Chang and Lin, 2006). 
3 20/1/1968  Pernis, Netherlands Frothing occurred when hot oil and water 
emulsion in a slop tank reacted with volatile 
slop, causing a violent vapour release an boil-
over. The fire destroyed 3 hydrocarbon, a sulfur 
plant, and 80 storage tanks (Chang and Lin, 
2006). 
4 1/9/1979  
 
Deer Park, Texas, 
USA 
Nearly simultaneous explosions aboard a 
70,000 Dead Weight Tonne (DWT) tanker off-
loading and in an 80,000 barrel ethanol tank at 
a refinery occurred during a electric storm 
(Chang and Lin, 2006). 
5 30/5/1978  
 
Texas, USA An unidentified failure led to the release of 
light hydrocarbons which spread to an ignition 
source. 11 tanks in this alkylation unit were 
destroyed (Chang and Lin, 2006). 
6 20/8/1981  Kuwait Fire destroyed 8 tanks and damaged several 
others. The cause of the fire has not been 
disclosed (Chang and Lin, 2006). 
7 14/9/1997 Vishakhapatnam, 
India 
LPG ignited during tank loading from a ship. A 
thick blanket of smoke spreading panic among 
the residents resulted in 37 people died and 100 
injured. 15 storage tanks burned for two days 
(Chang and Lin, 2006).  
8 21/12/1985 Naples, Italy 24 of the 32 tanks at a marine petroleum 
products terminal destroyed by fire that began 
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with a tank overfill. Explosion caused complete 
destruction of the terminal buildings and nearby 
industrial and residential structures (Chang and 
Lin, 2006; Clark et al., 2001). 
9 7/1/1983 Newark, New 
Jersey, USA 
A overfilling of a floating roof tank spilled 
1300 barrels of gasoline into the tank dyke. The 
vapour cloud carried by wind to a nearby 
incinerator was ignited. The resulting explosion 
destroyed two adjacent tanks and the terminal 
(Chang and Lin, 2006). 
10 26/5/1983 Prodhoe, Bay, 
Alaska, USA 
A low-pressure Natural Gas Liquid (NGL) feed 
drum ruptured in a crude oil station, resulting in 
fire damage to one third of the module and 
exterior of surrounding structure within 100 ft. 
(Chang and Lin, 2006). 
11 11/12/2005 (Buncefield) 
Hertfordshire, U.K.  
Failure of high-level gauges caused the 
overfilling of the tank at estimated rate of 
550m³/hr, which resulted to overflow into the 
bund generating large quantities of vapour. 
About 20 premises were lost in nearby 
industrial estate, affecting the livelihood of 
some 500 people (Buncefield Major Incident 
Investigation Board, 2008; Herbert, 2010). 
 
 
 
2.3. Risk Assessment of Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
Risk assessment is a comprehensive estimation of the probability and the degree of the possible 
consequences in a hazardous situation in order to select appropriate safety measures (Wang and 
Trbojevic, 2007). It has various phases such as HAZID, risk evaluation, risk analysis and 
management/control. Risk assessment of tank farm operations can be carried out using 
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qualitative or quantitative risk analysis approach. Availability of historical tank farm 
accidents/incidents data and requirement of experts involved in tank farm risk assessment will 
determine if the process is qualitative or quantitative base.  
 
The first phase of risk assessment is HAZID.  A hazard is defined as a physical situation with a 
potential to cause injury, damage to environment or some combination of these (Wang and 
Trbojevic, 2007). HAZID is concerned with the use of “brainstorming” techniques by utilising 
trained and experienced personnel to determine the hazards (Godaliyadde, 2008; Wang, 2000). 
The team involved in the exercise works with the theme of believability/credibility, which is that 
there must be potential for an initiating event to be technically feasible (even if highly unlikely) 
within the expected lifetime of the activity (Nwaoha et al., 2011; Pitblado et al., 2004). The team 
used brainstorming technique in HAZID exercise and ensures that the process is proactive. 
HAZID is usually carried out at the component level, then the sub-system level to the system 
level. The analysis at system level makes use of the information at sub-system level, while the 
analysis at the sub-system level uses the information produced at the component level. 
Traditional safety/risk analysis techniques such as the FTA, ETA, PHA, HAZOP, Bowtie, 
FMEA and FMECA can be used in the HAZID exercise. In this study, hazards of tank farm 
operations have been identified using brainstorming approach and thorough literature search by 
four experts. The hazards are: 
  
 Automatic shut-off oil safety valve failure. 
 Pipe corrosion protection system failure. 
 Automatic tank gauge system failure.  
 Leak detection device/system failure. 
 Secondary containment monitoring failure. 
 
The second phase of risk assessment is risk evaluations. It is a process of evaluating risks 
associated with the hazards identified in the first phase of risk assessment. This phase can also be 
conducted in a similar manner with the first phase of risk assessment. This phase helps to reveal 
levels of risks of hazards. It facilitates identification of hazards that need more attention. 
Methods such as the FTA, ETA, BOWTIE, FMEA and FMECA can be employed in risk 
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evaluation of a hazard as a stand alone or in combination with uncertainty treatments methods. 
History has shown that tank farm safety is very low (Chang and Lin, 2006). There have been 
numerous accidents in tank farm operations, which imply that high risk hazards associated with 
the operations have not been properly addressed. In view of this, the FMEA-FRB method is used 
in risk evaluation of the hazards identified in first phase of risk assessment, as evidenced in 
Chapter 3. 
 
The third phase of risk assessment is risk analysis. In this phase, attention is focused on the 
riskiest hazards, so as to reveal their causes. Identification of their causes will facilitate the 
provision of possible control measures for that hazard under investigation. Techniques such as 
the FTA, ETA, BOWTIE, FMEA and FMECA can also be employed as a stand alone or in 
combination with uncertainty treatment methods. In this study, the FFTA method is used in risk 
analysis of the riskiest hazard of tank farm operations as evidenced in Chapter 4.  
 
The final phase of risk assessment is managing and controlling of the risks of hazards. In this 
phase, various control measures are usually identified and the best selected among the lot. The 
MCDM techniques such as AHP, TOPSIS, MAUT and expected utility theory are usually used 
in this phase. The safety of tank farms failed to be in optimal level, irrespective of various safety 
features that are recommended and incorporated in the tank farm operations and other related 
facilities by API, AIChE, ASME, IMO and NFPA (AIChE, 1988; 1993; API, 1988; 1990; 
ASME, 2004; NFPA, 1992; UL, 1986; 1987; IMO MSC/Circ.1023, 2002). In this phase, the 
successful use of the AHP-TOPSIS method in combination with the expected utility theory has 
been revealed in Chapter 5.   
  
Various experts have demonstrated the applicability of quantitative and qualitative risk analysis 
approaches in onshore storage tank operations (Argyropoulos et al,. 2012; Shuai et al., 2012; 
Massimo et. al., 2013;  Fabbrocino, et. al., 2005; Crippa, et al., 2009; Necci et. al., 2014; Shi et. 
al., 2014; Wang, et. al., 2013; Kang, et al., 2014). In the works of Argyropoulos et al. (2012), a 
systematic HAZID methodology for liquid hydrocarbon fuel storage tanks is carried out by 
applying a checklist technique on the accident causes and the relevant protection measures, in the 
framework of the SEVESO Directive series. Their work revealed that the present hazards 
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assessment methodology facilitated the identification of the major contributors to risk, so as to 
improve safety measures (Argyropoulos et al., 2012). A quantitative risk assessment approach 
has been applied to a large-scale crude oil tank (Shuai et al., 2012). In their study, Risk-based 
Inspection (RBI) technology is used to quantitatively assess the risk of crude oil tanks in an oil 
depot in China. The risk comparison between tank shell and bottom shows that the risk of tank 
depends on the risk of tank bottom (Shuai et al., 2012). According to Massimo et. al. (2013), 
quantitative risk analysis is used to quantify the damage and to plan safety of exposed workers 
and people in surrounding area of a gasoline storage plant. The study revealed an effective means 
for emergency planning, defined the vulnerability of the potential damage area through the 
characterization of known exposure levels. The individual risk indicators depend on the exposure 
levels and the hazard scenarios evolution (Massimo et. al., 2013). Their research demonstrated 
that it is partial to consider only the accidental events with high probability of occurrence in the 
emergency management purposes and safety design.  
 
Fabbrocino, et. al. (2005) carried out integrating of structural seismic risk into quantitative 
probabilistic seismic risk analysis using an oil storage plant with a number of atmospheric steel 
tanks containing flammable substances. In their work, empirical seismic fragility curves and 
probit functions, properly defined both for building-like and non-building-like industrial 
components, have been crossed with outcomes of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis for a test 
site. Once the seismic failure probabilities have been quantified, consequence analysis has been 
performed for those events which may be triggered by the loss of containment following seismic 
action (Fabbrocino, et. al., 2005). Crippa, et al. (2009) proposed a fire risk assessment 
methodology to face the fire risk connected with large atmospheric storage tanks. Same 
workflow could also be extended to the issues connected with other problems related with large 
atmospheric tanks storing hydrocarbons, such as environmental impact by soil pollution, to 
create a common frame work of assessment (Crippa, et al., 2009).  
 
Necci et. al. (2014) investigated on the identification of event sequences and accident scenarios 
following lightning impact on atmospheric tanks.  An overall methodology was outlined to allow 
the calculation of the expected frequencies of final scenarios following lightning impact on 
atmospheric storage tanks, taking into account the expected performance of available safety 
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barriers (Necci et. al., 2014).  In their study, the methodology was applied to a case study in 
order to better understand the data that may be obtained and their importance in the framework 
of quantitative risk assessment and of the risk management of industrial facilities with respect to 
external hazards due to natural events. Shi et. al., (2014), contributed towards the development 
of a quantitative approach for assessing the occurrence probability of fire and explosion 
accidents of steel oil storage tanks. In their work, a fault tree method is employed in 
identification of potential causes of fire and explosion accidents of steel oil storage tanks. A 
hybrid application between an expert elicitation based improved AHP and Fuzzy Set Theory 
(FST) facilitated the estimation of the occurrence possibility of fire and explosion accidents of 
steel oil storage tanks for an oil depot in China.  
 
In the works of Wang et. al. (2013), FTA technique is used in revealing the various potential 
causes of the crude oil tank fire and explosion and the calculation of  the occurrence probability 
of the crude oil tank fire and explosion using exact probability data of the basic events. FST is 
incorporated in their study, to address challenges associated with difficulties in obtaining 
corresponding precise data and information as a result of changing environment or new 
components. According to Kang, et al. (2014), a new quantitative risk evaluation model for oil 
storage tank zones based on the theory of two types of hazards such as inherent hazards and 
controllable hazards are identified, analysed and classified. A combination of FTA, FST, AHP 
and risk matrix methodology is used in the aforementioned quantitative risk analysis exercise in 
oil storage tank zones.  
 
 
 
2.4. Rules and Regulation Governing Tank Farm Operations and Safety 
  
 
Tank farms and associated facilities are designed and constructed using best industrial standards 
to ensure safety. Employing best industrial standards ensures there is drainage facilities, proper 
equipment/instrument selection, proper layout, interspacing and safety release system etc. 
Organizations such as API, IMO, AIChE, ASME, and NFPA have contributed immensely in the 
tank farm operational safety (IMO MSC/Circ.1023, 2002; AIChE, 1988; 1993; API, 1988; 1990; 
ASME, 2004; NFPA, 1992). In AIChE, (1988), guidelines for storage and handling of high toxic 
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hazard materials is outlined while in AIChE, (1993), the guidelines for engineering design for 
process safety is explained. Other organization such as API explained guideline for welded steel 
tanks for oil storage  (API, 1988) and further recommended rules for design and construction of 
large, welded, low-pressure storage tank (API, 1990). ASME (2004) contributed in tank farm 
safety via provision of codes for boiler and pressure vessel and NFPA (1992) provided standard 
for the storage and handling of liquefied petroleum gases. Some notable safety measures used in 
tank farms operation are (GexCon AS., 2008): 
 
 Blanketing with an inert gas (usually nitrogen) to prevent the formation of an explosive 
atmosphere inside the tank, thereby eliminating the ignition hazard due to electrostatic 
discharges. 
 Antistatic additives that increase the conductivity of the liquid, thereby preventing 
electrostatic charges from accumulating on the liquid surface. 
 Minimising the formation of static electricity during filling of the tank by maintaining low 
flow velocities during pumping (typically below 3m/s for pure liquids, and below 1m/s when 
water is present), avoiding splash filling, and including long lengths of tubing after 
restriction like filters or orifice plates to allow charges to decay. 
 Sensible layout of tank farms, such as sufficient spacing between the tanks, separate bunds 
for each tank to capture liquid spills, placing pumps and other equipment outside the bunds, 
etc. 
 Flame arresters on all vents for tanks containing flammable liquids. 
 Hazardous area classification: preventing ignition sources by dictating design requirements 
for electrical equipment according to relative explosion risks in defined zones. 
 Use of floating roof tanks, thereby eliminating the formation of a confined explosive 
atmosphere. 
 
Other safety features of storage tanks and their environment include: 
 
 Tank roof safety valves. 
 Double deck pontoons on the roof. 
 Side entry mixers trip on the tank low level. 
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 Emergency Shutdown (ESD) switch for emergency shutdown of tank. 
 Auto tank radar gauging. 
 Tank overflows protection. 
 Double seal/liquid mounted seal. 
 Fire detection system in rim seal area. 
 Loading arms with overflow protection system. 
 Loading arms/SPM hoses provided with breakaway couplings. 
 Fire and gas detection system. 
 Fixed foam pourer system. 
 Automatic sprinkler system. 
 Rim seal fire detection for larger floating roof tanks. 
 Placement of portable firefighting equipment at strategic areas. 
 Fire water monitors and hydrants. 
 Firefighting equipment.  
 Pivot master for floating roof drains. 
 Tank dyke walls made of concrete. 
 Inbuilt protection for over pressurization of lines due to thermal expansion. 
 LPG driers facility. 
 
IMO mainly takes care of shipping related activities of the tank farm. IMO as a body that 
contributes to the standardisation of the legislations and regulations related to marine activities 
has put proactive measures in place to address any risk associated with loading/unloading of 
flammable liquid from tank farm to and from ship, evidenced by their adoption of FSA. The 
IMO defines FSA as a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing marine 
safety, including protection of life, health, the marine environment and property, based on risk 
and cost benefit assessments which lead to decisions (IMO MSC/Circ.1023, 2002). FSA is a 
process that involves HAZID, risk assessment, risk control option and decision making in a cost 
effective manner. The adoption of FSA for shipping represents a fundamental cultural change, 
from a largely reactive approach, to one which is integrated, proactive and soundly based upon 
the evaluation of risk (Godaliyadde, 2008). FSA is an outstanding tool because it considers 
25 
 
hazards that have not yet given rise to accidents in risk management of loading and unloading 
operations of ships to and from tank farms. Other benefits of FSA are (MSA, 1993): 
 
 A consistent regulatory regime which addresses all aspects of safety in an integrated way. 
 Cost effectiveness, whereby safety investment is targeted where it will achieve the greatest 
benefit.  
 Confidence that regulatory requirements are in proportion to the severity of risks. 
 A rational basis for addressing new risks posed by ever changing marine technology.  
 
 
2.5. Risk Assessment Techniques 
  
 
Experts can employ various safety/risk analysis techniques in carrying out comprehensive risk 
assessment of tank farm operations. These safety/risk analysis techniques are outline as follows: 
 
 Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). 
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
 Event Tree Analysis (ETA). 
 Bowtie Analysis. 
 Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Studies. 
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). 
 Risk Matrix. 
 
 
2.5.1. Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). 
 
 
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is one of the safety/risk analysis 
technique used in the maritime and oil and gas industries and was developed in the 1960s in the 
United States. The usefulness of the technique was firstly demonstrated by NASA during the 
development of the Apollo Project (Carmignani, 2009). It can be used in HAZID, risk evaluation 
and analysis phases. FMECA is an inductive technique and can handle both qualitative and 
quantitative assessment (Kumamoto and Henley, 1992; MIL-STD-1629A, 1980; Wang and 
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Ruxton, 1997). It involves compilation of reliability data for individual items. This technique has 
been widely used in many industries to address safety and risk assessment problems (Pillay, 
2001; Kumamoto and Henley, 1992; Villemeur, 1992; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). It can be 
carried out from any indenture level required to examine the failure modes of a component 
(subsystem) and its possible consequences (Nwaoha, 2011). FMECA is capable to address 
failure modes with severe effects that have sufficiently low occurrence probabilities (Villemeur, 
1992). FMECA is made up of two parts such as: 
 
 FMEA. Associated with identification of potential failures of a system and the effects of 
such failure on that system‟s performance. FMEA also reveals the potential severities of 
such effects on the systems. Further descriptions are detailed in Chapter 3. 
 Criticality Analysis (CA). Associated with calculation of the risk of each failure of the 
system through measurements of the severity and probability of a failure event. 
 
In Wang and Trbojevic (2007), the steps of FMECA are outlined as follows:  
 
1. Define the constraints and assumptions of the analysis. 
2. Break down the system to its levels such as the sub-system level and the component level. 
3. For each item at the level analysed, identify all possible modes of failures and respective 
causes. 
4. For each identified failure mode, identify or provide the following information: 
 All the distinctive operating conditions under which failure may occur. 
 The failure rate of the identified failure mode. 
 The effects (consequences) on the safety and operability of the higher levels (including 
the level analysed). 
 The possible means by which failure may be identified. 
 Design provisions and/or actions in operation to eliminate or control the possible 
resulting effects. 
 The severity class of the possible effects where such a class may be defined by one of the 
linguistic variables (i.e. catastrophic, critical, marginal and negligible). Catastrophic 
linguistic variable means death, system loss and/or severe environmental damage, while 
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critical linguistic variable means severe injury, major system damage and/or major 
environmental damage. Marginal linguistic variable means minor injury, minor system 
damage and/or minor environmental damage, while negligible linguistic variable means 
no injury and negligible damage to the system and the environment.  
5. Failure consequence probability defining the likelihood that the effects of the identified 
failure mode will occur given that the failure mode has taken place. 
6. Final step is criticality analysis. Criticality analysis allows a qualitative or a quantitative 
ranking of the criticality of the failure modes of items as a function of the severity 
classification and occurrence likelihood. 
The FMEA method has been used to solve various problems in combination with other 
algorithms. For example, Yang et al. (2008) used a FRB Bayesian reasoning approach and 
FMEA in assessment of collision risk between a floating, production, storage and offloading 
system and a shuttle tanker caused by technical failure during tandem offloading operation. An 
interesting application of FMEA-FRB model in reliability improvement of diesel engine's 
turbocharger system is carried out in Xu et al (2002). The difficulties of interdependencies 
among various failure modes with uncertain and imprecise information in failure analysis of 
diesel engine's turbocharger system are tackled. Pillay and Wang (2003) incorporated FRB-
FMEA model and grey theory in risk analysis of a fishing vessel. Such combination of 
algorithms addressed the draw backs of traditional FMEA and yielded a more accurate ranking 
of failure modes of fishing vessel systems.  
 
Risk assessment and management of port security is carried out using the FRB model in 
combination with FMECA and Expanded Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (EFMEA) (Ung et 
al., 2009). The fired rules in the 625 rules of the FRB model facilitated the risk ranking and 
management of the port security. Pam et al. (2013) have demonstrated the relevant of an FRB 
and Infection Mode Effect Analysis (IMEA) model in risk estimations of ballast water. The 
mechanism of the FMEA in combination with Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is applied in 
risk prioritization of failure modes of fishing vessel systems (Chin et al., 2009a). Other industries 
have explored the strength of FMEA and FRB methods in addressing various challenging tasks 
(Braglia et al., 2003a; Braglia et al., 2003b; Chang et al., 2001; Chang et al., 1999; Guimaraes 
and Lapa, 2007; Sankar and Prabhu, 2001; Sharma et al., 2005; Stamatis, 1995; Xu et al., 2002). 
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The FMEA-FRB technique is employed in subjective risk evaluation of tank farm operational 
hazards in Chapter 3. The technique facilitated the development of generic HAZID and risk 
evaluation framework of tank farm operations.  
 
 
2.5.2. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 
 
FTA is a safety/risk analysis technique that can be used to handle both quantitative and 
qualitative risk assessment problems. It can be used in HAZID, risk evaluation and analysis 
phases. FTA is a top down approach that systemically considers the causes or events at levels 
below the top level (Lavasani, 2010). It is a deductive reasoning approach and can be applied to 
a system of any size for risk assessment purposes (Ang and Tang, 1984; Godaliyadde, 2008; 
Wang and Trbojevic, 2007; Nwaoha, 2011). It was developed by H. A. Watson of the Bell 
Telephone Laboratories between 1961 and 1962 during an Air Force study contract for the 
Minuteman Launch Control System (Riahi, 2010; Godaliyadde, 2008). The technique represents 
the failure logic of a system in an inverted tree structure and provides very good documentation 
of how the failure logic of the system is developed (Andrews and Ridley, 2002; Nwaoha, 2011). 
In the maritime and oil and gas industries, FTA is constructed with “AND” or “OR” gate to show 
the causes of failure of an event. AND gate is used to connect the causes of failure of an event if 
the causes happen simultaneously, while OR gate is employed in FTA constructions if the causes 
of failure of an event happen directly (i.e. not simultaneously). The logic gates determine the 
addition or multiplication of probabilities to obtain the values for the top event (Lavasani, 2010). 
 
FTA is used to estimate the probability of an accident (i.e. TE) resulting from sequences and 
combinations of faults and failure events (i.e. BEs) (Riahi, 2010; Godaliyadde, 2008). It 
addresses quantitative risk assessment problem, when probabilities associated with BEs are 
known/available. The pathways through the FT diagram represent all the events which give rise 
to the TE, are known as cut sets or implicant sets (Riahi, 2010; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The 
Minimal Cut Set (MCS) is defined as the irreducible pathways leading to the occurrence of a top 
event (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). TE is the release of a hazard/undesired event of an item 
(Kumamoto and Henley, 1992; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The FTA is widely used technique 
for HAZID and risk estimation (Kumamoto and Henley, 1992).  
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A FTA method can be used as standalone or in combination with other algorithm in addressing 
uncertainty associated with risk assessment of a system. Lavasani et al. (2011a) used fuzzy logic 
to address uncertainties associated with quantification of FT of offshore pipeline system. It 
helped the researchers to reduce the ambiguity and imprecision arising from the subjectivity of 
data. Traditional FTA method needs a sound data base of failure of all BEs for quantifying the 
probability failure of system, whilst there is not such a database available in offshore pipeline 
industry; therefore, fuzzy FTA approach is proposed to deal with this issue (Lavasani et al., 
2011a). The paper also demonstrated the workability of the model using a case study. 
 
The usefulness of a combination of fuzzy and FTA is also demonstrated in the work of Ping et 
al. (2007). The researchers proved that accurate assessment of system reliability with limited or 
insufficient statistical data is difficult. Therefore, their paper presented a method which treated 
the drawbacks of traditional FTA by using the FTA based on possibilistic measures and fuzzy 
logic. According to Ping et al. (2007), the method is designed specifically for situations wherein 
reliability and safety assessment is imprecise by nature and necessary statistical data is scarce. 
Based on fundamentals of fuzzy logic, failure possibility is first defined and then fuzzy variables 
are characterized in the context of possibility theory (Ping et al., 2007). An example is used to 
illustrate the proposed model as evidence.  
 
The relevance of fuzzy FTA is proved in the works of Pan and Wang (2007). In their research, 
the difficulties in estimation of exact probabilities of occurrence of bridge failure for use in the 
conventional FTA are subdued through incorporation of fuzzy sets and possibility theory. An 
example of the collapse of cantilever gantry during construction demonstrates the capability of 
this technique (Pan and Wang; 2007). Similar approach is used in reliability analysis of auxiliary 
feedwater system (Guimarees and Ebecken; 1999). The effectiveness of the fuzzy FTA was 
demonstrated in analysing of safety problem of unexpected robot motion in an aircraft wing 
drilling system (Lin and Wang; 1997). The results indicated that the proposed approach is very 
effective in analysing the reliability of a man-machine system (Lin and Wang; 1997). Dong and 
Yu (2005) analysed failure of oil and gas transmission pipelines using fuzzy FTA model and 
revealed that the system has fuzzy failure probability of 6.4603×10
−3
.  The FFT model is used to 
conduct a quantitative assessment of leak detection system of tank farm operations in realm of 
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uncertainties in Chapter 4. The quantitative assessment is successfully applied by adoption of a 
subjective method, due to lack of failure probabilities of the BEs. 
 
 
2.5.3. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
 
 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a safety/risk analysis technique and logic diagram employed in the 
maritime and oil and gas industries to investigate the consequences of an accident or abnormal 
function of a system. An Event Tree (ET) is a logic diagram applied to analyse the effects of 
unintended events (Lavasani, 2010). Such a technique first expresses the probability or frequency 
of an accident linked to the safeguard measures required to be implemented to mitigate or 
prevent escalation after the occurrence of the event (Lavasani, 2010). This involves the study of 
the complex relationships among the subsystems of the system given the occurrence of an 
initiating event (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). It is usually used in risk evaluation and analysis 
phases. Initiating event is defined as a postulated occurrence capable of leading to possible 
consequences (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). It could be loss of control point, representation of a 
hazard to be analysed or an unsatisfactory operating event or situation. ETA is developed 
diagrammatically using inductive bottom-up logic (Halebsky, 1989; Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). 
In ETA, probabilities are assigned to each branch of an event using historical data or expert 
judgement in order to estimate the occurrence probability of each possible consequence. Success 
and failure paths lead to various consequences with different magnitudes (Lavasani, 2010). The 
likelihood of each consequence can be obtained by multiplying the probability of occurrence of 
the accident by likelihood of failure or success in each path. ETA can be employed to investigate 
unknown effects from known causes (Godaliyadde, 2008; Villemeur, 1992).  
 
 
2.5.4. Bowtie Analysis 
 
 
The Bowtie analysis was developed at RISO national laboratories, Denmark, in the 1970‟s to 
specifically aid in the reliability and risk analysis of nuclear power plants in Scandinavian 
countries (Andrews and Ridley, 2002; Andrews and Ridley, 2001; Villemeur, 1992). Bowtie 
Analysis is formed when an ETA and FTA is combined together to investigate the cause and 
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consequence of a hazard happening in any environment or system. It is a vital tool for risk 
management of any hazard. It can also be called Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA). The 
purpose of the CCA is to identify chains of events that can result in undesirable consequences 
(Nwaoha, 2011). Bowtie analysis is employed in HAZID, risk evaluation and analysis phases. 
 
Bowtie analysis can be address as a deductive and inductive analysis because it is the 
combination of ETA and FTA, which are inductive and deductive techniques respectively. 
Construction of CCA diagrams starts with a choice of a critical event and the “consequence 
tracing” part of the CCA involves taking the initial event and following the resulting chains of 
events through the system (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The “cause identification” part of the 
CCA involves drawing the FT and identifying the minimal cut sets leading to the identified 
critical event (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The CCA diagram documents the failure logic of a 
system (Andrews and Ridley, 2001). Various researchers have employed the CCA tool in risk 
management exercise because of its ability to identify hazards (FTA) and consequences of the 
hazards (ETA) (Andrews and Ridley, 2002; Pauperas, 1991; Valaityte et al., 2009; Vyzaite et al., 
2006).  
 
 
2.5.5. Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study 
 
 
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) study is a HAZID technique. It can be used to assess the risk of 
marine and oil and gas systems. The HAZOP technique was developed in the 1970s by loss 
prevention engineers working for Imperial Chemical Industries at Tees-Side UK (Villemeur, 
1992; Smith, 2005). A HAZOP is an inductive technique. It is an extension of FMECA 
technique, which can be applied by a multidisciplinary team to stimulate systematic thinking for 
identifying potential hazards and operability problems in systems (Kumamoto and Henley, 
1992). It is mainly used to carry out a qualitative analysis in the intermediate stages of a design 
process to predictable hazards, thus it is an exploratory technique (Godaliyadde, 2008; Mauri, 
2000).  
 
It is used in detailed examination of components within a system to determine what would 
happen if the components were to operate outside their normal design mode conducted by a 
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group of specialists headed by a hazard analyst (Nwaoha, 2011). Each component will have one 
or more parameters associated with its operation such as “pressure”, “flow”, “temperature”, 
“composition”, “relief”, “level”, “phase” and “instrumentation” (Nwaoha, 2011). HAZOP 
involves a full detailed description of the system (up-to-date engineering drawings, line diagrams 
etc.) and full working knowledge of the operating arrangements (Godaliyadde, 2008). Wang and 
Trbojevic (2007) and McKelvey (1988), outlined the steps of hazards as follows: 
 
1. Define the scope of the study. 
2. Select the correct analysis team. 
3. Gather the information necessary to conduct a thorough and detailed study. 
4. Review the normal functioning of the process. 
5. Subdivide the process into logical, manageable sub-units for efficient study and confirm 
that the scope of the study has been correctly set. 
6. Conduct a systematic review according to the established rules for the procedure being 
used and ensure that the study is within the special scope. 
7. Document the review proceedings. 
8. Follow up to ensure that all recommendations from the study are adequately addressed.  
 
 
2.5.6. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
 
 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a HAZID technique. It is a qualitative approach which 
involves a mixture of inductive and deductive logic (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). It is performed 
to identify all the possible hazards that could be created by the system being designed (Nwaoha, 
2011). PHA was introduced in the 1966 after the Department of Defence of the United States of 
America requested safety studies to be performed at all stages of product development 
(Godaliyadde, 2008). It is the step used to identify the hazards of a system starting from when 
the system is about to be designed (Nwaoha, 2011). Results of PHA enable system designers to 
avoid many potential safety problems (Dowlatshahi, 2001).  
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Brainstorming technique and checklists are used to assist in identifying of hazards (Godaliyadde, 
2008). The obtained results are always presented in a tabular form. The procedures and steps of a 
PHA method are detailed below (Czerny et al., 2005; Nwaoha, 2011): 
 
 Perform brainstorming or review existing potential hazard lists to identify hazards associated 
with the system. 
 Provide a description of the hazards and mishap scenarios associated with them. 
 Identify causes of the hazards. 
 Determine the risk of the hazards and the mishap scenarios. 
 Determine if system hazard avoidance requirements need to be added to the system 
specification to eliminate or mitigate the risks. 
 
 
2.5.7. Risk Matrix 
 
 
Risk matrix is safety/risk analysis technique that can be used in qualitative risk assessment. This 
method facilitates HAZID and risk prioritization of large systems, since the system failure rate 
values are not needed (Nwaoha, 2011). It can be used in risk evaluation phase of any system. 
This safety/risk analysis method is mainly adopted in pre-comprehensive risk assessment 
exercise of a system. It possesses a mechanism that can be used to screen high risk hazards that 
requires further investigation using other risk/safety analysis techniques. The success of this 
method depends heavily on the multi-disciplinary team experience of the system under 
investigation (Nwaoha, 2011). 
 
This helps experts to focus on those high risk hazards for facilitation of the risk assessment 
exercise of any system. Tabular format is adopted in risk estimation associated with the hazards 
(Halebsky, 1989; Eleye-Datubo, 2006; IMO, 2007; Military Standard, 1993; Tummala and 
Leung, 1995). The table of a risk matrix technique is made of probability of failure and 
consequence of that failure and estimated risk value that can be used to evaluate any hazard of a 
system. The risk value is product of values of probability of failure and consequence of that 
failure. 
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2.6. Uncertainty in Risk Assessment 
 
Uncertainty is defined as lack of knowledge of the true value of a quantity or relationships 
among quantities (USEPA 2011). The types of uncertainties associated with risk analysis are 
scenario, model and input or parameter uncertainties (Cullen and Frey 1999). These uncertainties 
are described as follows (Cullen and Frey 1999): 
 
 Scenario uncertainty. It is associated with errors and omission, which result from incorrect 
or incomplete specification of the risk scenario to be evaluated.  
 Model uncertainty. It arises when the risk model relies on missing or improperly formulated 
processes, structures or equations. It is referred to limitations in the mathematical models or 
techniques that are developed to represent the system of interest.  
 Input or parameter uncertainty. It is associated with errors in characterizing the empirical 
values used as inputs to the model. It arises from random or systematic errors involved in 
measuring a specific phenomenon (e.g. statistical sampling errors associated with small 
sample sizes, if the data are based on samples selected with a random, representative 
sampling design) and the absence of an empirical basis for characterizing an input.  
 
In maritime context, inherent uncertainty can be caused by imperfect understanding of the 
domain, incomplete knowledge of the state of the domain at the time where a given task is to be 
performed, randomness in the mechanisms governing the behaviour of the domain, or a 
combination of these (Eleye-Datubo, 2006). Notable accidents have occurred in tank farm 
operations as evidenced in Table 2.1. The evaluation of safety/risk level of the tank farm 
operations posed a challenge, given the high level of uncertainties in the historical failure data 
associated with tank farm systems and subsystems. Various uncertainty treatment techniques are 
outlined as: 
 
 Fuzzy Set Theory. 
 
 Evidential Reasoning. 
 
 Bayesian Network. 
.  
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2.6.1. Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) 
 
 
Lofti A. Zadeh, introduced FST in 1965 (Zadeh, 1965). The algorithm is developed for 
uncertainty treatment and it has been successfully applied in various fields (Riahi, 2010; Durga 
Rao et al., 2007; Gao et al., 2008; Hatiboglu et al., 2010; Markowski and Mannan, 2009; Pillay 
and Wang, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Moreno and Pascual, 2009; Prato, 2007; Soman and Misra, 
1993; Soh and Yang, 1996; Sun and Collins, 2007; Yang and Soh, 2000; Sii et al., 2001; Soman 
et al., 1993; Liu et al., 2005; Wang, 1997; Wang, 2000; Wang et al., 2001; Wang et al., 1995; 
Wang et al., 2009; Zadeh, 1987 and Yang et. al., 2005). Fuzzy logic is the term used for ad-hoc 
applications of rules based on a simplified FST (Eleye-Datubo, 2006). Fuzzy logic is an 
extension of classical Boolean logic from crisp sets to fuzzy sets and is the first new method of 
dealing with uncertainty since the development of probability (Godaliyadde, 2008). Fuzzy logic 
is based on possibility theory. The theory is a mathematical formalization which enables 
representation of degrees of membership of members in sets (Eleye-Datubo, 2006). Fuzzy logic 
is based on the principle that every crisp value belongs to all relevant fuzzy sets to various 
extents, called the degrees of membership (Yang, 2006). Its applications in system safety and 
reliability analysis could prove to be useful since such an analysis often requires the use of 
subjective judgments and uncertain data (Lavasani, 2010).  
 
Fuzzy logic is a versatile tool that is tolerant of imprecise, ambiguous and vague 
data/information, and one for which its reasoning builds understanding into a process (Nwaoha, 
2011; Eleye-Datubo, 2006). It uses the concept of linguistic variables, and provides a framework 
for dealing with such variables in a systematic way (Nwaoha, 2011). The use of linguistic 
variables provides flexible modelling of imprecise data and information; and the fuzzy variables 
are used to facilitate gradual transition between states (Lavasani, 2010). This enables fuzzy logic 
to address uncertainty problems. A linguistic variable differs from a numerical variable in that its 
value is not numbers but words and sentences in natural or artificial language (Pillay and Wang, 
2003c).  
 
Fuzzy logic employs human analysis and linguistic variables to represent risks and model 
uncertainty inherent in natural language (Zadeh, 1965; Pam, 2010). It is therefore complimentary 
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to traditional safety analysis methodologies and can be an effective tool in dealing with ill-
defined and imprecise information, especially linguistic information (Duckstein, 1994; Pam, 
2010). Their successful applications have been proven in many applications (Riahi, 2010; Eleye-
Datubo, 2006; Godaliyadde et al., 2009; Pillay, 2001; Pillay and Wang, 2002; Pillay and Wang, 
2003; Wang et al., 1995; Wang et al., 1996; Wang, 1997; Wang, 2000; Sii et al., 2001; Ung et 
al., 2006; Yang et al., 2005). Fuzzy logic has many techniques such as discrete and continuous 
fuzzy sets, and FRB that can be used to address uncertainty problems and their successful 
applications depend on the experience of the experts and problem formulation. Most fuzzy logic 
applications use linguistic variables in estimation of failure probabilities of a system. Adoption 
of fuzzy logic in risk assessment is because of its unique properties such as (Godaliyadde, 2008; 
Eleye-Datubo, 2006; Nwaoha, 2011):  
 
 Risk or safety assessment may involve the use of linguistic terms. Fuzzy logic is a non-
probabilistic method and it can deal with linguistic terms using membership functions. 
Therefore, fuzzy logic may be used in risk or safety assessment. 
 It is a highly recognised uncertainty treatment method which can be used in situations where 
a high level of uncertainty is involved. 
   Fuzzy sets can give good results for modelling qualitative information based on a linguistic 
approach.  
 It is conceptually easy to understand with “natural” mathematics. 
 It is tolerant to vague or imprecise data. Its use of FST is particularly adapted to the 
representation and manipulation of imprecision and uncertainty of the linguistic labels that 
define the criteria of the classes. 
 It presents a flexible way of dealing with different forms of uncertainty. For example, there 
is a lot of freedom in choosing the membership functions of fuzzy sets. 
 It is more intuitive than differential equations and enables analysts and decision-makers to 
capture knowledge of how the system behaves in everyday linguistic terms (i.e. based on 
natural language). 
 Though making use of heuristics, the framework still offers a convenient way to express and 
make the most of the experience of experts‟ common sense knowledge. 
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 It has the ability to model any complex or highly non-linear function to any arbitrary degree 
of accuracy. 
 It is based on rules (i.e. rule base logic) that can be specified with a natural language. 
Basically, the laws are naturally broken down into individual IF-THEN statements that lend 
themselves to parallel processing. 
 
FRB method uses IF-THEN statement and expert knowledge in formation of rules meant for 
addressing any risk related uncertainty problems. A fuzzy IF-THEN rule is an IF-THEN 
statement in which some words are characterised by continuous membership functions (Pillay 
and Wang, 2003). More knowledge about the FRB method can be found in Chapter 3.  A fuzzy 
set is characterized by a membership function with membership values ranging between 0 and 1 
(Pillay and Wang, 2003). Notable fuzzy membership functions employed in uncertainty 
treatment of various problems are triangular, trapezoidal, sigmoid curve, generalized bell curve 
and gaussian curve membership functions (Godaliyadde, 2008; Nwaoha, 2011). Triangular and 
trapezoidal membership functions are commonly used in uncertainty treatment of risk 
assessment of a system because they are computationally effective (Zaili, 2006; Nwaoha, 2011; 
Godaliyadde, 2008; Sii et al., 2001; Ung et al., 2006). In Chapter 3, the FRB method is used in 
combination with FMEA for HAZID and risk evaluation systems/failures that posed to threaten 
effective tank farm operations. Furthermore, fuzzy logic in combination with FTA is used in 
failure and risk analysis of a leak detection system of tank farm in Chapter 4.  
 
 
2.6.2. Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
  
 
The ER algorithm is developed in the 1990s to deal with Multi-Criteria Decision Making 
(MCDM) challenges under uncertainty using the decision theory and the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) 
theory of evidence (Yang, 2001; Yang and Singh; 1994). The D-S theory is a theory of evidence 
that can aggregate different evidences together using their Degree of Beliefs (DoBs). It is well 
suited for handling incomplete assessment of uncertainty that is either quantitative or qualitative 
in nature (Godaliyadde, 2008). The ER is unique from other techniques because it uses a belief 
structure to represent an assessment as a distribution. Its mechanism can be used to assess and 
combine various levels of a system or condition to reveal the highest level based on evaluation 
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grades associated with the DoBs. The ER has been proved to be a useful tool in many decision 
making applications, including risk assessment problems (Godaliyadde et al., 2009; Liu et al., 
2005; Sönmez et al., 2001; Tang et al., 2004; Wang et al., 1995; Wang et al., 1996; Wang, 1997; 
Wang, 2000; Wang and Yang, 2001; Yang, 2001; Yang et al., 2005; Yang and Singh, 1994; 
Yang and Xu, 2002; Xu and Yang, 2005; Xu et al., 2006). The properties of ER are (Sönmez et 
al., 2001, Yang and Xu, 2002):  
 
 It is difficult to deal with both quantitative and qualitative criteria under uncertainty but ER 
provides an alternative way of handling such information systematically and consistently. 
 The uncertainty and risk surrounding a problem can be represented through the concept of 
DoB. 
 Both complete and incomplete information can be aggregated and modelled by using a belief 
structure. 
 The ER algorithm is integrated into a software package called Intelligent Decision System 
(IDS) (Xu and Yang, 2005). It is a graphically designed decision support tool. The IDS allows 
decision makers to build their own models and input their own data. 
 The IDS software enables users to provide results of evaluation both in tabular and graphical 
forms.  
 
 
2.6.3. Bayesian Networks (BNs). 
 
 
Bayesian networks (BNs) was developed in the 70s at Stanford University (McCabe et al., 
1998). The first application of the BN was carried out by Munin (Andreassen et al., 1989). It has 
been used extensively to model real world problems as evidenced in the works of Oliver and 
Smith (1990), Ottonello et al. (1992), Burnell and Horvits (1995), Szolovits and Pauker, (1993) 
and Russell and Norvig, (1995). It has also been used to address maritime risk and reliability 
assessment under uncertainty by Eleye-Datubo (2006), Riahi et al. (2012), Yang  et al. (2008) 
and Yang (2006). BNs is also called "Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs)", "Belief Networks", 
"Causal Probabilistic Networks", "Causal Nets", "Graphical Probability Networks", and 
"Probabilistic Cause-Effect" (Riahi, 2010). It is an artificial intelligence technique that aims to 
provide a decision-support framework for problems involving uncertainty, complexity and 
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probabilistic reasoning (Riahi, 2010; Neapolitan, 1990). BN is a graphical representation of a 
probability distribution over a set of variables and it consists of two parts such as the directed 
network structure in the form of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and a set of the joint probability 
distributions, one for each node, conditional on each value combination of the parents (Riahi, 
2010).  
 
A BN is usually made up of a set of nodes and directed edges. Each node is used to represent a 
probability distribution. The probability distribution may be "continuous" or "discrete" type. 
Nodes also represent random variables, while edges/arcs represent probabilistic correlation 
between the variables. A variable, which is dependent on other variables, is called a "child node". 
Directly preceding variables are termed "parents". Nodes that have no parents, are termed "root 
nodes", while the ones without children are named "leaf nodes". Edges/arcs are used to show 
conditional probabilistic dependence so that the probability of a dependent variable being in a 
particular state is given for each combination of the states of the preceding variables. The 
dependence structure is thus represented by a set of conditional probability distributions (Riahi, 
2010).  
 
According to Wang and Trbojevic (2007), a generic BN model solution should therefore be 
defined to describe the functions, features, characteristics and attributes which are common or 
relevant to the problem under concern. Building the model should consist of the following 
(Wang and Trbojevic, 2007):  
 
 Create nodes.  
1. Generate list of relevant issues (facts, variables, decisions, payoffs, costs).  
2. Identify key nodes and their possible states.  
3. Insert these nodes into the network pane and label them.  
 Add and label the states for each node. Use short descriptive names for the states.  
 Identify relationships between nodes; draw links.  
 Review the developed scenario model.  
1. Check the logical implications of the links drawn. Be sure that all utility nodes have a 
decision node as an ancestor.  
2. Look for ways to introduce conditional independence into the network.  
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3. Avoid combinatorial explosions (ie the problem of too many parents with too many 
states).  
4. Revise network structure accordingly.  
   Approximate probability and utility values to be entered into the node tables.  
   Compile and revise as needed.  
 
 
 
2.7. Decision Making Techniques 
 
 
Decision making is an important phase in risk management of maritime operations. Once a risk 
that posed to be a threat to operations of maritime systems and subsystems is identified, decision 
making on best solution that can reduce the risk as low as reasonable practicable, need to be 
taken. This can be facilitated using MCDM techniques or optimization techniques. They can 
address single objective or multi objective decision making risk reduction challenges. The 
relevance of various MCDM techniques in risk-based decision making problems have been 
demonstrated in various applications (Arslan, 2009; Arunraj and Maiti, 2010; Chan and Kumar, 
2007; Chang et al., 2008; Guy et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2003; Lim et al., 2004; Riahi, 2010; Pillay 
and Wang, 2003; Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1990; Saaty, 2004; Saaty and Vargas, 2001; Yuen et al., 
2012; Song et al., 2004; Lavasani et al., 2011b; Jee and Kan, 2000; Deng et al. 2000; Tsaur et 
al., 2002). Such powerful engineering tools have been fully utilised in this research (See Chapter 
5). The mechanisms of the MCDM techniques are used to address decision making challenges in 
risk management of tank farm operations. Descriptions of various MCDM techniques as a stand-
alone and in combination with other MCDM, uncertainty treatment and traditional risk/safety 
analysis techniques are detailed in Sub-sections 2.5.2, 2.6.1, 2.6.2 and 2.6.3. The notable MCDM 
techniques are: 
 
 Evidential Reasoning (ER). 
 
 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 
 Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS). 
 
 Expected Utility Theory. 
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 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) 
 
 
2.7.1. Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
 
 
Saaty (1980) introduced AHP as a multi-criteria decision making tool. Since then, AHP has been 
proven to be a viable tool for tackling multi-criteria decision making problems, evidenced from 
the research carried out in various fields by many researchers (Riahi, 2010; Arslan, 2009; Yuen 
et al., 2012; Song et al., 2004; Lavasani et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2008; Guy et al., 2006; Lim et 
al., 2003; Lim et al., 2004; Chan and Kumar, 2007; Chang, 1996; Chen and Hwang, 1992; 
Cheng, 1994; Cheng et al., 1999; Kuo et al., 2002; Kwong and Bai, 2003; Lee, 1996; Leung and 
Cao, 2000).  The AHP decomposes a decision problem into a hierarchy of associated elements 
(Yuen et al., 2012).  
 
In port operations, Yuen et al. (2012) used AHP methodology to explore the relative importance 
of factors that determine container port competitiveness from the users‟ perspective. In their 
research, three groups of port users such as shipping liners, forwarders and shippers are 
considered. The importance of the various factors is determined via the AHP techniques and the 
results they obtained were used to evaluate ports in Mainland China, Hong Kong and other Asian 
cities. Other port problems have been addressed using AHP model as evidenced in Song et al. 
(2004); Lirn et al. (2003, 2004); Guy et al. (2006); and Chang et al. (2008). AHP model has also 
been employed as one of the decision support tool for spread mooring system selection. In the 
works of Mentes and Helvacioglu (2012), the AHP method is used to analyse the structure of the 
mooring system selection problem and determine the weights of the attributes. Risk and safety 
related problems have been addressed using AHP model. For example, Lavasani et al. (2011b) 
used AHP model in estimation of weights required for grouping non-commensurate risk sources 
in analysing fuzzy risk assessment of oil and gas offshore wells. Arsan (2009) used the AHP 
model for prioritizing precautions that will guide the clarification of the risk assessment option 
needed for proactive approach, in order to prevent marine casualties. The AHP model revealed 
appropriate management tool that can increase the level of safety for chemical tankers during 
cargo operations at a terminal.  
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The successful applications of the AHP in multi-criteria decision making problems lie on its 
mechanism and experts involves in the study. The AHP can be described using step by step 
approach. The AHP steps are: 
 
1. Identification and definition of a multi-criteria decision making problem (i.e. overall goal). 
2. Identification of criteria and decision alternatives that made up the multi-criteria decision 
making problem and the relationship between each criterion and decision alternatives. 
3. Diagrammatical representation of all the overall goal, criteria and decision alternatives in 
one structure, showing their relationship with one another in a hierarchical structural form. 
The hierarchy structure must be arranged in a way that each criterion of a level in the 
hierarchy would be related to the decision alternatives/elements at the adjacent levels and 
there is no hypothesized relationship between the elements of different groups at the same 
level (Cheng and Li, 2001). 
4. Pairwise comparison of all the criteria and decision alternatives with respect to their levels in 
the developed hierarchical structure using a defined numerical rating and expert judgement. 
The pairwise comparison exercise of each set of criteria or decision alternatives level is 
presented in a matrix form and each of the paired criteria or decision alternatives in the 
matrices is compared. This is used to facilitate each criterion and decision alternatives 
weight estimation exercise. 
5. Estimation of weights of the criteria or decision alternatives. The weights can be estimated 
by addition of all the values in each of the column of the pairwise comparison matrix, 
followed by dividing each criterion or decision alternative values in the matrix by total 
added values in the column. Finally, calculate the mean of the values of a criterion or 
decision alternatives in each row. 
6. Conduction of consistency ratio for each level of criteria and decision alternatives in the 
hierarchical structure. The weights estimate of criteria and decision alternatives are 
acceptable if the consistency ratio associated with them is less than 0.1, otherwise the 
exercise need to be reviewed. 
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The usefulness of the AHP model is extended in Chapter 5. The mechanism of the model is used 
to demonstrate how to select best safety improvement measure for leak detection system of tank 
farm operations. 
 
 
2.7.2. Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) 
 
 
TOPSIS method was introduced for the past three decades by Hwang and Yoon (1981) as a 
powerful multi-criteria decision making tool. Its crisp version was introduced by Chen and 
Hwang in 1992 (Chen and Hwang, 1992). In the works of Yoon and Hwang (1981), TOPSIS was 
developed using the principle that a selected option should have the shortest distance from the 
positive ideal reference point (PIRP) and the farthest distance from the negative ideal reference 
point (NIRP). TOPSIS method uses weighted normalised decision matrix to identify the positive 
ideal solution (PIS) and negative ideal solution (NIS). In the weighted normalised decision 
matrix, the criteria/attributes are usually monotonic. The cost criteria are defined as the most 
desirable candidate scoring at the lowest and benefit criteria are described as if more desirable 
the candidate, the higher its score verses this criterion (Wang and Chang, 2007). This facilitates 
identification of the PIS and NIS. NIS is a combination of all the best attribute values attainable 
and NIS is a combination of all the worse attribute values attainable (Yoon and Hwang, 1995).  
 
TOPSIS has been proved to be one of the best methods in addressing rank reversal issue (Pam, 
2010; Bottani and Anthony, 2006). It has also been proved to be insensitive to the number of 
alternatives (Pam, 2010). According to Rahman (2012), the advantages of the TOPSIS method 
are: 
 
 Ability to identify the best alternative quickly. 
 Simple and rationally comprehensive concept. 
 Good computational efficiency. 
   Ability to measure the relative performance of each alternative in a simple mathematical 
form. 
 Large flexibility in the definition of the choice set. 
 A sound logic that represents the rationale of human choice. 
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 A simple computational process that can be easily programmed into a spreadsheet.  
 
Usefulness of the TOPSIS technique has been recorded in works of Wang and Chang (2007). 
The researchers used the model to evaluate and select initial training aircraft. The method was 
also employed by Bottani and Rizzi (2006) in solving outsourcing of third party logistics service 
providers problems. Jee and Kan (2000) utilised TOPSIS method in materials selection, while 
Deng et al. (2000) used it to address evaluation of competitive companies. It has also been 
evidenced in Tsaur et al., (2002) that TOPSIS method can be used in the assessment of service 
quality in the airline industry. Other relevance of TOPSIS method have been revealed in works 
of Wu (2007), Aghajani et al. (2008), Mahmoodzadeh et al. (2007), Mohammad et al. (2010), 
Balli and Korukoglu (2009), Olson (2004) and Wang et al. (2005). Wu (2007) used the TOPSIS 
model to address supply chain management problem, while loading haulage equipment selection 
challenges is subdued using the aforementioned TOPSIS method by Aghajani et al. (2008). 
Mahmoodzadeh et al. (2007), Mohammad et al. (2010) and Balli and Korukoglu, (2009) have 
used TOPSIS method in addressing project selection, foreign direct investment and computer 
systems problems.  
 
Applications of combination of AHP and TOPSIS methods have been demonstrated in various 
applications (Rahman, 2012; Pam, 2010; Lavasani, 2010). An AHP-TOPSIS model has been 
utilised in the work of Rahman (2012). The researcher used the model in selection of the most 
efficient steaming speed of containerships. The strength of AHP-TOPSIS model is also 
demonstrated in subjective evaluation of ballast water decision alternatives by Pam (2010). The 
weights of criteria associated with ballast water such as safety, cost, practicability, environmental 
acceptability and biological effectiveness are revealed using the AHP technique, while TOPSIS 
method is used to select the best ballast water alternatives such as surface filtration, 
hydrocyclones, chlorination, biocides, ultra-violet irradiation (UVI) and filtration + UVI. The 
usefulness of combination of the AHP and TOPSIS techniques is also extended to the works of 
Lavasani (2010). In the research, the best Risk Control Option (RCO) for oil and gas offshore 
wells with respect to cost and benefit is selected using the AHP-TOPSIS model.  
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2.7.3. Expected Utility Theory 
 
 
Yang (2001) developed expected utility theory with the aim of adopting an utility approach in 
obtaining a single crisp number for each option. This facilitates the ranking of the options. 
Expected utility theory uses the evaluation grades and associated decree of beliefs (DoBs) to 
estimate the crisp numbers of assessed systems or operations. It suits well in ranking of risk-
based hazards as evidenced in Chapter 3.  The success of the algorithm have been recorded in the 
works of  Riahi (2010), Riahi et al. (2012), Yang (2010), Godaliyadde (2008), Yang (2006), 
Zhou et al. (2010), Yang and Xu (2002). The characteristics of the expected utility theory are 
described as follows:  
 
 In situations where 
1nH  
is preferred to
nH ,  1nHu  must be greater than  nHu .  
 The utility value,  nHu of evaluation grade, nH , is estimated using experts preference.  
 The utility value,  nHu of evaluation grade, nH , is assumed to be equidistantly distributed 
in normalised utility space, in situation where no preference information is available.  
 Its mechanism can be used to estimate crisp number for situation where safety/risk 
assessment of a system is either complete or incomplete. 
 The least preferred evaluation grade,
 n
H  with the lowest utility is denoted as  1Hu .  
 The most preferred evaluation grade with the highest utility is denoted as  NHu .  
 It is developed for only characterising an assessment and not for aggregation of criteria.  
 
 
2.7.4. Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) 
 
 
MAUT was first developed by Edwards (1954, 1961), Fishburn (1968), Feridman and Savage 
(1952) and Keeney and Raiffa (1976) as a MCDM method used for estimation of the utilities of 
multiple objectives. The mechanism is used to take decisions on different problems after analysis 
of the utilities that are given a set of well-defined objectives. According to Keeney (1974), 
MAUT is essentially an extension of Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT). In the works of 
Loken (2007), MAUT is described as a more rigorous approach for incorporation of risk 
preferences and uncertainty into multi criteria decision support methods. It is used to assists in 
46 
 
providing solution of problems, where a plethora of factors are involved and their assessment is 
essential to the final outcome (Yang, 2006). The seven steps of MAUT framework are outlined 
as follows (Edwards and Newman, 1982):   
 
 Identify objectives and functions.  
 Identify stakeholders.  
 Identify attributes and construct value trees.  
 Assess relative importance of attributes.  
 Ascertain location measures.  
 Aggregate weights and utilities.  
 Perform Sensitivity Analysis.  
 
The strength of MAUT has been used to address risk related problems (Amanda and Herath, 
2005; Limon et al., 2003; Wang et al., 1996). Other usefulness of the MAUT has been 
demonstrated in various publications (Zhang et al., 2003; Min, 1994; Talluri and Narasimhan, 2003; 
Platts et al., 2002; Khan et al., 2004;  Linares, 2002; Von, 1982; McDaniels, 1995; Erkut and Verter, 
1998). MAUT is superior to other MCDM techniques because of its robustness in problem 
formulation, preferences and probabilities. In other words, it has mechanism that can analyse and 
formulate problems with imprecision. Problem formulation is associated with the set of available 
alternatives, which are not fixed but can be extended (Korhonen, et al., 1986; Yang, 2006).). 
Preference can be expressed in an imprecise and intransitive way, which gives the scope for more in 
depth analysis of the plausible scenarios under study (Fishburn, 1991; Yang, 2006).). Probabilities 
provide decision makers with the ability to conduct robust analysis and facilitate the creation of a set 
of alternatives which will determine the future course of actions depending on the assumptions made 
and prevailing conditions at the time the actions need to be taken (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993; Yang, 
2006). Other MCDM techniques such as case-based reasoning, data envelopment analysis, simple 
multi-attribute rating technique, goal programming, ELECTRE, PROMETHEE and simple additive 
weighting can be found in the works of Velasquez and Hester (2013).  
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2.8. Conclusions 
 
 
In this chapter, detailed critical review has been carried out, focusing on the tank farm accidents, 
rules and regulations governing tank farm operations and safety, HAZID and risk assessment of 
tank farm operations, various safety/risk assessment techniques, and uncertainty treatment and 
decision making techniques.  The number of tank farm accidents experienced so far in the world, 
provided need for the research and the most catastrophic ones are described in details using 
tabular form. International organizations such as API, AIChE, ASME, IMO and NFPA that have 
contributed in ensuring tank farm operational safety in one way or the other are also identified 
and their roles are explained.  
 
The traditional safety/risk analysis techniques that can be employed in tank farm operational risk 
assessment are discussed. These include FMECA, FTA, ETA, Bowtie Analysis, HAZOP, PHA 
and Risk Matrix. Their relevance in risk assessment are described and supported with relevance 
literature. Brainstorming, FMEA and FTA techniques are engaged in the HAZID and risk 
management of tank farm operations in this research. Their qualitative and quantitative 
assessment potentials are fully utilized in this research. An advanced computing technique such 
as fuzzy logic for uncertainty treatment and a multi-criteria decision making technique such as 
AHP and TOPSIS are outlined. Their usefulness on the subject under investigation is discussed. 
 
The scientific assessment methods adopted in this research can be used to facilitate HAZID and 
risk/safety management of very large and complex tank farm operations under uncertainty. 
Experts involved in tank farm operational risk assessment have been provided with versatile 
proactive tools demonstrated in this innovative research, evidenced from the three novel 
chapters. They are outlined as enabling FMEA-FRB methodology in analysing tank farm 
operational hazards (Chapter 3), incorporation of FFT model to failure analysis of leak detection 
system of tank farm operations (Chapter 4), and optimal safety improvement of tank farm 
operations via AHP-TOPSIS methodology (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 3 - Enabling Failure Mode Effect Analysis - Fuzzy Rule Based 
(FMEA-FRB) Methodology in Risk Evaluation and Prioritization of Tank 
Farm Operational Hazards 
 
 
 
 
Summary  
 
 
Maritime industry has in recent years, as a result of increased trade volumes in crude oil 
globally, witnessed a higher need and utilization of tank farms, especially in ports/terminals. 
Tank farms are industrial installations used for the storage of crude oil, petroleum products and 
other hazardous materials for transportation to users or processing. The tank farms are prone to 
accidents because of the sensitive and complex nature of their operations. Failure of tank farm 
operational systems such as leak detection device/system, pipe corrosion protection system, 
automatic tank gauge system, automatic shut-down oil safety valve and secondary containment 
monitoring system, can result in losses amounting to huge sums of money, human lives or down 
time in operations. Therefore, it is necessary to perform a risk/safety assessment and analysis on 
these vital industrial facilities. In this regard, a subjective technique such as FMEA-FRB 
methodology will be used for the development of generic HAZID and risk evaluation framework 
based on the safety principles of the IMO.  
 
 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
 
 
The ports handle transport related operations, including the discharge and transfer of liquid 
cargo, such as oils, gasoline, petrochemicals, from vessels to tank farms (marine-based storage 
systems). The tank farms are usually located in ports in order to enhance logistics and facilitate 
the processing of liquid bulk and liquefied gases (Ronza et al., 2007). A safety management 
system is a necessity in tank farm operations in view of the hazardous nature of the substances 
and to prevent accidents that can lead to fatalities, injuries, loss of lives and so on. The IMO 
recognized the urgency of safety situation in marine activities, including the discharge operations 
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of liquid cargo and proactively adopted the FSA with the aim of attaining improved maritime 
safety performance. The application of FSA has achieved noticeable acceptability as a method 
for enhancing decision making in the industry (Wang, 2001). The ranking of origin of accidents 
in ports/terminals put the movement of containers and equipment as number one, while placing 
accidents in tank farms and other locations where hazardous materials are stored in second 
position (Darbra et al., 2004). It is noteworthy, that lack of failure rates data in most cases, has 
made the risk assessment of tank farm operations very difficult. 
 
In this chapter, a comparatively effective and reliable risk assessment technique such as FMEA 
in combination with FRB model will be used to address the problem of uncertainty in risk 
estimation of tank farm operations. The FMEA can provide a systematic method of examining 
all the ways in which failure of tank farm operations can occur. Therefore, its failure analysis is 
conducted using the components of FMEA such as severity, occurrence and detection. The FRB 
will be incorporated in the components of FMEA to subdue uncertainty challenges of failure 
rates data of the causes of tank farm operational failure. In view of this, 125 rules will be 
developed and used in the risk evaluations of the causes/failure modes of tank farm operational 
failures. The crisp number of the experts judgement on the tank farm operational failures will be 
obtained using Weighted Mean of Maximum (WMoM) defuzzification method for effective 
ranking of their Priority for Attention of Hazard (PAH) (i.e. Risk Priority Number (RPN)).  
 
 
 
3.2.  Background Analysis 
 
 
The review of storage tanks accidents showed that, fire and explosion account for 85% of the 
accidents (Chang et al., 2006). The December 11th, 2005 Buncefield Oil Storage Depots disaster 
is a worrisome accident that attracts a review of tank farm operation (Buncefield Incident, 2005). 
Another accident is the storage tank explosion and fire in Glenpool, Oklahoma (Pipeline 
Accident Report, 2003). These accidents would have been prevented if a predictive model such 
as the FMEA-FRB is used in uncertainty treatment of risk assessment of tank farm operations.  
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The FMEA and FRB have been used as a standalone or in combination with each other in 
solving various maritime challenges (Chin et al., 2009a; Chin et al., 2009b; Pam et al., 2013; 
Pillay and Wang, 2003; Ung et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2002). The literature 
review of applications of FMEA in combination with other methods/algorithms has been carried 
out in Chapter 2. In this research, the strength of FMEA-FRB model such as effective risk 
ranking of failure modes/hazards is extended in tank farm operational failure modes/hazards. 
Four experts involved in this study, described risk parameters (i.e. Occurrence Likelihood of 
Hazard (OLH), Consequence Severity of Hazard (CSH) and Detectability of Hazard (DH)) of 
FMEA with five linguistic terms and developed 125 IF-THEN rules for effective prediction of 
the risk rank of tank farm operational hazards/failure modes.    
 
 
 
3.3.  Hazards of Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
Aboveground Storage tanks (AST) and Underground Storage Tanks (UST) are tank farms 
commonly in use today. In ports, tank farms are provided with adequate storage capacity for port 
efficiency (Merk et al., 2012). To achieve the objectives of efficient tank farm operations, the 
safety management must be taken as a vital function.  In the maritime industry, HAZID is carried 
out using risk and safety analysis techniques (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Though, it depends on 
the subject under investigation and experience of the experts involved in the process. The tank 
farm hazards can come in the form of failures that may arise from some of the important 
operational elements in the system. These could be failures in systems such as leak detection 
device, pipe corrosion protection system, automatic tank gauge system, automatic shut-off oil 
safety valve and secondary containment monitoring. These systems are vital in the determination 
of the efficiency and safety of tank farm operations. It has been recognized that major source of 
accidents in tank farm operations are fire and explosion, which are caused by leakages and 
failures in the aforementioned systems. Such accidents can be catastrophic to the port personnel, 
environment and maritime systems. In fact, leakages represent an increasing danger to the 
maritime environment because of toxic nature of the petroleum hydrocarbons that could leak 
from the tanks.  
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In this research, a brain storming technique and thorough literature search is used to identify the 
tank farm operational failure modes/hazards as evidenced in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. According 
to Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, the identified major hazards/failure modes of tank farm operations 
are automatic shut-off oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic 
tank gauge system failure, leak detection device/system failure and secondary containment 
monitoring failure. The experts used in the brainstorming exercise, have equal experiences of 
tank farm operations. They are described as follows: 
 
1. Expert #1: He is a marine engineer and works at Nigerian Ports Authority. He has more than 
10 years experience in ports and tank farm operations. 
2. Expert #2: A senior operations manager at the MRS Oil & Gas Tank Farm, Lagos Nigeria 
with more than 10 years experience on the job. 
3. Expert #3: A principal manager at the Nigerian Ports Authority with more than 10 years 
experience in ports, marine and commercial operations. 
4. Expert #4: A technical assistant to the Managing Director, Nigerian Ports Authority with 
more than 10 years experience in ports and marine operations. 
 
 
 
3.4.  Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
 
 
FMEA is a risk, safety and reliability analysis tool used for identifying and evaluating failure 
modes of a system. The technique originated as a formal step-by-step procedure for the 
systematic evaluation of the severity of potential failure modes in the 1960s (Yang et al., 2008). 
In the work of Stamatis (1995), FMEA is described as an engineering technique for defining, 
identifying and eliminating known or potential failures, problems and errors in a system, design, 
process or service. FMEA has been successfully applied in the maritime risk assessment (Yang 
et al., 2008; Chin et al., 2009a, Chin et al., 2009b, Pillay and Wang, 2003, Pam et al., 2013; Ung 
et al., 2009) and other industries (Guimaraes and Lapa, 2007; Stamatis, 1995). Failure mode is a 
specific manner in which the item under investigation could malfunction (BS, 1986; Wang and 
Trbojevic, 2007). The riskiness of a failure mode of a system can be predicted through the RPN. 
A failure mode of a system associated with high RPN is riskier than the failure mode with low 
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RPN. Therefore, priority for attention on a failure mode with high RPN should be higher than 
others in order to ensure effective allocation of available safety improvement resources. RPN can 
be defined as product of failure consequence probability, failure consequence severity and failure 
consequence detectability of the failure mode of a system (Pam et al., 2013; Ung et al., 2009). 
Mathematically, RPN can be expressed as follows: 
 
RPN = OLH  CSH  DH                      (3.1) 
 
where, OLH = Occurrence Likelihood of a Hazard  
CSH = Consequence Severity of a Hazard 
             DH = Detection of a Hazard 
 
A comprehensive traditional FMEA application on risk assessment of maritime system 
operations follows the procedures below (Pillay and Wang, 2003):  
 
 Develop a good understanding of what the system is supposed to do when it is operating 
properly. 
 Divide the system into sub-systems and/or assemblies in order to „localise‟ the search for 
components. 
 Use blue prints, schematics and flow charts to identify components and relations among 
components. 
 Develop a complete component list for each assembly. 
 Identify operational and environmental stresses that can affect the system. Consider how 
these stresses might affect the performance of individual components. 
 Determine failure modes of each component and the effects of failure modes on assemblies, 
sub-systems, and the entire system. 
 Categorise the hazard level (severity) of each failure mode (several qualitative systems have 
been developed for this purpose). 
 Estimate the probability. In the absence of solid quantitative statistical information, this can 
also be done using qualitative estimates. 
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 Calculate the RPN: the RPN is given as the multiplication of the index representing the 
probability, severity and detectability. 
 Determine if action needs to be taken depending on the RPN. 
 Develop recommendations to enhance the system performance. 
 Summarise the analysis in tabular form. 
 
The level of uncertainties associated failure rate data of tank farm operations keeping on 
increasing due to complexity of the modern engineering systems. To overcome this challenge, 
FRB methodology will be incorporated in FMEA methodology in the next section of this 
research for effective address of the subject under investigation. 
 
 
3.5.  Failure Mode Effect Analysis - Fuzzy Rule Based (FMEA-FRB)   
 
 
Incorporating FRB model in safety/risk assessment of tank farm operations using the FMEA tool 
can treat uncertainties associated with tank farm operational failure rates data; and address the 
drawbacks of the traditional FMEA as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The flow of information in 
Figure 3.1 starts from the definition of tank farm operations, followed by identification of 
hazards associated with the operations. The next step is to review if all the tank farm operational 
hazards have been identified. Once all the hazards have been identified, their risk parameters 
such as OLH, CSH and DH will be defined. The next step is to check if all the risk parameters 
have been identified. If the risk parameters are acceptable, the triangular membership functions 
of OLH, CSH and DH described as antecedent part and the triangular membership function of 
PAH (i.e. equivalent to RPN) described as consequent part are developed in fuzzy rule based 
environment.  In view of this, the antecedents (OLH, CSH and DH) and the consequent (PAH) 
are used to develop the 125 IF-THEN rules of the FRB. A review is carried out on the developed 
125 IF-THEN rules of the FRB to ensure all the rules have been identified before estimation of 
the fuzzy scale values of OLH, CSH and DH of each hazard. If the experts are more than one, 
combine their expert judgement to reveal fuzzy scale of the OLH, CSH and DH of the hazards. 
Use the revealed fuzzy scales of OLH, CSH and DH of hazards to identify the relevant rules of 
the developed 125 IF-THEN rules. Fire these relevant rules for risk estimation of the tank farm 
operational hazards. The next step is estimation of fuzzy conclusion of the fired IF-THEN rules 
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for each hazard of the tank farm operations using their belief degree and max-min method, 
followed by calculation of their expected utility values. The final step is to rank the the tank farm 
operational hazards using their expected utility values.       
 
 
Figure 3.1: Incorporation of FMEA-FRB Methodology in Hazard Analysis of Tank Farm 
Operations 
Definition of tank farm operations
Hazard Identification of the tank 
farm operations
Have all the hazards been 
Identified ?
Identify the parameters for risk estimation of the hazards 
of the tank farm operations (i.e. OLH, CSH and DH)
Develop triangular membership functions for the 
antecedents (i.e. OLH, CSH and DH) and the consequent 
(i.e. PA)
Have all risk estimation parameters 
been identified?
Use the antecedents (i.e. OLH, CSH and DH) and the 
consequent (i.e. PA) and their respective linguistic terms 
to develop the various IF-THEN rules of the FRB
Review of the developed IF-THEN rules of FRB
Have all the IF-THEN rules for risk estimation
 of the hazards of the tank farm operations
 been developed?
Eestimate the fuzzy scale value of the OLH, CSH and 
DH
Calculate fuzzy conclusions of the fired rules using max-min 
method and estimate expected utility values of the hazards
Fire the relevant rules for risks estimation of the hazards of the 
tank farm operations
Review and prioritize the hazards of the tank farm 
operations using their expected utility values 
Combine the experts judgement to reveal fuzzy 
scale values of OLH, CSH and DH
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Are the experts more 
than one?
Yes
No
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The drawbacks of the traditional FMEA can mislead experts and stakeholders involved in the 
subject under investigation if not address. The shortcoming of traditional FMEA can be 
described as follows (Pam et al., 2013; Ung et al., 2009; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Ben-Daya and 
Raouf, 1996; Gilchrist, 1993):  
 
 The same RPN value can be assigned to failure modes/hazards, produced by various set of 
OLH, CSH and DH but their risk implications differ. Such information can mislead decision 
makers. 
 The ranking of the RPN overlooks the relative importance among OLH, CSH and DH. They 
are assumed to have the same importance. In most practical cases, the RPN assigned to a 
failure mode/hazard is arguable and not acceptable. 
 Assignment of a score to the possible failure occurrence rate and detection rate does follow 
any precise algebraic rule. 
 There is no rationale in obtaining the RPN value of a failure mode/hazard as a product of 
OLH, CSH and DH. 
 
FST was first proposed by Zadeh in 1965, and its objective is to help in making decisions 
characterized by imprecise information (Ung et al., 2009). It provides a systematic way of 
interpreting linguistic variables in a natural decision-making procedure (Zadeh, 1965). FST was 
developed by Zadeh to provide an approximate and yet effective means of describing the 
behaviour of situations which are too complex to allow mathematical analysis (Pam et al., 2013). 
It employs human analysis and linguistic variables to represent risks and model uncertainty 
inherent in natural language (Zadeh, 1965; Pam et al., 2013). The fuzzy logic is a logic 
developed from the FST, which uses a range from 0 to 1 to express the degree of truth of a 
sentence (Nwaoha, 2011). Fuzzy logic systems are knowledge/rule based systems constructed 
from human knowledge in form of Fuzzy IF-THEN rules (Wang, 1997). According to Nwaoha 
(2011), Zadeh (Zadeh, 1965), Mamdani (1974), Takagi and Sugeno (Sugeno and Kang, 1988; 
Sugeno and Yasukawa 1993), and Kosko (Kosko, 1994; Kosko, 1997), the fuzzy logic algorithm 
have been strengthened via development of a FRB technique. The IF-THEN rules of FRB can be 
fuzzified using membership functions (Mamdani, 1974; Sugeno and Kang, 1988; Sugeno and 
Yasukawa 1993; Kosko, 1994; Kosko, 1997, Jones et al., 2009; Pam et al., 2013; Nwaoha, 2011; 
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Yang et al., 2008; Ung et al., 2009; Eleye-Datubo, 2006; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii et al., 
2001). Fuzzy sets are represented by membership functions on the universe of (X) and in 
different shapes (Pam et al., 2013). The notable fuzzy membership functions employed in 
addressing maritime risk are trapezoid and triangular types (Pam et al., 2013; Nwaoha, 2011; 
Yang et al., 2008; Ung et al., 2009; Eleye-Datubo, 2006; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii et al., 
2001).  
 
In this research, a triangular membership function is used. A membership function is a curve that 
defines how each point in the input space is mapped to a membership value (often indicated on 
the vertical axis) starting at 0 (no membership) and continuing to 1 (full membership) (Pam et 
al., 2013), as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The horizontal axis of Figure 3.2 shows the scale values at 
which the curve is develop. Each curve (triangle) in Figure 3.2 is used to define a linguistic term 
(i.e. “Excellent”, “Very Good”, “Good”, “Average”, “Poor”). The fuzzy membership function 
values of a scale value depend on the shapes of the triangles. It can be determined by drawing a 
straight line from the chosen scale value (i.e. 3.44) to the apex of Figure 3.2. The drawn straight 
line normally cuts across the triangles used in defining the linguistic terms as shown in Figure 
3.2. The point of interception between the drawn straight line and the triangles in Figure 3.2 is 
used to locate the fuzzy membership function values representing the scale value (i.e. 3.44). 
Therefore, the fuzzy membership function values are (0.75, “Very  Good”; 0.25, “Good”) as 
illustrated in Figure 3.2.   
 
 
  
                Figure 3.2: A Typical Diagram of Fuzzy Membership Function  
   0                      1.25                    2.5             3.44 3.75                   5.0 
1.0 
              Poor                      Average                    Good                    Very Good           Excellent 
0.75 
0.25 
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3.5.1. IF-THEN Rules Development 
 
 
IF-THEN statement is used in rule development of the FRB model. The IF-THEN statement has 
consequent and antecedent parts (Nwaoha, 2011; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Yen and Langari, 
1999).  The values of the antecedent part determine the values of the consequent part. The IF part 
is called antecedent while the THEN part is called consequent (Nwaoha, 2011). The IF-THEN 
statement can be described as “IF<antecedent>THEN<consequent>” (Nwaoha, 2011; Pillay and 
Wang, 2003; Yen and Langari, 1999). If antecedent part is associated with more than one 
linguistic term, a logic connector such as AND, OR and NOT can be used to connect them 
(Nwaoha, 2011; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Yen and Langari, 1999). In this study, there is more 
than one linguistic term used to describe the antecedent part as illustrated in Figures 3.3 - 3.5 and 
Tables 3.1 - 3.3 respectively. The consequent part is also described with more than one linguistic 
term as shown in Table 3.4. The meanings of the linguistic terms of the risk parameters used in 
this research are explained in Tables 3.1 - 3.4.  
 
                              
                        Figure 3.3: A Membership Function for Linguistic Terms of OLH 
 
 
AND logic connector is used to connect/link the linguistic terms of the antecedents (i.e. the risk 
parameters (OLH, CSH and DH) of tank farm operations) because of their nature. There are five 
linguistic terms used to describe the OLH, CSH and DH as shown in Tables 3.1 - 3.3. A RPN 
can be described as a PAH in the IF-THEN rules used in this research because a PAH value 
indicates the riskiness of a failure mode/hazard over another failure mode/hazard. Higher PAH 
   0                         1.25                       2.5                     3.75                      5.0 
1.0 
             Very Low                  Low                      Average                      High                Very High 
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value indicates higher risk of a failure mode/hazard and vice versa. The number of linguistic 
terms used to describe each of the antecedents (i.e. OLH, CSH and DH) determines the number 
of the IF-THEN rules that is developed. The numbers of IF-THEN rules in this research are the 
multiplication of the number of linguistic terms used to describe OLH, CSH and DH. Since five 
linguistic terms are used to describe OLH, CSH and DH, 125 IF-THEN rules (i.e. 555  ) are 
developed (see Appendix 3A for details). 
 
 
                                   
                          
                             Figure 3.4: A Membership Function for Linguistic Terms of CSH 
     
 
                                    
  
                            Figure 3.5: A Membership Function for Linguistic Terms of DH 
 
 
   0                          1.25                    2.5                        3.75                   5.0 
1.0 
              Negligible            Marginal                Moderate                  Critical            Catastrophic 
   0                            1.25                    2.5                       3.75                   5.0 
1.0 
    Highly Unlikely               Unlikely         Reasonably Likely           Likely            Highly Likely 
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                                            Table 3.1: Ratings/Categories of OLH 
 
Category/Rating Linguistic Term Meaning of the Linguistic Term  
        1 Very Low The hazard of tank farm operations is unlikely to 
occur in lifetime of the system 
        2 Low The hazard of tank farm operations might occur 
few times in lifetime of the system. 
        3 Average The hazard of tank farm operations is likely to 
occur more than once or occasional in lifetime of 
the system. 
        4 High The hazard of tank farm operations is likely to 
occur from time to time in lifetime of the systems. 
        5 Very High It is certain; there will be frequent occurrence of 
the hazard of tank farm operations. 
 
                                              
                                            Table 3.2: Ratings/Categories of CSH 
 
Category/Rating Linguistic Terms Meanings of the Linguistic Terms  
        1 Negligible The occurrence of the hazard may have no or minor 
impact or effect on the tank farm operations. 
        2 Marginal The occurrence of the hazard would have minor 
impact or effect on the tank farm operations. 
        3 Moderate The occurrence of the hazard would have multiple 
impact or effect on the tank farm operations. 
        4 Critical The occurrence of the hazard would have major 
impact or effect on the tank farm operations. 
        5 Catastrophic The occurrence of the hazard would lead to total loss 
of tank farm operations.  
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                                           Table 3.3: Ratings/Categories of DH 
 
Category/Rating Linguistic Terms Meanings of the Linguistic Terms  
        1 Highly Unlikely The chance of detecting the hazard of the tank farm 
operations is very low. In most cases, the hazard can 
be detected when the productivity of the tank farm 
operations has collapsed or system loss.  
        2 Unlikely The chance of detecting the hazard of tank farm 
operations is low. In most cases, the hazard can be 
detected when the productivity of tank farm 
operations is found to be in low level. 
        3 Reasonably 
Likely 
The chance of detecting the hazard of tank farm 
operations may be possible. In most cases, the hazard 
can be detected when there are major effects/impacts 
on the productivity of the tank farm operations.  
        4 Likely It is possible to detect the hazard of tank farm 
operations in time. In most cases, the hazard can be 
detected when the productivity of the tank farm 
operations is found not to be in optimal level. 
        5 Highly Likely The hazard can be detected when the productivity of 
the tank farm operation is still in optimal level. In 
most cases, the hazard can be detected by visual 
inspection. 
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                        Table 3.4: Categories and Meanings of Linguistic Terms of PAH 
 
Linguistic 
Term 
Meanings of the Linguistic Term  
Very Low The hazard of tank farm operations needs no or little attention.  
Low The hazard of tank farm operations needs minor attention. 
Moderate The hazard of tank farm operations needs average or more attention. 
High The hazard of tank farm operations needs high attention. 
Very High The hazard of tank farm operations needs major or very high attention. 
                            
 
 
3.5.2. Estimation of Fuzzy Conclusion 
 
 
The fuzzy conclusion of an expert in maritime risk assessment can be estimated using max-min 
method (Pam et al., 2013; Nwaoha, 2011; Yang, 2008; Ung et al., 2009; Eleye-Datubo, 2006; 
Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii et al., 2001; Yen and Langari, 1999). The approach is utilized in 
estimation of the fuzzy membership function value of the consequent part of the 125 IF-THEN 
rules used in tank farm operational risk assessment. The max-min method is applied by selecting 
the minimum fuzzy membership function value of the antecedent part (i.e. OLH, CSH and DH) 
of relevant IF-THEN rules as the fuzzy membership function value of the consequent part (i.e. 
PAH). Then, selection of the maximum fuzzy membership function value of the same linguistic 
term in the relevant IF-THEN rules follows. Finally, the resultant fuzzy membership function 
values of the consequent part (i.e. PAH) are associated with their respective linguistic terms and 
identified as fuzzy conclusion of risk estimation of tank farm operational hazard/failure by an 
expert. In a situation where experts are more than one, and they have equal experience as in the 
case of this study, their risk assessment judgement of tank farm operational hazards/failure 
modes can be combined using the formula as follows:  
 
kiA  = 

n
j
ijkijaw
1
    ni .........2,1                                                                                                   (3.2)    
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   where, 
kiA  = Is the aggregated weighted ratings of a risk parameter k for failure mode/hazard i 
produced after n experts‟ judgement that have equal tank farm operational 
experience are combined. It is called the fuzzy scale value. 
  ijka  = Rating of a failure mode/hazard i by jth expert judgement and j   n . 
              ijw  = Weight of jth expert involved in rating of a failure mode/hazard i and j   n .   
 
                                                                                                 
3.5.3. Expected Utility Approach 
 
 
Ranking of hazards/failure modes of tank farm operations can be carried out using their crisp 
numbers in order to clarify their risk implications. The expected utility approach developed by 
Yang (2001) can be used to reveal the crisp values of the fuzzy conclusions of the hazards/failure 
modes of tank farm operations. In this research, detailed description of this method is necessary 
to facilitate its application in tank farm operations. Suppose nH  is the evaluation grade and 
 nHu  is the utility value of evaluation grade, nH . According to Yang (2001),  nHu  and 
 1nHu >  nHu  if 1nH is preferred to nH .  nHu  is estimated using experts preference. In 
situations where no preference information is available and  nHu  is assumed to be equidistantly 
distributed in normalised utility space,   nHu  can be equal to 11  Nn  ( Nn ..,.........1 ). 
According to Riahi et al. (2012),   nHu ( Nn ..,.........1 ) that are equidistantly distributed in a 
normalised utility space can be calculated using the formula below. 
 
 
minmax
min
VV
VV
Hu nn


                                                                                                                                          (3.3) 
 
Where nV  stands for ranking value of the evaluation grade, nH  been considered. maxV is 
described as the ranking value of the most preferred evaluation grade/linguistic term NH . minV  is 
described as the ranking value of the least preferred evaluation grade/linguistic term, 1H . In 
situation where safety/risk assessment of a system is complete, 0H . H  stands for 
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incomplete assessment. This can be mathematically represented as 


N
n
nH
1
1  . Where n  is 
the belief degree assigned to each evaluation grade, nH . When 0H , the expected utility 
value of safety/risk level of a system can be calculated as follows: 
 
                                                             
                                                                                                 (3.4)                                                              
 
In situations, where 0H , belief interval   Hnn  ,  is formed. This provides the 
likelihood that  ES  is assessed to evaluation grade, nH . Therefore, the average utility value can 
be used to calculate the expected utility value of safety/risk level of a system. Average utility 
value is an average of minimum and maximum utility values. The minimum, maximum and 
average utility are denoted as   ESumin ,   ESumax  and   ESuaverage . The mathematical 
descriptions are (Yang (2001)): 
 
             11
2
min HuEEHuEESu Hn
N
n
n  

                                                            (3.5) 
 
             NHNn
N
n
n HuEEHuEESu  


1
1
max                                                          (3.6) 
 
  
 
2
)( minmax EuEuESuaverage

                                                                                         (3.7) 
 
The least preferred evaluation grade/linguistic term with the lowest utility is denoted as  1Hu . 
The most preferred evaluation grade with the highest utility is denoted as  NHu . Expected 
utility theory is developed for only characterising an assessment and not for aggregation of 
criteria. Additionally, each   ESu  or   ESuaverage  is used to reveal the risk rank of a failure 
mode/hazard of tank farm operations.         
 
    )()(
1
n
N
n
n HuEESu 

 
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3.6.  Illustration of Application of Failure Mode Effect Analysis-Fuzzy Rule Based (FMEA-
FRB) Methodology in Risk Analysis of Tank Farm Operations.  
 
 
Safe operations of tank farm lies on the efficiency of various systems such as automatic shut-off 
oil safety valve, pipe corrosion protection system, automatic tank gauge system, leak detection 
device and secondary containment monitoring system. Assessments and prioritization of risks 
associated with these systems will contribute in improving the safety of tank farm operations via 
allocation of available resources for safety management of the systems.  
 
  
3.6.1. Hazard Identification (HAZID) of Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 involved in this study used the brainstorming method to identify 
hazards/failure modes of tank farm operations in marine environment as automatic shut-down oil 
safety valve failure, leak detection device/system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, 
pipe corrosion protection system failure and secondary containment monitoring system failure. 
These hazards can affect the optimal operations of the tank farm operations if attention is not 
given to them. The implications of the occurrence of these hazards (i.e. failures of these systems) 
can be catastrophic to the environment and personnel at the port and onboard marine vessel. 
Therefore, their PAH ranks need to be identified in marine environment under uncertainties.  
 
  
3.6.1.1. PAH Rank Estimation of Automatic Shut-down Oil Safety Valve Failure by 
Experts under Uncertainty. 
 
 
The PAH rank estimation of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure in risk/safety 
assessment of tank farm operations need to be identified in this research. To address this 
problem, PAH rank estimation of leak detection/system failure by Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 can 
be described as follows:  
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3.6.1.1.1. Experts Judgement in Fuzzy Environment 
 
 
The fuzzy scale values for OLH, CSH and DH can be estimated using Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 
respectively and Equation 3.2. In view of this, Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 with equal experience 
of the subject under investigation used Table 3.1 to rate/estimate occurrence likelihood of 
automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure as high. Numerical value for high is 4 in Table 3.1. 
Therefore, the fuzzy scale value for OLH denoted as 11A  is calculated using Equation 3.2 as 
follows:  
 
1411413113121121111111 awawawawA   
 
425.0425.0425.0425.011 A  
 
      = 4.0 
 
In a similar way, the fuzzy scale value for CSH denoted as 12A  can be estimated. To achieve this, 
Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 rated consequence severity of automatic shut-down oil safety valve 
failure as marginal, marginal, moderate and marginal respectively. Their equivalent numerical 
values are 2, 2, 3 and 4 respectively as shown in Table 3.2. In view of this, 12A  can be calculated 
as follows: 
 
1421413213122121121112 awawawawA   
 
225.0325.0225.0225.012 A  
 
      = 2.25 
 
Similar approach is adopted in finding 13A . In this case, the Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 rated the 
detectability of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure as reasonably likely with numerical 
value of 3. Therefore, 13A  is found as follows: 
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1431413313123121131113 awawawawA   
 
325.0325.0325.0325.013 A  
 
      = 3.0 
 
Therefore, 4.0, 2.25 and 3.0, which are the fuzzy scale values of OLH, CSH and DH 
respectively, can be used to estimate their respective fuzzy membership function values as shown 
in Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8.  In view of this, the fuzzy membership function values of OLH, CSH 
and DH are identified as (0.75, “high”; 0.25, “very high”), (0.8, “moderate”; 0.2, “marginal”) 
and (0.6, “reasonably likely”; 0.4, “likely”) respectively in their corresponding Figures 3.6, 3.7 
and 3.8. To find the fuzzy conclusions of all Experts‟ judgements, relevant rules in the 125 rules 
of PAH of tank farm operations need to be fired. In this study, 8 rules are relevant and can be 
identified as follows: 
 
  
 
Figure 3.6: A Membership Function for OLH of Automatic Shut-down Oil Safety Valve Failure 
  
Rule #18: IF OLH is high, CS is moderate AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #23: IF OLH is very high, CS is moderate AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #94: IF OLH is high, CS is marginal AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
   0                          1.25                    2.5                       3.75  4.0             5.0 
1.0 
             Very Low                 Low                        Average                     High                Very High 
0.75 
0.25 
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Rule #99: IF OLH is very high, CS is marginal AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #118: IF OLH is high, CS is marginal AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #119: IF OLH is high, CS is moderate AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #123: IF OLH is very high, CS is marginal AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #124: IF OLH is very high, CS is moderate AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
                  
  
Figure 3.7: A Membership Function for CSH of Automatic Shut-down Oil Safety Valve Failure 
     
The 8 rules are fired by incorporating the fuzzy membership functions values of the linguistic 
terms associated with OLH, CSH and DH in them, using the information found in Figures 3.6, 
3.7 and 3.8 respectively. The fuzzy membership functions values of the linguistic terms 
associated with PAH in the fired 8 rules can be calculated using the min-max method. Therefore, 
the fired 8 rules in fuzzy environment can be described as follows: 
 
Rule #18: IF OLH is (0.75, “high”), CSH is (0.8, “moderate”) AND DH is (0.6, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.6, “moderate”). 
Rule #23: IF OLH is (0.25, “very high”), CSH is (0.8, “moderate”) AND DH is (0.6, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.25, “moderate”). 
Rule #94: IF OLH is (0.75, “high”), CSH is (0.2, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.4, “likely”), THEN 
PAH is (0.2, “high”).   
   0                          1.25             2.25  2.5                    3.75                   5.0 
1.0 
              Negligible          Marginal                 Moderate                  Critical            Catastrophic 
0.8 
0.2 
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Rule #99: IF OLH is (0.25, “very high”), CSH is (0.2, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.4, “likely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.2, “high”). 
Rule #118: IF OLH is (0.75, “high), CSH is (0.2, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.6, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.2, “moderate”). 
Rule #119: IF OLH is (0.75, “high”), CSH is (0.8, “moderate”) AND DH is (0.4, “likely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.4, “high”). 
Rule #123: IF OLH is (0.25, “very high”), CSH is (0.2, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.6, 
“reasonably likely”), THEN PAH is (0.2, “moderate”). 
Rule #124: IF OLH is (0.25, “very high”), CSH is (0.8, “moderate”) AND DH is (0.4, “likely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.25, “high”). 
 
 
                                        
 
Figure 3.8: A Membership Function for DH of Automatic Shut-down Oil Safety Valve Failure 
 
 
In Rule #18, PAH is (0.6, “moderate”) because 0.6 is the minimum of 0.75, 0.8 and 0.6 (i.e. min 
(0.75, 08, 0.6)). Where 0.75, 0.8 and 0.6 are fuzzy membership function values of OLH, CS and 
DH respectively. OLH, CS and DH are associated with linguistic terms such as “high”, 
“moderate” and “reasonably likely” respectively. The fired Rule #23, Rule #94, Rule #99, Rule 
#118, Rule #119, Rule #123, and Rule #124 are explained in the same way.  
  
Since the minimum fuzzy membership functions values of linguistics terms associated with 
OLH, CS and DH on each of the 8 fired rules have been found as shown above (i.e. belief 
   0                          1.25                      2.5     3.0            3.75                   5.0 
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degrees/fuzzy values of PAH), then the maximum values of each of the categories of linguistics 
terms associated with PAH can be calculated as: 
 
For “moderate” linguistic term of PAH; 
 
max (0.6, 0.25, 0.2, 0.2) = 0.6. 0.6 is now the belief degree/fuzzy value associated with 
“moderate” linguistic term of PAH, described as fuzzy conclusions of Experts #1 - #4. 
 
For “high” linguistic term of PAH; 
 
max (0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.25) = 0.4. 0.4 is now the belief degree/fuzzy value associated “high” 
linguistic term of PAH, described as fuzzy conclusions of all Experts judgements. 
 
Therefore, the PAH estimated belief degrees/fuzzy values of automatic shut-down oil safety 
valve failure can be described as {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0.4, “high”), 
(0, “very high”)}. This result can be used to estimate the PAH rank of automatic shut-down oil 
safety valve failure in risk/safety assessment of tank farm operations.  
 
 
3.6.1.1.2. Expected Utility Value for PAH of Automatic Shut-down Oil Safety Valve 
Failure  
 
 
It has been revealed that the PAH belief degrees/fuzzy values of automatic shut-down oil safety 
valve failure is described as {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0.4, “high”), (0, 
“very high”)}. This shows that the assessment of the automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure 
is complete. That is, 0H . In view of this, the expected utility value of automatic shut-down 
oil safety valve failure can be revealed using combination of Equations 3.3 and 3.4 as follows: 
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Where 1V , 2V , 3V , 4V  and 5V  ranked as  1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively are for evaluation grades, 
very low, low, moderate, high and very high. Therefore, maxV = 5 and minV = 1. The fuzzy 
conclusions of {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0.4, “high”), (0, “very high”)} 
means that 0, 0, 0.6, 0.4 and 0 associated with the evaluation grades stand for 1 , 2 , 3 , 4  
and 5  respectively. Therefore,   ESu  of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure can be 
found as expressed below. 
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             = 0.3 + 0.3 
 
             = 0.6    
 
Therefore, PAH rank (i.e. crisp value) of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure in tank 
farm operations is 0.6. 
 
 
3.6.1.2. PAH Rank Estimation of Pipe Corrosion Protection System Failure by Experts  
under Uncertainty 
 
 
Pipe corrosion protection system failure is one of the failure modes (hazards) of tank farm 
operations. The risk rank need to be estimated in fuzzy environment using the judgement of 
Experts #1 - #4. In this study, the fuzzy conclusions of PAH of pipe corrosion protection system 
failure are described as (0.15, “very low”) and (0.85, “low”) using procedures and methods 
adopted in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.1 (See Appendix 3B). This means that the PAH estimated 
belief degrees/fuzzy values of pipe corrosion protection system failure is described as {(0.15, 
“very low”), (0.85, “low”), (0, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very high”)}.  Adopting similar 
methods used in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.2, the PAH rank (i.e. crisp value) of pipe corrosion 
protection system failure of 0.2125 is revealed in Appendix 3B.  
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3.6.1.3. PAH Rank Estimation of Automatic Tank Gauge System Failure by Experts under 
Uncertainty 
 
 
Automatic tank gauge system failure has contributed more or less significantly in hindering 
optimal operations of tank farm and its riskiness has not been determined under uncertainty. In 
this research, the riskiness of automatic tank gauge system failure in fuzzy environment has been 
revealed in Appendix 3C. In Appendix 3C, the fuzzy conclusions of PAH of automatic tank 
gauge system failure are (0.4, “low”) and (0.6, “moderate”) using the procedures and methods in 
Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.1. Therefore, the PAH belief degrees/fuzzy values of automatic tank 
gauge system failure is described as {(0, “very low”), (0.4, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0, 
“high”), (0, “very high”)}. PAH rank (i.e. crisp value) is found as 0.4 using the procedures and 
methods in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.2.  
 
 
3.6.1.4. PAH Rank Estimation of Leak Detection Device/System by Experts under 
Uncertainty 
 
 
Investigation of the safety level of tank farm operations showed that leak detection 
device/system failure is one of the causes of tank farm operational failures. Predictions of the 
levels of risk parameters such as OLH, CSH and DH of leak detection device/system failure in 
uncertain marine environment are difficult. To address this problem, experts have carried out 
detailed estimations of the data associated with the aforementioned risk parameters using FRB 
model in Appendix 3D. It has been revealed in Appendix 3D that the fuzzy conclusions of PAH 
of the leak detection device/system failure are (0.45, “moderate”) and (0.55, “high”) using the 
procedures and methods in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.1. Therefore, the PAH belief degrees/fuzzy 
values of leak detection device/system failure can be described as {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), 
(0.45, “moderate”), (0.55, “high”), (0, “very high”)}. It has also been revealed in Appendix 3D 
that the PAH rank (i.e. crisp value) of leak detection device/system failure is 0.6375 using the 
procedures and methods in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.2. 
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3.6.1.5. PAH Rank Estimation of Secondary Containment Monitoring System Failure by 
Experts under Uncertainty 
 
 
Failure of secondary containment monitoring system can affect the operations of tank farm more 
or less than other hazards. The PAH rank of secondary containment monitoring system failure 
need to be identified in order to ascertain how it reduces the efficiency and safety level of tank 
farm operations more than other tank farm hazards. In view of this, the fuzzy conclusions are 
found as (0.6, “moderate”) and (0.4, “high”) in Appendix 3E using the procedures and methods 
in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.1. Therefore, the fuzzy conclusions can be described in details as {(0, 
“very low”), (0, “low”), (0.55, “moderate”), (0.45, “high”), (0, “very high”)} to facilitate 
estimation of PAH rank of secondary containment monitoring system failure. The expected 
utility theory used in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.2, is employed in estimation of the PAH rank (i.e. 
crisp value) of secondary containment monitoring system failure as evidenced in Appendix 3E. 
A crisp value of 0.6125 is produced. 
 
 
3.6.2. Ranking of Hazards of the Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
Ranking of hazards of tank farm operations will be based on estimated expected utility values 
(i.e. crisp values) of PAH associated with them. The hazards that need more attention than others 
can be identified via the ranks of the crisp values of PAH associated with them in Table 3.5. Any 
failure mode/hazard with highest crisp value, is ranked 1 and need more attention than other ones 
because is the riskiest failure mode/hazard. Such decision can be taken using Table 3.5. Table 
3.5 can be described as follows: 
 
 Risk level of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure is estimated using triangular fuzzy 
membership function, which resulted to Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 fuzzy conclusion of {(0, 
“very low”), (0, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0.4, “high”), (0, “very high”)}, PAH crisp value 
of 0.6 and rank of 3. 
 Risk level of pipe corrosion protection system failure is estimated using triangular fuzzy 
membership function, which resulted to Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 fuzzy conclusion of 
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{(0.15, “very low”), (0.85, “low”), (0, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very high”)}, PAH 
crisp value of 0.2125 and rank of 5. 
 Risk level of automatic tank gauge system failure is estimated using triangular fuzzy 
membership function, which resulted to Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 fuzzy conclusion of {(0, 
“very low”), (0.4, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very high”)}, PAH crisp value 
of 0.4 and rank of 4.  
 Risk level of leak detection device/system is estimated using triangular fuzzy membership 
function, which resulted to Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 fuzzy conclusion of {(0, “very low”), 
(0, “low”), (0.45, “moderate”), (0.55, “high”), (0, “very high”)}, PAH crisp value of 0.6375 
and rank of 1. 
 Risk level of secondary containment monitoring system failure is estimated using triangular 
fuzzy membership function, which resulted to Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 fuzzy conclusion of 
{(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.55, “moderate”), (0.45, “high”), (0, “very high”)}, PAH 
crisp value of 0.6125 and rank of 2.  
 
                   Table 3.5: Risk-Based Ranks of Hazards of the Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
It has been revealed in Table 3.5, that leak detection device/system failure is the failure 
mode/hazard that is riskier than others with expected utility value (i.e. PAH crisp value) and rank 
Hazard of Tank Farm 
Operations 
Fuzzy 
Membership 
Type/Form 
Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 Fuzzy 
Conclusion  
Expected 
Utility Value of 
PAH (i.e. Crisp 
Value)  
Rank  
of  
PAH 
Automatic shut-down oil 
safety valve failure 
Triangular {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.6, 
“moderate”), (0.4, “high”), (0, “very 
high”)} 
0.6000 3 
Pipe corrosion protection 
system failure  
Triangular {(0.15, “very low”), (0.85, “low”), 
(0, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, 
“very high”)}   
0.2125 5 
Automatic tank gauge 
system failure 
Triangular {(0, “very low”), (0.4, “low”), (0.6, 
“moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very 
high”)} 
0.4000 4 
Leak detection 
device/system failure 
Triangular {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.45, 
“moderate”), (0.55, “high”), (0, 
“very high”)} 
0.6375 1 
Secondary containment 
monitoring system failure 
Triangular {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.55, 
“moderate”), (0.45, “high”), (0, 
“very high”)} 
0.6125 2 
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of 0.6375 and 1 respectively. Therefore, leak detection device/system failure needs more 
attention than other failure modes/hazards. 
 
 
3.6.3. Results Verification 
 
 
The model of a risk and safety problem needs to be verified via sensitivity analysis, in order to 
ascertain the relevance of the model. In this research, the model is verified and acceptable if the 
two axioms described below are satisfied.                                         
 
 Axiom 1. Increment of “very low” belief degree by 0.1 and decrement of highest belief 
degree by 0.1 of safety/risk level expression of a hazard, should result in decrease of the 
expected utility value. 
 Axiom 2. Increment of “very high” belief degree by 0.1 and decrement of 0.1 from highest 
belief degree of safety/risk level expression of a hazard, should result in increase of the 
expected utility value. 
 
In Table 3.5, the safety/risk level of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure is described as 
{(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0.4, “high”), (0, “very high”)} with expected 
utility value of 0.6. Increment of the belief degree of “very low” by 0.1 and decrement of highest 
belief degree by 0.1 of safety/risk level of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure produced 
a new safety/risk level of {(0.1, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.5, “moderate”), (0.4, “high”), (0, 
“very high”)} for automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure. Substitution of the belief degree 
values (i.e. 0.1, 0, 0.5, 0.4, 0) of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure in Equation 3.4, 
produced expected utility value of 0.55. This is in harmony with Axiom 1, therefore Axiom 1 is 
satisfied.  
 
In a similar way, the safety/risk levels of pipe corrosion protection system, automatic tank gauge 
system, leak detection device and secondary containment monitoring system are 
modified/developed and described as {(0.25, “very low”), (0.75, “low”), (0, “moderate”), (0, 
“high”), (0, “very high”)}, {(0.1, “very low”), (0.4, “low”), (0.5, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, 
“very high”)}, {(0.1, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.45, “moderate”), (0.45, “high”), (0, “very 
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high”)}, and {(0.1, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.45, “moderate”), (0.45, “high”), (0, “very high”)} 
respectively. Substitution of their belief degrees values in Equation 3.4, produced their respective 
expected utility values. These expected utility values are 0.1875, 0.35, 0.5625 and 0.5725 for 
pipe corrosion protection system, automatic tank gauge system, leak detection device and 
secondary containment monitoring system respectively. It has been revealed that expected utility 
values of 0.2125, 0.4, 0.6375 and 0.6125 for pipe corrosion protection system, automatic tank 
gauge system, leak detection device and secondary containment monitoring system have 
decreased to 0.1875, 0.35, 0.5625 and 0.5725 respectively. This is in line with Axiom 1, 
therefore  Axiom 1 has been satisfied.  
 
Increment of “very high” belief degree by 0.1 and decrement of 0.1 on highest belief degree of 
safety/risk level expression of automatic shut-off oil safety valve found in Table 3.5, produced  
{(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.5, “moderate”), (0.4, “high”), (0.1, “very high”)}. Therefore, 
substituting (0, 0, 0.5, 0.4, 0.1) in Equation 3.4, resulted to expected utility value of 0.65 for 
automatic shut-off oil safety valve. Similar approach is applied on the safety/risk levels of pipe 
corrosion protection system, automatic tank gauge system, leak detection device and secondary 
containment monitoring system described in Table 3.5. Therefore, their safety/risk levels can 
now be described as {(0.15, “very low”), (0.75, “low”), (0, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0.1, “very 
high”)}, {(0, “very low”), (0.4, “low”), (0.5, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0.1, “very high”)}, {(0, 
“very low”), (0, “low”), (0.45, “moderate”), (0.45, “high”), (0.1, “very high”)} and {(0, “very 
low”), (0, “low”), (0.45, “moderate”), (0.45, “high”), (0.1, “very high”)} respectively. Their 
respective expected utility values of 0.65, 0.2875, 0.45, 0.6625 and 0.6725 are produced using 
Equation 3.4. It has been shown that the expected utility values of automatic shut-off oil safety 
valve, pipe corrosion protection system, automatic tank gauge system, leak detection device and 
secondary containment monitoring system increased from 0.6, 0.2125, 0.4, 0.6375 and 0.6125 
respectively, to 0.65, 0.2875, 0.45, 0.6625 and 0.6725. This is in line with Axiom 2, therefore 
Axiom 2 has been satisfied.  
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3.7.  Conclusions 
  
 
This research has demonstrated that the FMEA-FRB model can effectively prioritise risks of 
failure modes/hazards of tank farm operations under uncertainties. Relevant rules in the 
developed 125 FRB IF-THEN rules are fired and used to facilitate uncertainty treatments of the 
risk parameters (i.e. OLH, CSH and DH) of tank farm operational failure modes/hazards in the 
FMEA structure. The tank farm operational hazards/failure modes are automatic shut-down oil 
safety valve failure, leak detection device/system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, 
pipe corrosion protection system failure and secondary containment monitoring system failure. 
The fuzzy conclusions of the PAH of tank farm operational failure modes are estimated via max-
min method. The fuzzy conclusions of the experts for each hazard are converted to crisp number 
using expected utility theory. In the FMEA-FRB model, the crisp value of the PAH of a failure 
mode/hazard of tank farm operations is described as the RPN. Therefore, experts concluded that 
the leak detection device/system failure is the riskiest failure mode/hazard of the tank farm 
operations, evidenced by the crisp value of the PAH in Table 3.5. Leak detection device/system 
failure is associated with a crisp value of PAH, 0.6125 and rank of 1, whereas the crisp values of 
PAH of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion protection system failure, 
automatic tank gauge system failure, and secondary containment monitoring system failure are 
0.6000, 0.6375, 0.4000 and 0.2125 respectively. In view of this, further investigation on the 
causes of leak detection system failure will be carried out in the next chapter under uncertainties.  
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Chapter 4 - Incorporation of Fuzzy Fault Tree (FFT) Model to Failure 
Analysis of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm Operations  
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
In this research, the implication of the growth and operations of tank farms in the storage of 
petroleum products in port environment is examined. There is no doubt that tank farms play an 
important role in the logistics of petroleum products and have gained strategic importance in 
recent years. The tank farms in ports, oil refineries and petrochemical plants usually contain 
hazardous material and damage to them, can result in a catastrophic consequence. Such damage 
could be caused by failures in a system such as leak detection device. Therefore, it is necessary 
to analyze these failures in the realm of uncertainty in order to identify and quantify their causes. 
In view of this, a FFT model is employed for the failure analysis of tank farm operations.  
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
 
Failure of tank farms can result to catastrophic consequences. In Chapter 3, the failure of leak 
detection system was identified as the one with the highest risk, when a FMEA-FRB 
methodology was used in the risk estimation exercise of the tank farm operations. In this study, 
an analysis of the causes of leak detection system of tank farm operations under uncertainty is 
undertaken. The failure analysis exercise will be successful via the use of FTA model in 
combination with fuzzy logic. The FTA model will be used to illustrate the causes of the leak 
detection system failure, while fuzzy logic will address uncertainties due to lack of failure rate 
data.     
 
Use of fuzzy FT model in failure analysis of leak detection system produces comprehensive 
causes of the system, so as to select appropriate SCDs in future work. It is useful to tank farm 
users in identifying hazards and protecting against them. FT is mainly use to demonstrate the 
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failure logic of a system, thereby facilitating the evaluation of failure probabilities of the system 
as evidenced in various applications (Dong and Yu, 2005; Huang et al., 2004; Guimarees and 
Ebecken, 1999; Lin and Wang, 1997; Sawer and Rao, 1994; Liang and Wang, 1993; Suresh et 
al., 1996; Cheng and Mon, 1993; Cai et al., 1991; Singer, 1990). To develop a FT, one needs to 
know the failure rate data of the basic events (BEs).  In situations where there are lack of failure 
rate data, experts involved in the failure analysis of a system, need to employ fuzzy logic 
methods to address the uncertainty. The feasibility of such combination will be demonstrated in 
this chapter.  
 
 
 
4.2.  Background Analysis 
 
 
The rapid growth in demand for petroleum product has led to expansion and building of tank 
farms in port environment. The increasing size and complexity of tank farms has made it difficult 
to carry out comprehensive failure analysis of tank farm operations. To overcome such 
challenge, a combination of FTA and fuzzy logic has been adopted because of the break through 
of the methodology in various fields. The aforementioned methods have been proved to be useful 
in the works of Lavasani et al. (2011a); Ping et al. (2007); Pan and Wang (2007); Shu et al. 
(2006); Dong and Yu (2005); Huang et al. (2004); Guimarees and Ebecken (1999); Lin and 
Wang (1997); Sawer and Rao (1994); Liang and Wang (1993). The importance of these methods 
have also been demonstrated in Suresh et al. (1996); Cheng and Mon (1993); Cai et al. (1991); 
Singer (1990); Onisawa (1988); Misra and Weber (1990); Furuta and Shiraishi (1984); Tanaka et 
al. (1983) and Celik et al. (2010). The literature reviews of the FFT tool in Chapter 2 have 
proved that the tool can solve uncertainty problems. Therefore, the model will be adopted in 
risk/failure analysis of leak detection system of tank farm operations. Firstly, an FTA of leak 
detection system of tank farm operations will be developed in order to identify the causes/failure 
modes and their failure logics. Expert judgement will be used to incorporate the fuzzy model on 
the FTA to facilitate the identification of fuzzy possibility and probability of each BE. 
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4.3.  Leak Detection System of Tank Farm Operations  
 
 
A leak detection system is one of the systems that make up tank farm operations. Monitoring the 
tank farm for leaks is required by stalk holders and regulatory bodies. Failure of such system to 
detect any leak during tank farm operations could lead to catastrophic consequences. Therefore, 
understanding its mode of operations contributes in providing optimal safety for the tank farm 
operations. The leak detection system mainly alerts the tank farm operator whenever a leak is 
experienced via shutting off the flow of petroleum products through the piping system, so that 
appropriate action can be applied immediately. Failure to perform such function means the 
system is functioning abnormally. Leak detection system is usually installed in the product line 
or in/near the pump head (State Water Resources Control Board, 2000). 
 
 
 
4.4. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Methodology 
 
The FTA technique involves the decomposition of a system into a logic diagram or FT in which 
certain primary events lead to a specified Top Event (TE) that signifies the total failure of the 
system (Sawer and Rao, 1994). The FTs can be used to find the Minimal Cut Sets (MCSs) 
which, when coupled with the failure rates of the primary events, lead to an estimation of the 
reliability of the system (Sawer and Rao, 1994). In this study, two type of gate is used in 
quantification of FTA. The gates are “AND” and “OR”.   
The failure logics and basic events of a FTA determine how the FTA can be quantified. An FTA 
without repeated events can be quantified using Equations 4.1 and 4.2. Equation 4.1 can be used 
in quantification of an FTA that is made of “AND” gates only and has no repeated events; while 
Equation 4.2 can be used to calculate an FTA that is made of “OR” gates only and has no 
repeated events.   
TEF Pr  = 

n
i
iBEF
1
Pr                                                                                                            (4. 1) 
 
where TEF Pr  = Failure probability (FPr) of TE. 
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iBEF Pr  = Failure probability (FPr) of ith basic event ( iBE ). 
                       n = Number of BEs that made up the AND gate. 
 
TEF Pr  = 1-  


n
i
iBEF
1
Pr1                                                                                               (4.2) 
 
 
where TEF Pr  = Failure probability (FPr) of TE. 
 
           
iBEF Pr  = Failure probability (FPr) of ith basic event ( iBE ). 
                       n = Number of BEs that made up the OR gate. 
In situations where there are repeated events in a FT, a new quantification formula needs to be 
introduced. In view of this, a FT can be described as a tree made up of MCSs; and MCSs are 
made of BEs. A TE of the FT can only occur when all or any of the BE occurs. It implies that TE 
can be described as follows (Andrew and Moss, 2002): 
TE =  
n
i in
MCMCSMCSMCS
121
...........

                                                             (4.3) 
Therefore, the formula for quantification of TEF Pr  of the FT with repeated events can be 
described as follows (Celik et al., 2010; Lavasani et al., 2011; Andrew and Moss, 2002): 
 
TEF Pr  =  NMCSMCSMCSF  ..........Pr 21               
     
 
   
   N
N
ji
N
MCSMCSMCSF
MCSMCSMCSMCSF
MCSMCSF
MCSFMCSFMCSF



...Pr1
...
....Pr
Pr
Pr....PrPr
21
1
31
21
21













         (4.4) 
 
 
 
4.5.  Fuzzy-Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) Methodology 
 
 
FFTA methodology is a combination of fuzzy logic and FTA techniques in order to address 
uncertainties due to lack of failure rate data. In this research, the methodology will be made 
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feasible in failure analysis of leak detection system of tank farm operations as evidenced in 
Figure 4.1. To facilitate the FFTA application, the procedures are detailed below. 
 
Definition of leak detection system of tank farm 
operations
Identification of the top event (TE) i.e. failure of leak 
detection of tank farm operations
Connections of failure modes/causes of the TE  using 
failure logic connectors such as AND and OR gates  
Identify and review the basic events (BEs) 
of the TE 
Are the failure logic of the TE reasonable? 
Identify the minimal cut sets (MCSs) using 
boolean algebra 
Assign failure probabilities 
(FPr) to the  BEs. 
Any uncertainties due to lack of FPr data  of the 
BEs?.  
Estimate the failure possibility (FPr) of each MCS or BE in 
fuzzy environment using experts judgement
Find the crisp numbers of the FPs  of  each BE using the 
centre of gravity (CoA) defuzzication  method 
Convert the crisp numbers (i.e FPs) of the BEs  to FPr 
and calculate the FPr of the TE
Aggregate the experts judgement of the FPs of each BE.
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Are the experts more 
than one?
Yes
No
Have all the BEs been identified?
No
Are the MCS  correct?
No
Yes
Rank the BEs using the F-VIM method 
Identify the BE with highest value of FPr for 
applications of preventive and mitigative  measures
Figure 4.1: A Methodology for Application of Fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) to Leak 
Detection System of Tank Farm Operations  
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1. Identification of the BEs. 
2. Estimation of the fuzzy numbers in triangular or trapezoid form for each BE. 
3. Aggregate experts‟ opinion. 
4. Defuzzify the fuzzy triangular/trapezoid description of each BE using CoA defuzzification 
method in order to obtain their respective FPs. 
5. Convert the FPs of the BE (i.e. FPsBE )  to FPr (i.e. BEF Pr ).  
6. Determine the failure probability of the TE.  
7. Rank the BEs in order of importance/riskiness. 
 
 
The flow of information in Figure 4.1 starts from definition of leak detection system of tank farm 
operations, followed by identification of top event, denoted as TE (i.e. failure of leak detection 
system) and development failure logic of the causes of TE with gates. The next step is to check if 
the failure logics are reasonable and identification of BEs of the TE. Once all the BEs have been 
identified, the MCSs can be estimated using boolean algebra and reviewed to ensure correctness. 
Then, assign FPr to the BEs or MCSs if available. The next step is to treat uncertainties 
associated with the BEs or MCSs by assigning FPs values to them using expert judgement. Then, 
check if the experts are more than one and aggregate judgement of each BEs. The next step is to 
find the crisp number of each FPs of the BEs using the CoA method, followed by conversion of 
the FPs of the BEs and calculation of the FPr of the TE. The final step is to rank the BEs using 
their FPr values, so as to identify the BEs with highest FPr value for proposing of effective 
preventive or mitigative measures.           
 
 
4.5.1. Identification of Basic Events (BEs) of the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and 
Estimation of Their Fuzzy Numbers 
 
 
BEs need to be identified before estimation of their fuzzy numbers. BEs can be found and 
identified in a constructed FTA of a system or hazard. Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1 will be used in 
estimations of fuzzy numbers of the BEs of the FTA of leak detection system of tank farm 
operations. The linguistic terms and associated membership function found in Figure 4.2 and 
Table 4.1 will be used to facilitate such estimation exercise.  
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Figure 4.2: A Representation of Linguistic Terms in Triangular Fuzzy Membership Function 
Form  
 
 
4.5.2. Aggregation of Experts’ Opinion 
 
 
Various experts are involved in the failure analysis of leak detection system of tank farm 
operations so as to ensure comprehensive analysis of tank farm operational failures. In view of 
this, there individual opinion needs to be aggregated using available method in the literature 
(Hsu and Chen, 1994; Clement and Winkler, 1999). In this research, the one of Clement and 
Winkler (1999) is adopted because of its computational effectiveness; and represented as 
follows:        
 
iFPsBE  = 

n
k
kjiki aw
1
                                                                                                                   (4.5)                   
 
where 
iFPsBE  = Failure possibility (FPs) of ith basic event )( iBE . 
                    i = Number of BE. 
                  
kiw   = The value of kth expert‟s weight for ith basic event )( iBE . 
                   k  = Number of expert. 
                    i = Number of BE. 
   0         0.1         0.2        0.3         0.4        0.5         0.6       0.7         0.8        0.9        1.0 
1.0 
            Very Low                       Low                        Average                     High               Very High 
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                  kjia   = Fuzzy triangular membership scale value j of a linguistic term described by 
expert k for basic event i )( iBE . 
                   j = Number of scale values of a fuzzy triangular membership. 
 
 
      Table 4.1: Description of Linguistic Terms of Failure Probability (FPr) in Fuzzy Scale 
 
 
Linguistic Term 
of Failure 
Probability                      
 
Definition of 
Linguistic Term 
in Triangular 
Fuzzy Scale 
Definition of the Linguistic Terms of BE of  the 
TE (i.e. Failure of Leak Detection System of Tank 
Farm)  
Very Low (0, 0.2, 0.4) 
 
The BE of the TE is unlikely to occur in lifetime 
of the system 
Low (0.2, 0.4, 0.6) 
 
The BE of the TE might occur few times in 
lifetime of the system. 
Average (0.4, 0.6, 0.8) 
 
The BE of the TE is likely to occur more than 
once or occasional in lifetime of the system. 
High (0.6, 0.8, 1.0) The BE of the TE is likely to occur from time to 
time in lifetime of the systems. 
Very High (0.8, 1.0, 1.0) It is certain that the BE of the TE will occur 
frequently. 
 
 
4.5.3. Defuzzification 
 
 
The centre of area (CoA) defuzzification method was developed by Sugeno in 1985 (Sugeno, 
1999).  This method can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
 


dxx
xdxx
X
i
i


*
                                                                                                                    (4.6)  
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where  *X = Defuzzified output.  
         xi  = Aggregated membership function.  
               x   = Output variable. 
A triangular fuzzy number ),,(
~
321 aaaA   can be defuzzified as follows:                     
 
 
 










0
)/()(
)/()(
0
233
121
aaxa
aaax
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3
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
                                                                               (4.7)                                   
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                                                                                    (4.8)  
         =  321
3
1
aaa                                                                                                              (4.9) 
A trapezoidal fuzzy number ),,,(
~
4321 aaaaA  , can be defuzzified as follows: 
 
 
 










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0
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                                                                         (4.10)  
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          = 
   
2134
21
2
2134
2
34
3
1
aaaa
aaaaaaaa


                                                                (4.12) 
 
 
4.5.4. Conversion of Fuzzy Possibility (FPs) to Failure Probability (FPr) 
 
In this research, the conversion method adopted in the works of Onisawa (1988); Lin and Wang 
(1997); Nishiwaki and Onisawa (1998) are used in the conversion of FPs to FPr. The conversion 
formula is described as follows: 
 
 











0,0
0,
10
1
Pr
FPsBE
FPsBE
BEF
K
                                                                                                 (4.13)  
where 301.2
1 3
1





 

FPsBE
FPsBE
K  
 
 
where FPr stands for failure probability and FPs stands for failure possibility respectively. 
 
 
The values of FPr of the MCSs/BEs can be used in ranking of the MCSs or BEs leading to the 
occurrence of the TE. Ranking is used to reveal which MCSs/BEs is more important than the 
other. 
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4.6. A Test Case of Application of Fuzzy-Fault Tree Analysis (FFTA) Model in Analysing 
the Risk of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm Operation and its Causes 
 
 
In Chapter 3 five causes/hazards were identified. These are: 1) automatic shut-down oil safety 
valve failure, 2) pipe corrosion protection system failure, 3) automatic tank gauge system failure, 
4) leak detection device/system failure and 5) secondary containment monitoring system failure 
hinders optimal operations of the tank farm. The riskiest one among the five hazards was found 
to be leak detection system failure. Therefore, investigation of the probability of the failure of 
leak detection system will be carried out in this research so that appropriate control measure can 
be employed. In this study, four experts with equal weights are utilised in addressing of 
uncertainties associated with failure rates data of causes of the failure of leak detection system. 
The experts‟ experiences have been detailed in previous chapter. 
 
 
4.6.1.  Hazard Analysis of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm Operation 
 
 
An FTA technique is employed in hazard analysis of leak detection system of tank farm 
operations. The method has the ability to show all the major causes and failure logics of any 
system under investigation. The strength of FTA technique has been demonstrated in Figure 4.3.  
In Figure 4.3, failure of leak detection system of tank farm operations is the TE of the FTA.  
 
The TE occurs when human threats, mechanical failure or control panel failure happens. Human 
threats occur when human error, human sabotage or human vandalization happens. Mechanical 
failure occurs when thermal condition, check valve leaks, pressure relief valve leaks, high static 
head pressure, continuous pump run, material defects and vapour pockets occur. Thermal 
condition fails when thermal contraction and thermal expansion happen. Control panel failure 
occurs when fuse unit failure, power supply unit failure and switch failure occur.  
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Figure 4.3: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Diagram of Failure of Leak Detection System of Tank 
Farm   
 
 
4.6.1.1. Experts’ Estimation of the Failure Possibility (FPs) of Each Basic Event (BE) of 
the Tank Farm Leak Detection System Operations in Fuzzy Environment 
 
 
The FPs of a BE can be estimated using Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1. The four experts involved in 
this study estimated the FPs of each BE that made up the TE (i.e. leaks detection system failure) 
in Table 4.2. In Table 4.2: a) listing of the BEs of the TE are outlined in Column 1; b) in Column 
2, the experts‟ judgement of the FPs of each BE are shown using linguistic terms; c) in Column 
3, Table 4.1 is used to convert experts‟ judgement to a triangular fuzzy number. 
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Table 4.2: Experts‟ Judgement of Failure Possibility (FPs) of Each Basic Event (BE) of the Top 
Event (TE) (i.e. Failure of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm) 
 
Basic Events (BEs) of the 
Top Event (TE) (i.e. Failure 
of Leak Detection System 
of Tank Farm) 
 
Experts‟ Judgement of the Failure Possibility (FPs) of 
each Basic Event (BE) using Linguistic Terms of  
Triangular Fuzzy Scale 
 
Experts‟ Judgement  of  the Failure Possibility (FPs) 
 of  each Basic Event (BE) using Triangular Fuzzy  
Scales Values 
Expert 
#1 
Expert 
#2 
Expert 
#3 
Expert 
#4 
Expert #1  
(i.e. ( 11a , 
12a , 
13a )) 
 
Expert #2 
(i.e. ( 21a , 
22a , 
23a )) 
Expert #3 
(i.e.    
( 31a , 
32a , 
33a )) 
Expert #4 
(i.e.    
( 41a , 
42a , 
43a )) 
Human Error  
 
Very 
Low 
Low Very 
Low 
Low (0, 0.2, 0.4) 
 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
Human Sabotage  Low Low Low Very 
Low 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) 
Human Vandalization Average Low Low Average (0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
Thermal Contraction  High High Very 
High 
Very 
High 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
(0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
Thermal Expansion  Very 
High 
Very 
High 
High High (0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
(0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
Check Valve Leaks  Average High Average High (0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
Pressure Relief Valve Leaks  Low Low Low Low (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
High Static Head Pressure  Very 
High 
High High High (0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
Continuous Pump Run  Average Average Average Average (0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
Material Defects Low Very 
Low 
Low Low (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
Vapour Pockets  High High Average Average (0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
Fuse Unit Failure  Very 
Low 
Very 
Low 
Very 
Low 
Very 
Low 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) (0, 0.2, 0.4) 
 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) 
 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) 
Power Supply Unit Failure  Very 
Low 
Low Very 
Low 
Low (0, 0.2, 0.4) 
 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) 
 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
Switch Failure  Low Low Low Low  (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
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4.6.1.2. Experts’ Opinion Aggregation on the Failure Possibility (FPs) of Each Basic Event 
(BE) of the Leak Detection System of Tank Farm in Fuzzy Environment 
 
 
In aggregation exercise of experts‟ judgement of the FPs of each BE (i.e. FPsBE), Equation 4,5 
described as 
iFPsBE  = 

n
k
kjk aw
1
 is used as follows: 
                                                                                                  
1. Human Error 
 
1FPsBE  = 

4
1k
kjiki aw  
 
1FPsBE  =        43142141141331321311312312212112113112111111 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)  0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   
              = (00.25, 0.20.25, 0.40.25)   (0.20.25, 0.40.25, 0.60.25)   (00.25, 0.2
0.25, 0.40.25)  (0.20.25, 0.40.25, 0.60.25) 
              = (0, 0.05, 0.1) (0.05, 0.1, 0.15)  (0, 0.05, 0.1)   (0.05, 0.1, 0.15) 
              = (00.0500.05, 0.050.10.05 0.1, 0.1 0.15 0.1 0.15) 
              = (0.1, 0.3, 0.5)      
 
Therefore, FPs of Human Error ( 1FPsBE ) is described as (0.1, 0.3, 0.5).  
 
The values of ,2FPsBE  ,3FPsBE  ,4FPsBE ,5FPsBE  ,6FPsBE  ,7FPsBE  ,8FPsBE  ,9FPsBE  
,10FPsBE  ,11FPsBE  ,12FPsBE  ,13FPsBE  and 14FPsBE  are found in a similar way, described 
and outlined in Appendix 4A and Table 4.3 as (0.15, 0.35, 0.55), (0.35, 0.55, 0.75), (0.7, 0.9, 1), 
(0.7, 0.9, 1), (0.5, 0.7, 0.9), (0.2, 0.4, 0.6), (0.65, 0.85, 1), (0.4, 0.6, 0.8), (0.15, 0.35, 0.55), (0.5, 
0.7, 0.9), (0, 0.2, 0.4), (0.1, 0.3, 0.5)  and (0.2, 0.4, 0.6) respectively. The ,2FPsBE  ,3FPsBE  
,4FPsBE ,5FPsBE  ,6FPsBE  ,7FPsBE  ,8FPsBE  ,9FPsBE  ,10FPsBE  ,11FPsBE  ,12FPsBE  
,13FPsBE  and 14FPsBE  are known as failure probabilities of Human Sabotage, Human 
Vandalization, Thermal Contraction, Thermal Expansion, Check Valve Leaks, Pressure Relief 
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Valve Leaks, High Static Head Pressure, Continuous Pump Run,  Material Defects, Vapour 
Pockets, Fuse Unit Failure, Power Supply Unit Failure and Switch Failure.  
 
Table 4.3: Aggregation of Experts‟ Judgement on the Failure Possibilities (FPs) of Basic Events 
(BEs) of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm Operations in Fuzzy Environment 
 
Basic Events (BEs) 
of the Top Event  
(TE) (i.e. Failure of 
Leak Detection 
System of Tank 
Farm) 
 
                   
          Weight of Experts  
 
Experts‟ Judgement  of the Failure Possibility (FPs) 
 of each Basic Event (BE) using Triangular Fuzzy 
Scales Values 
Aggregation of 
Experts‟  
Judgement on  
the Failure  
Possibility  
(FPs) of  each  
Basic Event  
(BE)    
(i.e. iFPsBE ) 
Weight 
of 
Expert 
#1 (i.e. 
1w ) 
Weight 
of 
Expert 
#2 (i.e. 
2w ) 
Weight 
of 
Expert 
#3 (i.e. 
3w ) 
Weight 
of 
Expert 
#4 (i.e. 
4w ) 
 
Expert #1  
(i.e. 
( 11a , 
12a , 
13a )) 
 
Expert #2 
(i.e. 
( 21a , 
22a , 
23a )) 
Expert #3 
(i.e.    
( 31a , 
32a , 
33a )) 
Expert #4 (i.e.    
( 41a , 42a , 
43a )) 
Human Error  
 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0, 0.2, 
0.4) 
 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0, 0.2, 
0.4) 
(0.2, 0.4, 0.6) (0.1, 0.3, 0.5) 
Human Sabotage  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) (0.15, 0.35, 
0.55) 
Human 
Vandalization 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.4, 0.6, 0.8) (0.35, 0.55, 
0.75) 
Thermal 
Contraction  
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
(0.8, 1.0, 1.0) (0.7, 0.9, 1) 
Thermal Expansion  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
(0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 1.0) (0.7, 0.9, 1) 
Check Valve Leaks  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.6, 0.8, 1.0) (0.5, 0.7, 0.9) 
Pressure Relief 
Valve Leaks  
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 0.6) (0.2, 0.4, 0.6) 
High Static Head 
Pressure  
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.8, 1.0, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 1.0) (0.65, 0.85, 1) 
Continuous Pump 
Run  
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.4, 0.6, 0.8) (0.4, 0.6, 0.8) 
Material Defects 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0, 0.2, 
0.4) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 0.6) (0.15, 0.35, 
0.55) 
Vapour Pockets  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.6, 0.8, 
1.0) 
(0.4, 0.6, 
0.8) 
(0.4, 0.6, 0.8) (0.5, 0.7, 0.9) 
Fuse Unit Failure  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0, 0.2, 
0.4) 
 
(0, 0.2, 
0.4) 
 
(0, 0.2, 
0.4) 
 
(0, 0.2, 0.4) (0, 0.2, 0.4) 
Power Supply Unit 
Failure  
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0, 0.2, 
0.4) 
 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0, 0.2, 
0.4) 
(0.2, 0.4, 0.6) (0.1, 0.3, 0.5) 
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Switch Failure  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 (0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 
0.6) 
(0.2, 0.4, 0.6) (0.2, 0.4, 0.6) 
 
In Table 4.3, BEs are outlined in Column 1, while the weights of the experts are listed in Column 
2. In the Column 3 of Table 4.3, the experts‟ judgement of the FPs of each BE using triangular 
fuzzy scales values are outlined while the aggregation of experts‟ judgement on the FPs of each 
BE using triangular fuzzy scales values are listed in Column 4 of Table 4.3. 
 
 
4.6.1.3. Defuzzification of the Aggregated Experts’ Opinion on the Failure Possibility (FPs) 
of Each Basic Event (BE) of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm 
  
 
In this research, CoA method is used to defuzzify each FPsBE value described in Table 4.3. 
The CoA defuzzification method is applied to each BE of the TE as follows: 
 
Considering Human Error. 
 
In Equation 4.9, the formula for CoA defuzzification method is described as follows: 
 
 321
3
1
aaaX   for fuzzy triangular membership function. 
 
Since X  is the defuzzified output, 1FPsBE  can be described as X . ,1a  2a  and 3a  are 
described as the fuzzy triangular scale values. 21,aa and 3a  are represented as 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 
respectively; and can be addressed as 2111, aa and 31a  of 1FPsBE  . 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 are the 
aggregated experts‟ opinion on the FPs of each BE using triangular fuzzy scale values, listed in 
Column 4 of Table 4.3. The defuzzified 1FPsBE  can be calculated as follows: 
 
 5.03.01.0
3
1
1 FPsBE  
 
               = 0.3  
 
 
 1FPsBE  can also be described as FPsError . In a similar way, values of ,2FPsBE  ,3FPsBE  
,4FPsBE  ,5FPsBE  ,6FPsBE  ,7FPsBE  ,8FPsBE  ,9FPsBE  ,10FPsBE  ,11FPsBE  ,12FPsBE  
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,13FPsBE  and 14FPsBE  are found as 0.35, 0.55, 0.867, 0.867, 0.7, 0.4, 0.833, 0.6, 0.35, 0.7, 0.2, 
0.3 and 0.2 respectively (See Appendix 4B for details). ,2FPsBE  ,3FPsBE  ,4FPsBE  ,5FPsBE  
,6FPsBE  ,7FPsBE  ,8FPsBE  ,9FPsBE  ,10FPsBE  ,11FPsBE  ,12FPsBE  ,13FPsBE  and 
14FPsBE  stand for failure possibilities of Human Sabotage, Human Vandalization, Thermal 
Contraction, Thermal Expansion, Check Valve Leaks, Pressure Relief Valve Leaks, High Static 
Head Pressure, Continuous Pump Run, Material Defects, Vapour Pockets, Fuse Unit Failure, 
Power Supply Unit Failure and Switch Failure. They can also be addressed as eFPsSabotag , 
seFPsVandali , tFPsContrac , ,FPsExpand  FPsCValve, FPsPValve, essureFPs Pr , 
FPsPump, FPsDefect, FPsVapour, FPsFuse, FPsPower and  FPsSwitch respectively.  
 
 
4.6.1.4. Conversion of the Failure Possibility (FPs) of Each Basic Event (BE) of the Top 
Event (TE) to Failure Probability (FPs)  
 
 
In this research, the FPsBE will be converted to BEF Pr so as to facilitate the estimation of FPr 
of the TE and ranking of the BEs. Equation 4.13 described FPsBE as follows: 
 
 











0,0
0,
10
1
Pr
FPsBE
FPsBE
BEF
K
                                                            
where 301.2
1 3
1





 

FPsBE
FPsBE
K  
 
In view of this, BEF Pr  can be calculated as follows, with respect to Human error: 
 
Since 1FPsBE  0 , 1Pr BEF  = K10
1
 will be used in the conversion of 1FPsBE  to 1Pr BEF  as 
expressed below. 
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1Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
1
1
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
3.0
3.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.001 
 
Using the same method, the values of ,Pr 2BEF  ,Pr 3BEF  ,Pr 4BEF  ,Pr 5BEF  ,Pr 6BEF  ,Pr 7BEF  
,Pr 8BEF  ,Pr 9BEF  ,Pr 10BEF  ,Pr 11BEF  ,Pr 12BEF  ,Pr 13BEF  and 14Pr BEF  are found to be 0.0015, 
0.007, 0.059, 0.059, 0.018, 0.002, 0.045, 0.01, 0.0015, 0.018, 0.0002, 0.001 and 0.002 
respectively (See Appendix 4C for details). The ,Pr 2BEF  ,Pr 3BEF  ,Pr 4BEF  ,Pr 5BEF  ,Pr 6BEF  
,Pr 7BEF  ,Pr 8BEF  ,Pr 9BEF  ,Pr 10BEF  ,Pr 11BEF  ,Pr 12BEF  ,Pr 13BEF  and 14Pr BEF  are described 
as failure probabilities of Human Sabotage, Human Vandalization, Thermal Contraction, 
Thermal Expansion, Check Valve Leaks, Pressure Relief Valve Leaks, High Static Head 
Pressure, Continuous Pump Run,  Material Defects, Vapour Pockets, Fuse Unit Failure, Power 
Supply Unit Failure and Switch Failure. They are also denoted as ErrorF Pr , SabotageF Pr , 
VandaliseF Pr , ContractF Pr , ExpandF Pr , CValveF Pr , PValveF Pr , essureF PrPr , 
PumpF Pr , DefectF Pr , VapourF Pr , FuseF Pr , PowerF Pr  and  SwitchF Pr  respectively. 
 
 
4.6.2. Calculation of Failure Probability (FPr) of Top Event (TE) of Tank Farm 
Operations 
 
In this study, the FPr of each BE has been identified in Section 4.12, while the FPr of TE remains 
unknown. To identify the value of FPr of the TE (i.e. failure of leak detection system of tank 
farm), Equation 4.2 and bottom-top approach (i.e. starting from the base (BEs) of the FT to the 
top) will be used, since the TE is made up of OR gates and unrepeated events. In view of this, 
TEF Pr  can be calculated as follows:  
 
TEF Pr  = 1-  


n
i
iBEF
1
Pr1  
 
TEF Pr =     PanelFMechanicalFHumanF Pr1Pr1Pr11                               (4.14) 
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HumanF Pr =     VandaliseFSabotageFErrorF Pr1Pr1Pr11                         (4.15) 
 
MechanicalF Pr = 
   
    






VapourFDefectFPumpFessureF
PValveFCValveFThermalF
Pr1Pr1Pr1PrPr1
Pr1Pr1Pr11
  (4.16) 
 
PanelF Pr =     SwitchFPowerFFuseF Pr1Pr1Pr11                                       (4.17) 
 
The value of ThermalF Pr  is unknown. From Figure 4.3, ThermalF Pr  can be revealed as 
follows:  
 
ThermalF Pr =    ExpandFContractF Pr1Pr11                                                    (4.18) 
 
ErrorF Pr , SabotageF Pr , VandaliseF Pr , ContractF Pr , ExpandF Pr , CValveF Pr , 
PValveF Pr , essureF PrPr , PumpF Pr , DefectF Pr , VapourF Pr , FuseF Pr , PowerF Pr  and  
SwitchF Pr  are denoted as ,Pr 1BEF  ,Pr 2BEF  ,Pr 3BEF  ,Pr 4BEF  ,Pr 5BEF  ,Pr 6BEF  ,Pr 7BEF  
,Pr 8BEF  ,Pr 9BEF  ,Pr 10BEF  ,Pr 11BEF  ,Pr 12BEF  13Pr BEF  and 14Pr BEF  respectively. Their FPr 
values described as 0.001, 0.0015, 0.007, 0.059, 0.059, 0.018, 0.002, 0.045, 0.01, 0.0015, 0.018, 
0.0002, 0.001 and 0.002 respectively; can be substituted in Equations 4.16, 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19 in 
order to calculate TEF Pr  as expressed below. 
 
HumanF Pr =     007.010015.01001.011    
                      =     993.09985.0999.01  
                     =  0.009 
 
ThermalF Pr =    059.01059.011          
 =    941.0941.01  
 
                     = 0.115 
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MechanicalF Pr  =  
      
  






018.01
0015.0101.01045.01002.01018.01115.011
   
                            = 
      
  



 
982.0
9985.099.0955.0998.0982.0885.01
 
                             = 0.196 
 
PanelF Pr  =     002.01001.010002.011       
                  =     998.0999.09998.01  
                 = 0.003                    
 
Therefore, TEF Pr =     PanelFMechanicalFHumanF Pr1Pr1Pr11                          
                                =     003.01196.01009.011   
                                =     997.0804.0991.01  
                                = 0.205     
  
Since the FPr of each BE has been revealed, the ranking of the BEs in order of importance can be 
described as follows: 
 
0.059 > 0.045 > 0.018 > 0.01 > 0.007 > 0.002 > 0.0015 > 0.001 > 0.0002 
 
It means that any BE associated with the value of 0.059 is more important that others and should 
be given more attention via application of preventive and mitigative measures. Thermal 
contraction (i.e. 4BE ) and thermal expansion (i.e. 5BE ) are associated with 0.059 as their FPr 
values, while 1BE  and 13BE ; 2BE  and 10BE ; 6BE  and 11BE ; and 7BE  and 14BE ; have the same 
FPr values described as 0.001, 0.0015, 0.018 and 0.002 respectively.   
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4.6.3. Verification of the Model 
 
 
A sensitivity analysis is conducted to partially verify the usefulness and robustness of the model 
used in this research. The TEF Pr will be logical if the three axioms below are satisfied.    
                                      
 Axiom 1. Elimination of any event should result in a reduction of TE failure probability (i.e.
TEF Pr ). 
 Axiom 2. Elimination of an event with higher failure probability should result in a reduction 
of TE failure probability (i.e. TEF Pr ) more than the one with lower probability. 
 Axiom 3. Elimination of the entire events should result in TE failure probability (i.e. TEF Pr
) equal to zero. 
 
Table 4.4 is produced after elimination of intermediate events. The intermediate events (i.e. 
Human Threat, Mechanical Failure and Control Panel Failure) are eliminated by changing their 
failure probabilities from their initial value to zero. Elimination of HumanF Pr , 
MechanicalF Pr  and PanelF Pr  values resulted in a reduction of TEF Pr values by 3.41%, 
94.14% and 0.98% respectively as evidenced in Table 4.4. This is in line with Axiom 1, 
therefore Axiom 1 is satisfied. In Table 4.4, change of the HumanF Pr and PanelF Pr  values to 
zero, resulted in a reduction of TEF Pr values by 0.0341 (i.e. 3.41%) and 0.0098 (0.98%) 
respectively, while change of MechanicalF Pr  value (i.e. 0.196) to zero, yields a TEF Pr value 
of 0.012 (i.e. 94.14% reduction from initial value). Elimination of MechanicalF Pr  value 
reduced the TEF Pr value than others and the MechanicalF Pr  value is the highest in Table 4.4. 
This is in line with Axiom 2. Therefore, Axiom 2 is satisfied. Elimination of MechanicalF Pr , 
HumanF Pr and PanelF Pr  values at the same time, will result to 100% elimination of TEF Pr
value. This is in harmony with Axiom 3. Therefore the logic of Axiom 3 has been satisfied and 
used to verify the model. 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
                    Table 4.4: Model Verification by Elimination of Intermediate Events 
 
Intermediate 
Events 
Failure Probability of 
Events  
Main Top 
Event (TE) 
Failure  
Probability (
TEF Pr  ) 
New Top 
Event (TE)  
Failure 
Probability 
after an Event 
Elimination 
Rate/Amount 
of Reduction 
of Main Top 
Event (TE) 
Failure  
Probability (
TEF Pr  ) 
Percentage 
Reduction of 
Main Top 
Event (TE) 
Failure  
Probability (
TEF Pr  ) 
Human 
Threats 
HumanF Pr = 
0.009 
0.205 0.198 0.0341 3.41% 
Mechanical 
Failure 
MechanicalF Pr  
=0.196 
0.205     0.012     0.9415 94.14% 
Control 
Panel 
Failure 
PanelF Pr  = 0.003 0.205     0.203     0.0098 0.98% 
 
 
 
4.7.  Conclusions 
 
 
After a careful failure analysis of leak detection system of tank farm operations, various causes 
of the failure such as Human Error, Human Sabotage, Human Vandalization, Thermal 
Contraction, Thermal Expansion, Check Valve Leaks, Pressure Relief Valve Leaks, High Static 
Head Pressure, Continuous Pump Run, Material Defect, Vapour Pockets, Fuse Unit Failure, 
Power Supply Unit Failure and Switch Failure have been revealed via FTA methodology.  
 
The failure contribution of each cause is identified using fuzzy logic because of uncertainties 
associate with their failure rate data. Demonstration of how the failures occurred, are carried out 
using the logic gates. Four experts with equal experience of the tank farm operations used expert 
judgement in fuzzy environment to identify the FPs  of each BE. This facilitated the conversion 
process of the FPs  to their respective FPr and it is revealed that TEF Pr is 0.205.   
 
The importance of a BE over another has been identified using their FPr values. Their FPr values 
facilitated the prioritisations of the BEs for efficient adoption of an improvement measure. In this 
research, it has been revealed that the most important BEs of the TE (i.e. failure of leak detection 
system of tank farm operations) are Thermal Contraction (i.e. 4BE ) and Thermal Expansion (i.e.
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5BE ) because they are associated with FPr highest values of 0.059 and 0.059 respectively. 
Therefore, available resources on safety improvement measure should be focused on the 
causes/BEs such as Thermal Contraction (i.e. 4BE ) and Thermal Expansion (i.e. 5BE ). The 
feasibility of such study will be demonstrated in the next chapter using AHP-TOPSIS model. 
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Chapter 5 - Optimal Safety Improvement of Tank Farm Operations using an 
Analytic Hierarchy Process-Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to 
the Ideal Solution(AHP-TOPSIS) Model  
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
The analysis of various alternatives that can be adopted to ensure optimal tank farm operations, 
can be seen as a multi-criteria decision process. In view of this, this research aims to provide a 
logical approach in identification of important SCD using the AHP-TOPSIS model. The 
alternatives and criteria levels are the two levels of the AHP-TOPSIS hierarchical structure for 
optimal operations of tank farm. The alternatives are comprised of SCD #1, SCD#2 and SCD #3, 
while the criteria is made up of labour cost, equipment cost, company organisational strategy, 
company structure and technology management. The AHP model and experts’ judgement are 
used to estimate the weights of the criteria, while the TOPSIS technique provided the needed 
ranks of the SCDs for optimal operations of the tank farm.  
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
 
Occurrence of tank farm accidents may lead to millions-dollar property loss and production 
interruption and the consequences could be lawsuits against the company, company‟s stock 
devaluation, or company bankruptcy (Chang and Lin, 2006). These accidents demonstrate not 
only the large-scale of destruction in the surroundings, together with the implication of potential 
environmental issues, but also the necessity to prevent similar accidents (Argyropoulos et al., 
2012; Pitblado, 2010)  
 
In view of this, this research aims at investigation and identification of safety improve measures 
and associated criteria on tank farm operations in order of importance using AHP-TOPSIS 
methodology. To achieve this aim, the safety of the tank farm operations is discussed in Section 
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5.3, after a thorough background analysis of AHP and TOPSIS applications in Sections 5.2 and 
5.3 respectively. Safety improvement of leak detection system of tank farm operations is 
discussed in Section 5.4 and AHP and TOPSIS methodologies are analysed in Section 5.5 and 
Section 5.6 respectively, so as to facilitate ranking of the SCDs in Section 5.7. The ranks of the 
SCDs are finally used to make decision on the best SCD in Section 5.8. An illustrative case study 
is carried out to demonstrate the workability of the proposed methodology in Section 5.9 and 
conclusion is drawn that the model is logical in Section 5.10. 
 
 
 
5.2. Background Analysis 
 
 
Difficulties encountered in solving complex multi-criteria decision making problems can be 
subdued by using powerful engineering tools and mathematical model (Satty, 1980; 1990, 2004, 
Saaty and Vargas, 2001; Yang and Singh 1994; Yang, 2001; Yang and Xu, 2002; Chan and 
Kumar, 2007; Olcer and Odabasi, 2005). An AHP method is one of the techniques that can make 
a difference in such problems. The importance of an AHP methodology has been proved in many 
applications (Satty, 1980; Chan and Kumar, 2007; Yuen et al., 2012; Pam, 2010; Song et al., 
2004; Lirn et al., 2003; Lirn et al., 2004; Guy et al., 2006; and Chang et al., 2008). It can be used 
alone or in combination with other method such as TOPSIS technique as evidenced in Chapter 2. 
Successful application of the TOPSIS method in various applications have been demonstrated in  
Pam (2010), Wu (2007), Lavasani et al. (2011), Mahmoodzadeh et al. (2007), Mohammad et al., 
(2010) and Balli and Korukoglu (2009). Literature reviews of applications of the AHP and 
TOPSIS methods have been carried out in Chapter 2, including the combination of both. Since 
the purpose of this research is to rank all the SCDs in order of preferences, the AHP-TOPSIS 
model will be adopted in addressing such challenges for optimal tank farm operations. 
 
 
 
5.3. Safety of Tank Farm Operations  
 
 
In previous chapters, the safety of tank farm operations are found not to be in an acceptable 
level, due to various safety levels of the systems such as automatic shut-down oil safety valve, 
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pipe corrosion protection system, automatic tank gauge system, leak detection device/system and 
secondary containment monitoring system, that make up tank farm operations. To address this 
abnormal operating condition of the tank farm, a model that can optimize the system 
performance is shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Flow of information in Figure 5.1 starts from description of safety level of leak detection system 
of tank farm operations. The next step is to check if the system safety operations are satisfactory. 
If the system safety is satisfactory, there will be no need for further investigation as shown in 
Figure 5.1, otherwise investigation continues by identification of SCDs and associated criteria 
for optimal system operations. Once all the SCDs and associated criteria have been identified, a 
review is conducted and how reasonable all criteria are, is checked. The next step is to 
investigate the weights of the SCDs and associated criteria via AHP methodology and a review 
of such weights values so as to confirm the values have been properly estimated. In situation 
where the weights values are not properly estimated, weight values‟ investigation is reconducted 
before application of TOPSIS method. The mechanism of TOPSIS method is used to reveal the 
ranks of the SCDs. Finally, the best SCD, which is the one with highest rank of 1, can be used to 
improve the safety of leak detection system of tank farm operations.  
 
 
5.4.  Safety Improvement of Leak Detection System of the Tank Farm  
 
 
In Chapter 3, risk assessment of various causes of tank farm operational failures is investigated 
so as to identify high risk ones, which will be evaluated and controlled. The leak detection 
system failure has been identified as the riskiest cause of tank farm operational failure and need 
to be controlled. The leak detection system is one of the systems that can ensure optimal tank 
farm operations, and failure of such system can be catastrophic. To prevent the failure of leak 
detection system and ensure optimal operation of the tank farm, safety improvement measures 
need to be identified and implemented. According to Lois et al (2004) and PVA (1997), casual 
chain can be used by experts to facilitate identification of safety improvement measures via 
development of appropriate measures at a selected control point in sequence of cause, incident, 
accident and consequence. According to MSA (1993), any safety improvement measure must 
possess attributes such as:  
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Figure 5.1: A Flow Chart of Safety Improvement of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm 
Operations using the AHP-TOPSIS Methodology.  
Description of safety level of leak detection system of tank farm operations 
Are the system 
safety operations 
not satisfactory? 
No 
Yes 
                  Identify SCDs and associated criteria for optimal system operations 
Are the SCDs and associated 
criteria reasonable? 
   Yes 
No 
Investigate the weights of the SCDs’ associated criteria via AHP methodology 
Review the weights of the SCDs’ associated criteria 
Are the weights of SCDs’ 
associated criteria correct? 
No 
                      Prioritise the SCDs in order of importance using their ranks  
Use the best SCD to improve the safety of leak detection system of tank 
farm operations  
  Start 
  Review of the SCDs and their associated criteria 
    End 
Yes 
                          Use TOPSIS method to calculate the ranks of the SCDs 
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 Those relating to the fundamental type of risk reduction (preventative or mitigating). 
 Those relating to the type of action required and therefore to the costs of the action 
(engineering or procedural). 
   Those relating to the confidence that can be placed in the measure (active or passive, single 
or redundant).  
 
 
 
5.5. Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) Methodology 
 
 
AHP technique was developed by Saaty (1977). The technique is one of the mathematical 
methods for analysing complex decision problems with multiple criteria, and it can deal with 
qualitative attributes as well as quantitative (Arslan, 2009). AHP is a methodical approach that 
implies structuring criteria of multiple options into a system hierarchy, including relative values 
of all criteria, comparing alternatives for each particular criterion and defining average 
importance of alternatives (Lavasani et al., 2011). Criteria associated with any system can be 
quantitatively weighted and rated using AHP. The assessment grades of the criteria can be 
described using Table 5.1 and 5.2. An AHP methodology is applied on multi-criteria problems 
via pairwise comparison and experts‟ judgement, facilitated with Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The 
pairwise comparison is mainly conducted by arranging n criteria in row and column of nn 
matrix. The judgments of each expert in AHP applications can be aggregated using Equation 5.1. 
The AHP methodology can be mathematically described by assuming that quantified judgement 
on the pairs of criteria iA and jA ; is represented by an nn single value comparison matrix A 
(Pillay & Wang, 2003). Then Equations 5.2-5.6 can be used and described below. 
 
Average Numerical Value Rating =  
n
a
n
i
i
1                                                                          (5.1) 
where ia  is each value estimated by experts for the same criterion and n is the total number of 
experts involved in the exercise.   
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 Table 5.1: Scale for Assessment Grades of the Criteria for the Important Pair-wise Comparison  
 
Assessment Grade Description of Assessment Grade Numerical Value Rating 
Equally important Two criteria contribute equally to the objective 1 
Between moderately more 
and equally important 
There is a compromise between two criteria being 
considered within the grades. 
2 
Moderately more important Experience and judgment slightly favour a criterion 
over another 
3 
Between moderately more 
and strongly more important 
There is a compromise between two criteria being 
considered within the grades. 
4 
Strongly more important Experience and judgment strongly favour a criterion  
over another 
5 
Between strongly more and 
very strong important 
There is a compromise between two criteria being 
considered within the grades. 
6 
Very strongly important A criterion is strongly favoured over another and its 
importance is demonstrated in practice 
7 
Between very strong and 
extreme important 
There is a compromise between two criteria being 
considered within the grades. 
8 
Extreme important The evidence favouring a criterion over another is of 
the highest order of affirmation 
9 
 
 
A =  ija  =







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


1...11
......
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...1
.
21
212
112
nn
n
n
aa
aaa
aa
                                                                                       (5.2) 
 
 
where each ija  is the relative importance of the criteria iA and jA ; and ,i j =.1, 2, 3,….n. The 
weighting vector of a specific element k   in the pair wise comparison matrix is described as kw
. The weighting vector indicates the priority of each element in the pairwise comparison matrix 
in terms of its overall contribution to the decision making process (Pam, 2010). In view of this, 
kw  can be mathematically represented as follows: 
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
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




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n
i
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a
a
n
w
1
1
1
          nk ...........3,2,1                                                                      (5.3)  
 
Where ija represents the entry of row i and column j in a comparison matrix of order n. For 
better and easy understanding of the method, Equation 5.3 can be grammatically described as 
follows (Pam, 2013): 
 
Table 5.2: Scale for Assessment Grades of the Criteria for the Unimportant Pair-wise 
Comparison 
Assessment Grade Description of Assessment Grade Numerical 
Value Rating 
Equally important Two criteria contribute equally to the objective 1 
Between moderately more and equally 
unimportant 
There is a compromise between two criteria being 
considered within the grades. 
1/2 
Moderately more unimportant Experience and judgment slightly favour a 
criterion over another 
1/3 
Between moderately more and strongly more 
unimportant 
There is a compromise between two criteria being 
considered within the grades. 
1/4 
Strongly more unimportant Experience and judgment strongly favour a 
criterion over another 
1/5 
Between strongly more and very strong 
unimportant 
There is a compromise between two criteria being 
considered within the grades. 
1/6 
Very strongly unimportant A criterion is strongly favoured over another and 
its unimportance is demonstrated in practice 
1/7 
Between very strong and extreme unimportant There is a compromise between two criteria being 
considered within the grades. 
1/8 
Extreme unimportant The evidence favouring a criterion over another is 
of the highest order of affirmation 
1/9 
 
 
 Summation of the values in each column of the pairwise comparison matrix. 
 Division of each element of the matrix by its column. 
 Establishment of the average of the elements in each row. 
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The values of weights (i.e. kw ) obtained in the pair-wise comparison exercise and expert 
judgement, need to be verified using Consistency Ratio (CR). The prime determinant of the CR 
value is Consistency Index (CI) and Random Index (RI) values. According to Satty (1980), 
whenever a CR value of 0.10 or less is obtained, it means that the pairwise comparison exercises 
and experts‟ judgement are reasonable and can be acceptable results. But, any pairwise 
comparison exercises and expert judgements, where CR value is greater than 0.10, kw is subject 
to review or outright results rejection. In view of this, CI can be mathematically described as 
follows: 
 
 
CI = 
1
max


n
n
                                                                                                             (5.4) 
 
 
Where n stands for the number of items being compared and max stands for the maximum 
Eigen value of an n × n comparison matrix. To identify max value in any pairwise comparison 
exercise, max can be mathematically described as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                            (5.5) 
 
 
Since the values of CI and max can be identified using Equations 5.4 and 5.5, CR value can be 
known using its mathematical definition as follows. 
 
 
CR = 
RI
CI
                       (5.6) 
 
 
Where RI, is the random index, which the value depends on the n (i.e. the number of items being 
compared in pairwise comparison exercise. RI value can be chosen from Table 5.3. 
n
w
aw
n
j k
n
k
kjk





1
1
max
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                                    Table 5.3: Average RI values (Satty, 1980) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
 
 
 
5.6. Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) 
Methodology 
 
 
Hwang and Yoon (1981) developed TOPSIS method as a technique that can be utilized in 
addressing a multi-criteria decision making problem. The technique was developed based on the 
concept that the chosen alternative should have the shortest distance from the PIRP and the 
farthest distance from the NIRP (Hwang & Yoon, 1981). Its mechanism can be used to assign the 
relative importance of attributes on any multi-criteria decision making problem using precise 
numbers. Therefore, TOPSIS can be used to rank finite number of feasible alternatives according 
to the features of each attribute/criterion for every alternative and to the decision maker‟s choice 
(Mentes and Helvacioglu, 2012). This method is applied in situations, where selection criteria 
developed for addressing any problem is monotonic. Criteria are monotonic if two or more 
criterion that makes up the criteria can be classified as either benefits or costs. A criterion can be 
classified as a benefit if the more desirable the alternative, the higher its score versus this 
criterion (Pam, 2010). On the contrary, cost criteria see the most desirable alternative scoring at 
the lowest (Pam, 2010). 1. TOPSIS method is employed in various applications because its logic 
is rational and understandable; computation processes are straightforward; the concept permits 
the pursuit of best alternatives for each criterion depicted in a simple mathematical form; it 
allows the straight linguistic definition of weights and ratings under each criterion, without the 
need of cumbersome pairwise comparisons and the risk of inconsistencies (Deng et al, 2000; 
Olson, 2004; Pam, 2010; Bottani and Rizzi, 2006). The process of TOPSIS method starts from 
development of a decision matrix, shown in Equation 5.7, with given m alternatives/options, n 
criteria/attributes and k decision analysts (Wang and Chang, 2007; Bottani and Rizzi, 2006).                             
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     i = 1, 2, .…, m;  j = 1, 2, …., n                                                      (5.7)                                                                                                                
 
In Equation 5.7, 1A , 2A ,…… mA  stands for the alternatives/options, while 1C , 2C ,… nC  stands 
for criteria/attributes, and ijr  represents crisp number that shows the rating of the 
alternative/option iA  with respect to criterion jC . In situations, where decision makers/experts 
are more than one and rated ijr . The average of their ratings is taken as ijr  value. The decision 
matrix in Equation 5.7, can be normalised using ijX . ijX  is mathematically defined in Equation 
5.8. Equation 5.8 is used to transform various attribute/criteria dimensions into non-dimensional 
attributes/criteria, so as to facilitate choosing of any alternatives/option with respect to all the 
criteria.  
 
 

m
i ij
ij
ij
r
r
X
1
2
,  i = 1, 2, ….,m;   j = 1, 2, …..n                                                      (5.8)  
 
The normalised decision matrix, need to be weighted using Equation 5.9, in order to facilitate 
determination of iD  (i.e. the distance separation measure for the PIS) and the 

iD (i.e. the 
distance separation measure for the NIS). 
  
ijjij XwV  ,  i = 1, 2, ….,m;   j = 1, 2, …..n                                                                (5.9) 
 
According to Yoon and Hwang (1995) and Raham (2012), jw  stands for weight of jth  
attribute/criterion, while ijV  is the crisp number that represents the rating of the 
alternative/option iA  with respect to criterion jC  in a weighted normalised decision matrix. 
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The PIS and NIS denoted as 
V  and V  respectively, are mathematically defined in Equations 
5.10 and 5.11, so as to facilitate the calculation of the iD  and 

iD .  
 
    JjVVVVVV ijjn   |max.............,, 321 ,   '|min JjVijj                                         (5.10) 
 
    JjVVVVVV ijjn   |min.............,, 321 ,   '|max JjVijj                                        (5.11) 
 
In the works of (Mahmoodzadeh et al., 2007) J  and 'J  are associated with benefit and cost 
criteria respectively. Therefore, in this research, J  and 'J  are associated with benefit and cost 
criteria respectively. iD  and 

iD  are developed, so as to measure all the alternatives/options 
with their PIS and NIS. iD  and 

iD are mathematically described in Equations 5.12 and 5.13 
respectively. 
 
  
 
n
j jiji
VVD
1
2
,  i = 1, 2, ….,m                                                                        (5.12) 
 
  
 
n
j jiji
VVD
1
2
,  i = 1, 2, ….,m                                                                         (5.13) 
 
Ranking of the various alternatives/options, 1A , 2A ,…… mA , can only be carried out using the 
relative closeness to ideal solution, denoted as .iRC  Therefore, 

iD  and 

iD  are used to 
described iRC mathematically as follows: 
 





ii
i
i
DD
D
RC ,   i = 1, 2,……….,m                                                                              (5.14) 
 
0  iRC   1 and the best alternative/option is the one with value of 

iRC  closest to 1.  
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5.7.  Ranking of Safety Control Designs (SCDs) 
 
 
Ranking of the SCDs is used to facilitate decision making process on which alternative that can 
improve system operations in Sub-Section 4.3. The SCDs are ranked according to the values of 
their RC  revealed from application of AHP-TOPSIS model on a tank farm operations. A SCD 
associated with highest RC value is assigned rank of 1. The SCD with second highest RC  
value is assigned rank of 2. Other rankings of alternatives follow same procedure.  
 
 
5.8.  Decision Making on Best Safety Control Design (SCD)  
 
 
Information provided from conduction of AHP-TOPSIS methodology and ranking exercise on 
tank farm operations is used for decision making on the best SCD that can be used to improve 
the safety level of that system. The SCDs are ranked using their respective RC  values. Experts 
use the ranks of the SCDs to take decision on the most effective one. The most effective 
alternative will be recommended by the experts involved in the study, for improvement of the 
safety level of the system.   
 
 
 
5.9. A Test Case of Using Analytical Hierarchical Process-Technique for Order 
Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (AHP-TOPSIS) Methodology in Safety 
Improvement of Tank Farm Operations  
 
 
In this section, the workability of the aforementioned AHP-TOPSIS methodology on the subject 
under investigation is illustrated. Synthesis of AHP, TOPSIS and experts judgement is adopted 
for optimal operations of tank farm via improvement of safety of the leak detection system. 
Various safety improvement alternatives will be identified and adopted in this exercise. The 
evaluation criteria will be developed by the four experts, whose levels of experiences have been 
detailed in Chapter 3. 
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5.9.1.  Safety Assessment of Leak Detection for Optimal Tank Farm Operations  
 
 
Various factors/causes that affect the optimal operations of tank farm have been discussed in 
Chapter 3. These are automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion protection 
system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, leak detection device/system failure and 
secondary containment monitoring system failure. It has been revealed that the leak detection 
system has the highest risk level in Chapter 3, evidenced by further analysis of the system in 
Chapter 4.  Uncertainties associated with the operations of leak detection system have also been 
addressed in a fuzzy environment in the same chapters, so as to reveal the exact safety level. Due 
to the present level of safety of leak detection system, safety measures need to be identified and 
adopted, with the view of obtaining optimal tank farm operations. 
 
 
5.9.2. Establishment of Safety Control Designs (SCDs) for Optimal Tank Farm  
Operations  
 
 
In this research, SCDs for optimal tank farm operations are established via AHP-TOPSIS 
methodology. An AHP-TOPSIS hierarchical structure for safety improvement of leak detection 
system of tank farm operations is developed in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2 revealed two levels, as 
evidenced in Table 5.4.  The information flow in Figure 5.2 started from safety improvement of 
leak detection system of tank farm operations, which is referred to the selection of best SCD for 
optimal operations of the leak detection system. The first level of alternatives/options in Figure 
5.2 is made up of various SCDs such as SCD #1 (i.e. weekly maintenance), SCD #2 (i.e. weekly 
visual inspections) and SCD #3 (i.e. use of experts in system operations) that can be used to 
optimised the safety operations of leak detection system; followed by the second level of criteria, 
which are labour cost, equipment cost, company organisational strategy, company‟s structure and 
technology management.                                               
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Figure 5.2: An AHP-TOPSIS Hierarchical Structure for Safety Improvement of Leak Detection 
System of Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
5.9.3. Identification of Weights of Criteria for Optimal Tank Farm Operations using the 
Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) Methodology 
 
 
In this section, an AHP method is used to identify the weights of the criteria/attributes in order to 
facilitate the estimation of the ranks of the SCDs via the TOPSIS method. The aforementioned 
criteria described in Table 5.4 are labour cost, equipment cost, company organisational strategy, 
company structure and technology management. Their weights are described as ,1w 2w , 3w , 
4w  and 5w  respectively.  
 
 
5.9.3.1. Expert #1 Opinion on Criteria for Optimal Tank Farm Operations via Analytical 
Hierarchical Process (AHP) Methodology 
 
 
Table 5.5 is used to carry out the pairwise comparisons of the evaluation criteria of Figure 5.2. 
Table 5.5 is used by Expert #1 to demonstrate as follows: 
 
Safety improvement of leak detection 
system of tank farm operations 
SCD #1 (i.e. Weekly 
maintenance) 
SCD #2 (i.e. Weekly visual 
inspections) 
SCD #3 (i.e. Use of experts 
in system operations) 
Labour cost  Equipment cost  Company organizational 
strategy  
Company 
structure  
Technology 
management  
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                                  Table 5.4: Definition of the Alternatives and Criteria 
 
Name of Levels  Definition of Levels       Explanation of Levels 
Level 1 SCD #1  Weekly maintenance of the tank farm 
operations 
SCD #2  Weekly visual inspections of tank farm 
operations 
SCD #3 Use of experts in system operations 
Level 2 Labour cost  Cost of labour in using/carrying out any of 
the SCDs 
Equipment cost  Cost of equipment used or hired for 
carrying out any of the SCDs 
Company organisational 
strategy  
Entails anticipation and making of 
contingency plans for obstacles that may 
arise in the future. It also involves assigning 
of roles to different teams in the company 
and laying out timelines of progress that 
shows different milestones. 
Company structure  It means decentralization of company 
structure in order to provide a better way to 
make quick decisions especially regarding 
safety or emergency situation. 
Technology management  It means improvement of speed and quality 
of service provided by the company via 
optimisation of resource allocation.  
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 In Row 2 of Table 5.5, labour cost and labour cost are compared, and the Expert #1 revealed 
that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 3 of Table 5.5, labour cost and equipment cost are compared, and the Expert #1 
revealed that equipment cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally Important” than 
Labour cost with numerical value of 2.  
 In Row 4 of Table 5.5, labour cost and company organisational strategy are compared, and 
the Expert #1 revealed that labour cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally 
Important” than company organisational strategy with numerical value of 2. 
 In Row 5 of Table 5.5, labour cost and company structure are compared, and the Expert #1 
revealed that labour cost are “Moderately more Important” than company structure with 
numerical value of 3.  
 In Row 6 of Table 5.5, labour cost and technology management are compared, and the 
Expert #1 revealed that labour cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally Important” 
than technology management with numerical value of 2. 
 In Row 7 of Table 5.5, equipment cost and equipment cost are compared, and the Expert #1 
revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 8 of Table 5.5, equipment cost and company organisational strategy are compared, 
and the Expert #1 revealed that equipment cost is “Between moderately more and strongly 
more Important” than company organisational strategy with numerical value of 4. 
 In Row 9 of Table 5.5, equipment cost and company structure are compared, and the Expert 
#1 revealed that equipment is “Moderately more Important” than company structure with 
numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 10 of Table 5.5, equipment cost and technology management are compared, and the 
Expert #1 revealed that equipment cost is “Moderately more Important” than equipment cost 
with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 11 of Table 5.5, company organisational strategy on the use of SCD #1 and 
company organisational strategy on the use of SCD #1 are compared, and the Expert #1 
revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 12 of Table 5.5, company organisational strategy and company structure are 
compared, and the Expert #1 revealed that company organisational strategy is “Moderately 
more Important” than company structure with numerical value of 3. 
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 In Row 13 of Table 5.5, company organisational strategy and technology management are 
compared, and the Expert #1 revealed that company organisational strategy is “Moderately 
more Important” than technology management with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 14 of Table 5.5, company structure on the use of SCD #1 and company structure are 
compared, and the Expert #1 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical 
value of 1. 
 In Row 15 of Table 5.5, company structure and technology management are compared, and 
the Expert #1 revealed that company structure is “Moderately more Important” than 
technology management with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 16 of Table 5.5, technology management and technology management are 
compared, and the Expert #1 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical 
value of 1. 
 
Four experts judgement are used in the numerical value ratings of pairwise comparison of the 
level 2 criteria of the Table 5.4 associated with SCDs. The experts‟ judgement of the Experts #2, 
#3 and #4 are described in Appendix 5A.  Equation 5.1 is used to aggregate the numerical value 
ratings by the four experts as shown in Table 5.6, so as to facilitate the estimation of the weights 
of the level 2 criteria of the Table 5.4 associated with the SCDs. The numerical value ratings in 
Table 5.6 and Equation 5.2 is use to develop a 5 x 5 pair-wise comparison matrix as evidenced in 
Table 5.7. 
 
 
5.9.3.2. Estimation of Weights of the Criteria for Optimal Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
Table 5.7 and Equation 5.3 is used to calculate the weights (i.e. ,1w 2w , 3w , 4w  and 5w )  of  
labour cost, equipment cost, company organisational strategy, company structure and technology 
management respectively as follows:                                                      
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      Table 5.5: Illustration of Conduction of Pairwise Comparison of the Criteria by Expert #1 
 
                        Pairwise Comparison Which Criterion 
is Important than 
the other? 
Details of level of 
Important 
Numerical 
Value 
Labour cost Labour cost None Equally Important 1 
Labour cost Equipment cost Equipment cost Between Moderately 
more and Equally 
Important 
2 
Labour cost Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Labour cost Between Moderately 
more and Equally 
Important 
2 
Labour cost Company structure Labour cost Moderately more 
Important 
3 
Labour cost Technology 
management 
Labour cost Between Moderately 
more and Equally 
Important 
2 
Equipment cost Equipment cost None Equally Important 1 
Equipment cost Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Equipment cost Between moderately 
more and strongly 
more Important 
4 
Equipment cost Company structure Equipment cost Moderately more 
Important 
3 
Equipment cost Technology 
management 
Equipment cost Moderately more 
Important 
3 
Company 
organisational strategy 
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
None Equally Important 1 
Company 
organisational strategy 
Company structure Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Moderately more 
Important 
3 
Company 
organisational strategy 
Technology 
management 
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Moderately more 
Important 
3 
Company structure Company structure None Equally Important 1 
Company structure Technology 
management 
Company 
structure 
Moderately more 
Important 
3 
Technology 
management 
Technology 
management 
None Equally Important 1 
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   Table 5.6: Aggregation of Numerical Value Rating of Pairwise Comparison of the Criteria  
 
Pairwise Comparison Numeric
-al 
Value 
Rating 
by 
Expert 
#1 
Numerical 
Value 
Rating by 
Expert #2 
(See 
Appendix 
5A for 
details) 
Numerical 
Value 
Rating by 
Expert #3 
(See 
Appendix 
5A for 
details) 
Numerical 
Value 
Rating by 
Expert #4 
(See 
Appendix 
5A for 
details) 
Aggregated 
Numerical 
Value 
Ratings 
using 
Equation 
5.1 
Labour cost Labour cost 1 1 1 1 1 
Labour cost Equipment 
cost 
2 2 3 2 2.25 
Labour cost Company 
organisation-
al strategy 
2 3 2 2 2.25 
Labour cost Company 
structure 
3 3 4 3 3.25 
Labour cost Technology 
management 
2 3 2 2 2.25 
Equipment 
cost 
Equipment 
cost 
1 1 1 1 1 
Equipment 
cost 
Company 
organisation-
al strategy 
4 3 4 4 3.75 
Equipment 
cost 
Company 
structure 
3 3 3 4 3.25 
Equipment 
cost 
Technology 
management 
3 4 3 3 3.25 
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Company 
organisation-
al strategy 
1 1 1 1 1 
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Company 
structure 
3 3 3 4 3.25 
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Technology 
management 
3 4 3 3 3.25 
Company 
structure 
Company 
structure 
1 1 1 1 1 
Company 
structure 
Technology 
management 
3 2 3 3 2.75 
Technology 
management 
Technology 
management 
1 1 1 1 1 
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                        Table 5.7: Pairwise Comparison of the Criteria by Experts #1 - #4 
 
Criterion Labour cost  Equipment 
cost  
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Company 
structure 
Technology 
management  
Labour cost         1 1/2.25 (i.e. 
0.444) 
      2.25      3.25       2.25 
Equipment cost       2.25 1       3.75      3.25       3.25 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
    
    1/2.25 
(i.e. 0.444) 
       
      1/3.75 (i.e. 
0.267) 
        
         1 
             
    3.25 
       
      3.25        
Company 
structure  
    
    1/3.25 
(i.e. 0.308) 
       
      1/3.25 (i.e. 
0.308) 
       
1/3.25 (i.e. 
0.308) 
    
      1 
 
      2.75 
Technology 
management  
        1/2.25 
(i.e. 0.444 
      1/3.25 (i.e. 
0.308) 
 1/3.25 (i.e. 
0.308) 
  1/2.75 
(i.e. 
0.364) 
       1 
SUM 4.446      2.327  7.616   11.11      12.5 
 
 







5.12
25.2
11.11
25.3
616.7
25.2
327.2
444.0
446.4
1
5
1
1w  
 
       = 0.237 
   







5.12
25.3
11.11
25.3
616.7
75.3
327.2
1
446.4
25.2
5
1
2w  
 
       = 0.396 
 







5.12
25.3
11.11
25.3
616.7
1
327.2
267.0
446.4
444.0
5
1
3w  
 
       = 0.18 
 







5.12
75.2
11.11
1
616.7
308.0
327.2
308.0
446.4
308.0
5
1
4w  
 
       = 0.11 
 







5.12
1
11.11
364.0
616.7
308.0
327.2
308.0
446.4
444.0
5
1
5w  
 
       = 0.077 
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The values of ,1w 2w , 3w , 4w  and 5w  are 0.237, 0.396, 0.18, 0.11 and 0.077 respectively. 
 
  
5.9.3.3. Investigation of the Consistency of the Pairwise Comparison of Criteria  
 
 
The consistency of pairwise comparison criteria associated with SCDs can be investigation via 
multiplication of ,1w 2w , 3w , 4w  and 5w  of labour cost, equipment cost, company 
organisational strategy, company structure and technology management respectively with each 
numerical values ratings in columns of Table 5.7 as described below. 
 
0.237  + 0.396   + 0.18 + 0.11 + 0.077  =  + 
  + +  + =  
 
CI is defined in Equation 5.4 as follows: 
 
CI =                                                                                          
 
The number of criteria in Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2 associated with SCDs is 5. Therefore, n is 5. 
 can be calculated using Equation 5.5 as follows: 
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=    
 
=  
= 5.442 
 
Therefore CI can be calculated as follows: 
   
 
CI =  
 
     = 0.1105 
 
The CR value will be calculated using Equation 5.6 and Table 5.3. Since the number of criteria is 
5, RI value of 1.12 will be chosen from Table 5.3 for estimation of the CR value as follows.  
 
CR = = = 0.099       
   
 
5.9.4. Application of Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS) Method in Identification of Best Safety Control Design (SCD) for Optimal 
Tank Farm Operations  
 
 
In this section, the mechanism of TOPSIS method is used to facilitate the ranking of the SCD #1, 
SCD #2 and SCD #3. In this study, the criteria associated with SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD #3 are 
monotonic, as evidenced in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.4. Therefore, they need to be classified as 
benefit or cost criteria for successful application of the TOPSIS method.  
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5.9.4.1. Development of Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS) Decision Matrix 
 
 
Using Equation 5.7, a decision matrix can be developed. Criteria classified as benefits are 
company organisational strategy, company structure and technology management, while the 
criteria classified as costs are labour cost and equipment cost. The SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD #3 
will be rated with respect to labour cost, equipment cost, company organisational strategy, 
company structure and technology management. Experts #1 - #4 will use Table 5.8 to rate the 
SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD #3 with respect to the criteria classified as benefits. The criteria 
classified as cost will be rated using cost data provided by the experts. Therefore, the decision 
matrix is illustrated in Table 5.9. 
 
                            Table 5.8: Rating Scale for Criteria Classified as Benefit  
 
                         Low           Average                    High 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
                                            Table 5.9: TOPSIS Decision Matrix 
 
 Labour cost ($) Equipment cost 
($) 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Company 
structure  
Technology 
management 
SCD #1 1900 875 7.5 8.25 8.5 
SCD #2 1925 963 5.25 3.5 7.25 
SCD #3 2400 2025 7.25 7.0 8.25 
 
 
$1900 for SCD #1 with respect to labour cost in Table 5.9, is the average of $2000, $1700, 
$2100 and $1800 estimated by Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 respectively. That is ($2000 + $1700 + 
$2100 + $1800)/4 = $1900. In a similar way, other cost estimate for SCDs with respect to cost 
criteria in Table 5.9 is found. In addition, the rated value of 7.5 for SCD #1 with respect to 
benefit criteria, company organisational strategy in Table 5.9 is estimated by Experts #1, #2, #3 
and #4. The experts used the rating scale for benefit criteria in Table 5.8. 7.5 is the average value 
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of 7, 8, 7 and 8 rated by Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 respectively. That is (7 + 8 + 7 + 8)/4 = 7.5. 
Similarly, other SCDs in Table 5.9 are rated with respect to benefit criteria. Therefore, 1900, 
875, 7.5, 8.25, 8.5, 1925, 963, 5.25, 3.5, 7.25, 2400, 2025, 7.25, 7 and 8.25 found in Table 5.9 
are values of 11r , 12r , 13r , 14r , 15r , 21r , 22r , 23r , 24r , 25r , 31r , 32r , 33r , 34r  and 35r  respectively. 
 
 
5.9.4.2. Construction of Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal  
Solution (TOPSIS) Normalised Decision Matrix 
 
 
Table 5.9 is normalised using Equation 5.8. Therefore, the normalised decision matrix is found in 
Table 5.10. For instance, 0.5254 for SCD #1 with respect to labour cost in Table 5.10 is found by 
dividing 1900 with 3616.023.  3616.023 is  
m
i ij
r
1
2
 (i = 1, 2, ..,m;  j = 1, 2, …..n) and 1900 is 
11r . 
 
                                 Table 5.10: TOPSIS Normalised Decision Matrix  
 
 Labour cost Equipment cost 
 
 
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Company 
structure 
Technology 
management 
SCD #1 0.5254   0.3635 0.6422 0.7255 0.6120 
SCD #2 0.5324 0.4001 0.4496 0.3078 0.5220 
SCD #3 0.6637 0.8413 0.6208 0.6156 0.5940 
 
 
In a similar way, other values in Table 5.10 are found. The values are 0.5254, 0.3635, 0.6422, 
0.7255, 0.6120, 0.5324, 0.4001, 0.4496, 0.3078, 0.5220, 0.6637, 0.8413, 0.6208, 0.6156 and 
0.5940. They are described as 11X , 12X , 13X ,  14X ,  15X ,  21X , 22X , 23X , 24X , 25X , 31X , 
32X , 33X ,  34X  and 35X  respectively.                               
 
 
 
 
 
124 
 
5.9.4.3. Construction of Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS) Weighted Normalised Decision Matrix 
 
 
The normalised decision matrix needs to be converted to weighted normalised decision matrix 
using Equation 5.9.  Since weight is one of the variable in Equation 5.9. Therefore, the values of 
,1w 2w , 3w , 4w  and 5w  of labour cost, equipment cost, company organisational strategy, 
company structure and technology management need to be revealed, so as to facilitate 
development of weighted normalised decision matrix. ,1w 2w , 3w , 4w  and 5w  have been 
revealed in Sub-sub-section 5.9.3.2 using the AHP technique. They are 0.237, 0.396, 0.18, 0.11 
and 0.077 respectively. Application of Equation 5.9 in this study, resulted to formation of 
weighted normalised decision matrix in Table 5.11. 
 
                                Table 5.11: TOPSIS Weighted Normalised Decision Matrix 
 
 Labour cost Equipment cost 
 
 
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Company 
structure 
Technology 
management 
SCD #1 0.1245   0.1439 0.1156 0.0798 0.0471 
SCD #2 0.1262 0.1584 0.0809 0.0339 0.0402 
SCD #3 0.1573 0.3332 0.1117 0.0677 0.0457 
 
 
In Table 5.11, 0.1245 for SCD #1 with respect to labour cost is found as a result of multiplication 
of 1w  (i.e. 0.237) with 11X (i.e. 0.5254). In a similar way, other values of ijV  are revealed as 
shown in Table 5.11. Values such as 0.1245, 0.1439, 0.1156,  0.0798, 0.0471, 0.1262, 0.1584, 
0.0809, 0.0339, 0.0402, 0.1573, 0.3332, 0.1117, 0.0677 and 0.0457 are for 11V , 12V , 13V , 14V , 
15V , 21V , 22V , 23V , 24V , 25V , 31V , 32V , 33V , 34V  and 35V  respectively.  
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5.9.4.4.  Determination of Positive Ideal Solution, PIS, V  
 
 
Values of 11V , 12V , 13V , 14V , 15V , 21V , 22V , 23V , 24V , 25V , 31V , 32V , 33V , 34V  and 35V  and 
Equations 5.10 and 5.11 will be used to identify 
V  and V  respectively, so as to calculate iD  
and iD .  Therefore,    54321 ,,,, VVVVVV  = {0.1245, 0.1439, 0.1156, 0.0798, 0.0471}. These 
five values of V  are selected from columns of labour cost, equipment cost, company 
organisational strategy, company structure and technology management in Table 5.11. These 
values are as results of selection of minimum and maximum values in columns of criteria 
classified as costs (i.e. labour cost and equipment cost) and benefits (i.e. company organisational 
strategy, company structure and technology management) respectively, in Table 5.11. This is in 
line with Equation 5.10. 
 
 
5.9.4.5. Determination of Negative Ideal Solution, NIS, V  
 
 
Application of Equation 5.11, yielded    54321 ,,,, VVVVVV  = {0.1573, 0.3332, 0.0809, 
0.0339, 0.0402}. The values of V are selected from columns of labour cost, equipment cost, 
company organisational strategy, company structure and technology management in Table 5.11 
in line with the principle of Equation 5.11. The principle states that maximum value should be 
selected from each column of a criterion in a weighted normalised decision matrix classified as 
cost and minimum value chosen from the ones classified as benefits.  
 
 
5.9.4.6. Determination of the Distance Separation Measure for the PIS, D  
 
 
Since the values of 
V  and V have been revealed, D  and D  can now be calculated using 
Equations 5.12 and 5.13 respectively. iD  for SCD #1,  SCD #2 and SCD #3 can be calculated 
using the information in Table 5.11 and provided values of 
V . In Table 5.11, the row for SCD 
#1 is associated with 11V , 12V , 13V , 14V  and 15V . Their corresponding values are 0.1245, 0.1439, 
0.1156, 0.0798 and 0.0471. 11V  and 12V  are weighted normalised value for SCD #1 with respect 
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to criteria classified as cost, such as labour cost and equipment cost respectively. Therefore, in 
the calculation of 1D , 0.1245 and 0.1439, which are values of 

1V  and 

2V  are for criteria 
classified as cost (i.e. labour cost and equipment cost). While 0.1156, 0.0798 and 0.0471 which 
are values of 3V , 

4V  and 

5V  are criteria classified as benefit (i.e. company organisational 
strategy, company structure and technology management). 
 
In view of the above explanation, 1D  for SCD #1 can be calculated as follows: 
 
  
 
5
1
2
11 j jj
VVD =          2515
2
414
2
313
2
212
2
111
  VVVVVVVVVV  
 
  =          22222 0471.00471.00798.00798.01156.01156.01439.01439.01245.01245.0   
 
  = 0 
In a similar way, 2D  and 

3D  for SCD #2 and SCD #3 respectively, are calculated as follows:   
 
  
 
5
1
2
22 j jj
VVD =          2525
2
424
2
323
2
222
2
121
  VVVVVVVVVV  
 
  =          22222 0471.00402.00798.00339.01156.00809.01439.01584.01245.01262.0   
 
  = 0.0592 
 
  
 
5
1
2
33 j jj
VVD =          2535
2
434
2
333
2
232
2
131
  VVVVVVVVVV  
 
  =          22222 0471.00457.00798.00677.01156.01117.01439.03332.01245.01573.0   
 
  = 0.1924 
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5.9.4.7. Determination of the Distance Separation Measure for the NIS, D  
 
 

iD  for SCD #1,  SCD #1 and SCD #1 can be calculated using their respective ijV  values and 
   54321 ,,,, VVVVVV  . Since the values of 1V , 2V ,  3V , 4V  and 5V  has been revealed as 
0.1573, 0.3332, 0.0809, 0.0339 and 0.0402 respectively, Equation 5.13 can be implemented for 
each SCD. 
  
To facilitate calculation of the 1D  for SCD #1, the values of 11V , 12V , 13V , 14V  and 15V  
described as 0.1245, 0.1439, 0.1156, 0.0798 and 0.0471 respectively in the row of SCD #1 in 
Table 5.11, need to be classified as value for benefit or cost criteria. It has been revealed in Sub-
sub-section 5.9.4.1 that 11V  and 12V  are for labour cost and equipment cost respectively. 13V , 14V  
and 15V  are for company organisational strategy, company structure and technology 
management. In view of this, the values of 11V , 12V , 13V , 14V  and 15V  and the ones of  

1V , 

2V ,  

3V , 

4V  and 

5V can now be used to calculate 

1D  as follows:   
 
  
 
5
1
2
11 j jj
VVD =          2515
2
414
2
313
2
212
2
111
  VVVVVVVVVV  
 
  =          22222 0402.00471.00339.00798.00809.01156.03332.01439.01573.01245.0   
 
  = 0.2005 
 
Similarly, 2D  and 

3D  for SCD #2 and SCD #3 respectively, are calculated as expressed below.   
 
  
 
5
1
2
22 j jj
VVD =          2525
2
424
2
323
2
222
2
121
  VVVVVVVVVV  
 
  =          22222 0402.00402.00339.00339.00809.00809.03332.01584.01573.01262.0   
 
128 
 
  = 0.1778 
 
  
 
5
1
2
33 j jj
VVD =          2535
2
434
2
333
2
232
2
131
  VVVVVVVVVV  
 
  =          22222 0402.00457.00339.00677.00809.01117.03332.03332.01573.01573.0   
 
  = 0.0447 
 
 
5.9.4.8. Determination of the Relative Closeness to Ideal Solution, RC  
 
 
The ranks of SCDs will be used to facilitate decision making processes in the next section. The 
RC  values of the SCDs will be used to show how important each alternative is through 
ranking. SCD with high RC  value is more important than the one with low RC value. In this 
study, iRC  values of SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD #3 are calculated using Equation 5.14, so as to 
rank them in order of importance. Therefore, their iD  and 

iD  values are used to calculate their 
various iRC  values as follows: 
 





11
1
1
DD
D
RC  =   
2005.00
2005.0

= 1 
 





22
2
2
DD
D
RC  =   
1778.00592.0
1778.0

= 0.7502 
 





33
3
3
DD
D
RC  =   
0447.01924.0
0447.0

= 0.1885 
 
 
In view of this, the ranks of the SCDs are detailed in Table 5.12. Table 5.12 is explained as 
follows: 
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                              Table 5.12: iD , 

iD  and 

iRC  Values and Ranking  of SCDs  
 
Alternatives/Options 
iD  

iD  

iRC  
Rank 
SCD #1 0 0.2005 1 1 
SCD #2 0.0592 0.1778 0.7502 2 
SCD #3 0.0447 0.1924 0.1885 3 
 
 SCD #1 is associated with 0 for 1D , 0.2005 for 

1D , 1 for 

1RC  and rank of 1. 
 SCD #2 is associated with 0.0592 for 2D , 0.1778 for 

2D , 0.7502 for 

2RC  and rank of 2. 
 SCD #3 is associated with 0.0447 for 3D , 0.1924 for 

3D , 0.1885 for 

3RC  and rank of 3.   
                            
                  
5.9.5. Decision Making on Best Safety Control Design (SCD) for Optimal Tank Farm 
Operations 
 
 
Most important design options can be identified using the ranks associated with the three SCDs 
(i.e. SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD #3). The SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD #3 are identified by Experts 
#1, #2, #3 and #4 for safety improvement of leak detection system in order to achieve optimal 
tank farm operations. Information provided in Table 5.12 can be employed in decision making 
on most important SCD. In view of this, SCD #1 is identified as the most important SCD, 
because it has 1RC  value of 1 and rank of 1, while SCD #2 and SCD #3 have 

2RC  and 

3RC  
values of 0.7502 and 0.1885 and ranks of 2 and 3 respectively. Since 1#3#2# SCDSCDSCD  , 
therefore, SCD #1 will be used to ensure optimal operations of tank farm via safety improvement 
of leak detection system. 
 
 
5.9.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
In this study, sensitivity analysis is will be used to verify the robustness of the model employed. 
In view of this, the following axioms are outlined as follows: 
 Axiom 1. Slight increase of the value of distance separation measure for the PIS, iD for an 
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alternative/option, should result in decrease of the relative closeness to ideal solution, iRC
for that alternative/option. 
 Axiom 2. Slight decrease of the value of distance separation measure for the PIS, iD for an 
alternative, should result in increase of the relative closeness to ideal solution, iRC for that 
alternative/option. 
 
In Table 5.12, 1D for SCD #1 is 0. When the value is increased by 0.01, it becomes 0.01 (i.e. 0 + 
0.01). Substituting 0.01 in Equation 5.14, produced 1RC  value of 0.9525. Similarly, the 

2D  
value for SCD #2 shown in Table 5.12 is increased by 0.01. The resultant value (i.e. 0.0692) is 
used in Equation 5.14 to produce 2RC  
value of 0.7198.
 
In a similar way, the 3D value for SCD 
#3 illustrated in Table 5.14 is increased by 0.01 to produce 0.0547. Using the 0.0547 in Equation 
5.14, yielded 3RC value of 0.1809. The new ,1
RC andRC ,2

3RC values satisfied Axiom 1.  
 
The values of ,1
D andD2

3D  illustrated in Table 5.12 are decreased by 0.01 to produce new 
values of -0.01, 0.0492, and 0.1824 respectively. Substituting each of the values in Equation 
5.14, resulted in ,1
RC andRC ,2

3RC values of 1.052, 0.7833 and 0.1968 respectively. This is in 
harmony with Axiom 2. 
 
 
 
5.10. Conclusions 
 
 
Obtaining of optimal tank farm operations is the desire of users and stake holders in the maritime 
industry. The consequences of failure of any tank farm operations can be disastrous. This can be 
subdued by identification of SCDs and multi-criteria decision making tools. In this research, it 
has been revealed that combined multi-criteria decision making tools such as AHP-TOPSIS 
model can be employed to identify the best SCD that can be used to improve the safety level of a 
leak detection of tank farm, so as to achieve optimal tank farm operations. The mechanism of the 
AHP-TOPSIS model is used by four experts to investigate the weight values of the criteria such 
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as labour cost, equipment cost, company organisational strategy, company structure and 
technology management and ranks of the alternatives (i.e. SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD #3).  
 
The AHP technique and expert judgement is used to reveal the weights of the labour cost, 
equipment cost, company organisational strategy, company structure and technology 
management, while TOPSIS method is employed for ranking exercise of the SCD #1, SCD #2 
and SCD #3. In doing so, the SCD #1 is identified as the SCD that can be used to improve the 
leak detection system of tank farm, evidenced by its 1RC  value of 1 and rank of 1. The 

1RC  
value of 1 is the highest 1RC  value assigned to the SCDs, which makes SCD #1 most important 
one, because the higher the 1RC  value, the more important the SCD. The methodology of this 
study can be used by oil and gas companies, chemical and nuclear industries and regulatory 
authorities for decision making processes on various operations of their systems and subsystems. 
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Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, the models and results used in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are discussed. Verifications of 
the models are also outlined. The strengths and weaknesses of the models are described and 
relevant industries that can use the research are discussed. Furthermore, the 
research conclusions and limitations are explained. Finally, the areas of recommendation for 
future research are outlined. 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
 
There is no doubt that the safety level of tank farm operations need to be improved evidenced 
from various accidents that has happen in the industry, which is described in Chapter 2  of this 
research. The number of tank farms needed for storage of petroleum and chemical products is 
significantly increasing in recent time. There is public concern about their safety. Occurrences of 
tank farm accidents are likely to be catastrophic. Therefore, prevention of these accidents is a 
necessity. To accomplish this task, high risk tank farm operational hazards have been 
investigated using proactive approach in company with traditional risk/safety analysis methods, 
advanced computational techniques and multi-criteria decision making method as described in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
 
The impact of various organizations in tank farm optimal operations via setting of standards, 
codes and regulations contributed in accidents preventions as described in Chapter 2. For 
instance, AIChE and API provided guidelines for storage and handling of high toxic hazard 
materials and guideline for welded steel tanks for oil storage respectively. Additionally, API 
developed rules for design and construction of large, welded, low-pressure storage tank and 
NFPA recommended standard for the storage and handling of liquefied petroleum gases. 
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This study illustrated how the FMEA-FRB methodology is incorporated in risk evaluation of 
tank farm operational hazards such as leak detection system failure, pipe corrosion protection 
system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure 
and secondary containment monitoring system failure in Chapter 3 and investigation of the 
causes of the riskiest hazard under uncertainty in fuzzy environment in Chapter 4. Furthermore, 
identification of designs/measures that can improve tank farm operational safety is facilitated 
using the AHP-TOPSIS technique in Chapter 5.  
 
 
 
6.2.  Discussion of the Failure Mode Effect Analysis - Fuzzy Rule Based (FMEA-FRB) 
Methodology in Risk Analysis of Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
Estimations of ranks of tank farm operational hazards/failure modes such as automatic shut-
down oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic tank gauge 
system failure, leak detection device/system failure, and secondary containment monitoring 
system failure are facilitated using the FMEA-FRB methodology and four experts‟ judgement in 
Chapter 3. The FMEA-FRB methodology is a combination of FMEA and FRB techniques for the 
purpose of addressing uncertainty due lack of failure rate data of tank farm operational 
hazards/failure modes. The ranking exercise is a risk based one. Such exercise is conducted with 
the aid of risk and FMEA parameters such as RPN (i.e. PAH), OLH, CSH and DH, and the FRB. 
The experts involved in the study are experienced and understand the subject under investigation. 
They employed brainstorming techniques in the investigation of the risk ranks of the 
aforementioned hazards in fuzzy environment.  
 
The OLH, CSH, DH and PAH of the FMEA methodology are described using five linguistic 
terms as shown in Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 respectively, in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the developed fuzzy 125 IF-THEN rules for detail analysis and investigation 
of the risk ranks of the tank farm operational hazards/failure modes. The fuzzy 125 IF-THEN 
rule is developed as a result of associating five linguistic terms to each parameter in the 
antecedent part of the IF-THEN rule. The OLH, CSH and DH are described as antecedent 
parameters of the IF-THEN rule, while PAH is known as the consequent part of the IF-THEN 
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rule. OLH is associated with very low, low, average, high and very high linguistic terms as 
demonstrated in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.3, while CSH is categorised as negligible, marginal, 
moderate, critical and catastrophic as illustrated in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4. The last parameter 
of the antecedent IF-THEN rule part, DH is described using highly unlikely, unlikely, reasonably 
likely, likely and highly likely linguistic term as evidenced in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.5, whereas 
the only parameter of the consequent IF-THEN rule part, PAH is described using five linguistic 
terms such as very low, low, moderate, high and very high as shown in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.6. 
Fuzzy membership functions of the OLH, CSH, DH and PAH are developed using their 
respective linguistic terms, which created platforms that can be used for estimation of the degree 
of belief (i.e. fuzzy values) of tank farm operational hazards/failure modes.  
 
Experts with the domain knowledge as evidenced in this study, employed these fuzzy 
membership functions of OLH, CSH, DH and PAH as a guide in the estimation exercise of fuzzy 
values for OLH, CSH, DH and PAH for all the five tank farm operational hazards/failure modes 
under investigation. The number of fired rules out of 125 fuzzy IF-THEN rules depends purely 
on if the fuzzy values of linguistic terms associated with OLH, CSH and DH that made up a rule 
are known. The fuzzy value associated with the linguistic term of the PAH of a rule depends on 
the ones of OLH, CSH and DH. The minimum fuzzy value among the ones of OLH, CSH and 
DH is assigned and described as the one of PAH due to adoption of min-max method in the 
subject under investigation. 
 
In the investigation of risk based ranks of automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure, pipe 
corrosion protection system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, leak detection 
device/system failure, and secondary containment monitoring system failure, 8 rules are fired 
and min-max method adopted for facilitation of estimation of fuzzy conclusions for PAH of each 
tank farm operational hazards. The fuzzy conclusions for PAH of automatic shut-down oil safety 
valve failure, pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, leak 
detection device/system failure, and secondary containment monitoring system failure are 
described as {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0.4, “high”), (0, “very high”)}, 
{(0.15, “very low”), (0.85, “low”), (0, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very high”)}, {(0, “very 
low”), (0.4, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very high”)}, {(0, “very low”), (0, 
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“low”), (0.45, “moderate”), (0.55, “high”), (0, “very high”)} and {(0, “very low”), (0, “low”), 
(0.55, “moderate”), (0.45, “high”), (0, “very high”)} respectively, as evidenced in Table 3.5. 
 
These fuzzy conclusions are converted to crisp values using the expected utility theory method. 
The crisp values for automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion protection 
system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, leak detection device/system failure, and 
secondary containment monitoring system failure are described as 0.6, 0.2125, 0.4, 0.6375 and 
0.6125 respectively as illustrated in Table 3.5. These values are used to rank the automatic shut-
down oil safety valve failure, pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic tank gauge 
system failure, leak detection device/system failure, and secondary containment monitoring 
system failure as 3, 5, 4, 1 and 2 respectively as shown in Table 3.5. In this study, the hazards are 
ranked according to their riskiness. The riskiest hazard is ranked as 1. Thus, the leak detection 
system failure is the riskiest hazard.  
 
Sensitivity analysis carried out on the model, proved that the model is robust and effectively 
served its purpose as evidenced in Sub-section 3.6.3. This groundbreaking method can be 
employed in the HAZID and risk evaluation of various maritime, oil and gas facilities by 
maritime and oil companies. However, this method posed some challenges such as very difficult 
to use when the number of fuzzy rules increase and is prone to error during computation, if not 
carefully handled.  
 
 
 
6.3. Discussion of Fuzzy Fault Tree (FFT) Methodology in Failure Analysis of Leak 
Detection System of Tank Farm Operations 
  
 
The results verification conducted via sensitivity analysis reveals that the FFT model served its 
purpose in this research and justified the estimated values of the failure probabilities of all the 
events. The causes of the leak detection system failure are revealed using a novel model such as 
FFT method. In this research, traditional risk/safety analysis (i.e. FTA) in combination with 
fuzzy logic is employed for investigation of the subject under investigation. The failure logics 
structure of an FTA facilitated the linking of causes of the leak detection system failure of tank 
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farm operations. The characteristics of an FTA such as possession of a TE, BE and intermediate 
events facilitated the structuring of the leak detection system failure as TE,  human error, human 
sabotage, human vandalization, thermal contraction, thermal expansion, check valve leaks, 
pressure relief valve leaks, high static head pressure, continuous pump run,  material defects, 
vapour pockets, fuse unit failure, power supply unit failure and switch failure as BEs, while 
human threats, mechanical failure, control panel failure and thermal condition as intermediate 
events. The FTA structure of leak detection system failure in Figure 4.3, revealed that the TE can 
only occur when any of the intermediate events such as human threats, mechanical failure, 
control panel failure happens.  
 
Estimation of the failure probabilities of these events posed to be a challenge. The challenge is 
subdued by incorporation of fuzzy logic into an FTA technique, so as to address uncertainties in 
failure probabilities estimation of all the events that made up the FTA of the leak detection 
system failure. In estimation of the BEs failure probabilities denoted as BEFPr , a fuzzy 
membership function described with very low, low, average, high and very high linguistic terms 
is used as illustrated in Figure 4.2. The exercise is facilitated using triangular fuzzy scales of (0, 
0.2, 0.4), (0.2, 0.4, 0.6), (0.4, 0.6, 0.8), (0.6, 0.8, 1.0) and (0.8, 1.0, 1.0) for very low, low, 
average, high and very high respectively, as illustrated in Table 4.1. The judgement of four 
experts involved in the investigation of each BE failure possibility, denoted as FPsBE , using the 
triangular fuzzy scales is aggregated. (0.1, 0.3, 0.5), (0.15, 0.35, 0.55), (0.35, 0.55, 0.75), (0.7, 
0.9, 1), (0.7, 0.9, 1), (0.5, 0.7, 0.9), (0.2, 0.4, 0.6), (0.65, 0.85, 1), (0.4, 0.6, 0.8), (0.15, 0.35, 
0.55), (0.5, 0.7, 0.9), (0, 0.2, 0.4), (0.1, 0.3, 0.5)  and (0.2, 0.4, 0.6) are found as BEs triangular 
fuzzy scales such as human error, human sabotage, human vandalization, thermal contraction, 
thermal expansion, check valve leaks, pressure relief valve leaks, high static head pressure, 
continuous pump run,  material defects, vapour pockets, fuse unit failure, power supply unit 
failure and switch failure respectively.   
 
The defuzzification process is conducted using CoA defuzzification method and the defuzzified 
values revealed are 0.3, 0.35, 0.55, 0.867, 0.867, 0.7, 0.4, 0.833, 0.6, 0.35, 0.7, 0.2, 0.3 and 0.2. 
They are described as failure possibilities of BEs such as human error, human sabotage, human 
vandalization, thermal contraction, thermal expansion, check valve leaks, pressure relief valve 
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leaks, high static head pressure, continuous pump run,  material defects, vapour pockets, fuse 
unit failure, power supply unit failure and switch failure respectively. These failure possibilities 
values are converted to failure probabilities and found as 0.001, 0.0015, 0.007, 0.059, 0.059, 
0.018, 0.002, 0.045, 0.01, 0.0015, 0.018, 0.0002, 0.001 and 0.002 respectively. BEs failure 
probabilities values and the FTA failure logics is used to estimate the failure probabilities of the 
TE (i.e. leak detection system failure) and intermediate events.  
 
The failure probability of leak detection system failure is found to be 0.205 and the ones of the 
intermediate events such as human threats, mechanical failure, control panel failure and thermal 
condition are revealed as 0.009, 0.196, 0.003 and 0.059 respectively. The TE failure probability 
is 0.205, and the consequences will be catastrophic, if the correct preventive and mitigative 
measures are not in place. The higher the failure probability of a BE, the more important of that 
BE and vice versa. This study revealed that BEs such as thermal expansion and thermal 
contraction are the most important ones, while the fuse unit failure is the least important one. 
Various industries can adopt the methodology used in this research for their system failure and 
risk analysis in realm of uncertainty. The successful application of this method has been proven 
in this research but there are still some shortcomings. Hazards with the same failure probability 
may have different risk implications in reality. Therefore, preventive and mitigative measures 
employed must be able to address and prevent the occurrence of all the BEs and intermediate 
events.  
 
 
 
6.4. Discussion of Analytic Hierarchy Process-Technique for Order Preference by 
Similarity to the Ideal Solution (AHP-TOPSIS) Methodology in Optimal Safety 
Improvement of Tank Farm Operations 
 
 
Various SCDs are identified but selection of most effective one for optimal operations of tank 
farm is a challenge. This multi-criteria decision making problem is overcome using the AHP-
TOPSIS model in this study. The mechanism of the AHP-TOPSIS model is used to facilitate the 
identification of the best SCD. The SCDs are SCD #1 described as weekly maintenance, SCD #2 
detailed as daily visual inspections and SCD #3 known as use of experts in system operations. 
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The SCDs and their associated criteria are identified and developed in a hierarchical structural 
form to facilitate selection of most efficient one using the AHP-TOPSIS model. Linguistic terms 
are identified and defined in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 for pair-wise comparison of various criteria 
associated with the SCDs using four experts judgement. Scores are assigned to them for effective 
utilisation of the linguistic terms by four experts in the judgement of the relevance of the criteria 
in facilitation of the identification of a SCD that can ensure optimal tank farm operations.  
 
The pair-wise comparison is carried out using linguistic terms as a guide at the criteria level of 
the hierarchical structure developed in Figure 5.2 i.e. each criterion is compared with one 
another. Criteria in the hierarchical structure are linked to the alternatives (i.e. SCD #1, SCD #2 
and SCD #3) as shown in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.4. The criteria are labour cost, equipment cost, 
company organisational strategy, company structure and technology management as illustrated 
in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.4. The results of the four experts‟ judgement in the pair-wise 
comparison exercise are aggregated and used to estimate the weights of all the criteria. The 
weights of the labour cost, equipment cost, company organisational strategy, company structure 
and technology management are found as 0.237, 0.396, 0.18, 0.11 and 0.077 respectively as 
evidenced in Sub-section 5.9.3.2. A CR is conducted to ascertain if the four experts‟ judgement 
used in this research is reasonable and acceptable. A CR value equal or less than 0.1 must be 
produced for the four experts‟ judgement to be reasonable in the pair-wise comparison of the 
criteria. 0.099 CR value is produced in the pair-wise comparison of the criteria associated with 
SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD#3 as demonstrated in Sub-section 5.9.3.3. Therefore, the four 
experts‟ judgements are reasonable.  
 
These weights of the criteria associated with SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD#3 revealed, are 
incorporated in TOPSIS model so as to find out an SCD that can ensure optimal tank farm 
operations. Rated scale and TOPSIS decision matrix illustrated in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 respectively 
are used to investigate the most efficient SCD. The criteria associated with the SCDs illustrated 
in Figure 5.2 and Table 5.4 are classified as cost and benefits, so as to facilitate the revealing of 
the relative closeness to ideal solution, 
RC values of the SCDs. RC values are used for 
ranking of the SCDs. 
RC values are estimated using the distance separation measure for the 
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NIS, D
 
and  the distance separation measure for the PIS, D values illustrated in Table 5.12.
 
D
 
and D  values are revealed using the information in Table 5.11. RC values of SCD #1, 
SCD #2 and SCD#3 are revealed in Table 5.12 as 1, 0.7502 and 0.1885 respectively. In this 
study, any SCD with highest RC value is the most efficient one. Therefore, SCD #1 is more 
desirable than others in addressing optimal operations problem of tank farm and ranked as 1.  
 
This work can serve as a platform for experts in the maritime and oil and gas industries with 
domain knowledge to make rational decision in multi-criteria problems. Though, this model 
possesses significant advantages, some weaknesses still exist. If the criteria are in hundreds, the 
computation of the pair-wise comparison becomes difficult and error is inevitable. Sometimes, 
the model may estimates the same weight values for two or more control measures. In the real 
world, these control measures may have different impact on safety improvement level of a 
system/operation. 
 
 
 
6.5. Main Conclusions of the Research 
 
 
In this research, HAZID, risk evaluation and safety/risk control of tank farm operational hazards 
were conducted and addressed for the purpose of improving tank farm operations under 
uncertainty. The investigations and analysis were proactive based. Therefore, the research 
findings are: 
 
 A brainstorming technique was employed in the HAZID of the tank farm operations, 
facilitated by the adoption of the FMEA-FRB methodology. The major tank farm 
operational hazards such as leak detection system failure, pipe corrosion protection system 
failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure 
and secondary containment monitoring system failure were revealed and their risks 
estimated and ranked. The riskiest one was noted and described as leak detection system 
failure. 
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 The causes of leak detection system failure were investigated using the FTA method. The 
failure probabilities of the causes were identified using FFT. The FTA diagram was made up 
of a TE (leak detection system failure), 14 BEs (i.e. human error, human Sabotage, human 
vandalization, thermal contraction, thermal expansion, check valve leaks, pressure relief 
valve leaks, high static head pressure, continuous pump run,  material defects, vapour 
pockets, fuse unit failure, power supply unit failure and switch failure) and 4 intermediate 
events (human threat, control panel failure, mechanical failure and thermal condition). All 
their failure probabilities were revealed under uncertainty and used to rank them. 
 An AHP-TOPSIS model has been adopted as a decision making tool and was used in 
combination with experts‟ judgements to illustrate how the SCD #1, SCD #2 and SCD #3 
can be identified and selected for optimal tank farm operations.  The SCD #1 is identified as 
the best SCD that can prevent the occurrence of the leak detection system failure and 
improve the tank farm operations optimally.  
 
 
 
6.6. Research Limitations 
 
 
This research is focused on HAZID and risk/safety evaluation and control of tank farm 
operational hazards. The HAZID exercise is limited to the major ones that can hinder the proper 
operations of tank farms in Chapter 3. Risk evaluation has been conducted on them using the 
FMEA-FRB method to reveal the high risk ones and their respective ranks. The leak detection 
system failure is the hazard that needs further investigation because it is the riskiest among all 
the major hazards considered. This research is not extended to investigation of causes of other 
hazards that have lesser risk than the one of leak detection system failure. 
 
The causes of leak detection system failure and their failure probabilities were investigated using 
a powerful tool, described as FFT. The FTA method is limited to identification and addressing of 
the causes of the leak detection system failure quantitatively and qualitatively. The fuzzy values 
served only as reasonable alternative to the failure probabilities of the causes (i.e. BE) in Chapter 
4.  
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The experts used in this research are limited to four, due to their recognizable experiences in the 
subject investigated. The research framework is limited to the use of only AHP-TOPSIS model 
for multi-criteria decision making on the best SCD in Chapter 5. Other similar methods were not 
accommodated in this research framework due to the nature and limitation of the investigated 
subject.  
 
 
 
6.7. Recommendations for Future Research 
 
 
The areas recommended for future research are described as follows:  
 
 Future research on investigation of the causes of other tank farm operational hazards such as 
pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic tank gauge system failure, automatic 
shut-down oil safety valve failure and secondary containment monitoring system failure 
using the FTA method is necessary. The FFT method should be used in the identification of 
the failure probabilities of their respective BEs and TEs. Such informations will contribute 
immensely in strengthening the safety management of the tank farm operations.  
 The usefulness of the AHP model cannot be ignored in future research work. Therefore, it 
should be extended to management of other tank farm operational hazards. The AHP-
TOPSIS method can be adopted in decision making on the best control measure that can be 
used to eliminate hazards such as pipe corrosion protection system failure, automatic tank 
gauge system failure, automatic shut-down oil safety valve failure and secondary 
containment monitoring system failure.  
 It will be useful if future researchers can employ other multi-criteria decision making 
technique and involvement of more than four experts‟ judgements in testing of how sound 
the developed model is. This may give rise to interesting findings and will boast the 
confidence of the researchers on this work. It will encourage the researchers to apply this 
model to other areas of interest.  
 This research can accommodate other traditional safety/risk analysis techniques described in 
Chapter 2. I recommend future researchers to use this work to investigate the usefulness of 
those techniques.  
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 The novel models (i.e. FMEA-FRB, FFT and AHP-TOPSIS models) developed in this 
research, should be extended and applied to safety/risk management of the areas where the 
tank farms are sited. Other facilities very close to the tank farm operations should also be 
considered. This will guarantee maximum protection of the tank farm operations. 
 Applications of the PRA are hindered by lack of failure rates data. Such method can be 
employed in comprehensive risk assessment of tank farms operation and their surroundings 
if industries can make failure rates data available for researchers. This will facilitate 
effective safety/risk management of the systems in certain environment. Therefore, 
industries should be encouraged to make data available for various researches.   
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Appendix 3A: The 125 IF-THEN Fuzzy Rules of PAH of Tank Farm Operations  
 
 
Rule #1: IF OLH is very low, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #2: IF OLH is very low, CSH is marginal AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #3: IF OLH is very low, CSH is moderate AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #4: IF OLH is very low, CSH is critical AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #5: IF OLH is very low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #6: IF OLH is low, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very low. 
Rule #7: IF OLH is low, CSH is marginal AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #8: IF OLH is low, CSH is moderate AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #9: IF OLH is low, CSH is critical AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #10: IF OLH is low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #11: IF OLH is average, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #12: IF OLH is average, CSH is marginal AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #13: IF OLH is average, CSH is moderate AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #14: IF OLH is average, CSH is critical AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #15: IF OLH is average, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
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Rule #16: IF OLH is high, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #17: IF OLH is high, CSH is marginal AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #18: IF OLH is high, CSH is moderate AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #19: IF OLH is high, CSH is critical AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #20: IF OLH is high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #21: IF OLH is very high, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is 
very low. 
Rule #22: IF OLH is very high, CSH is marginal AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #23: IF OLH is very high, CSH is moderate AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #24: IF OLH is very high, CSH is critical AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #25: IF OLH is very high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is 
very high. 
Rule #26: IF OLH is very low, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #27: IF OLH is very low, CSH is moderate AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #28: IF OLH is very low, CSH is critical AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #29: IF OLH is very low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #30: IF OLH is very low, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #31: IF OLH is low, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very low. 
Rule #32: IF OLH is low, CSH is moderate AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #33: IF OLH is low, CSH is critical AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #34: IF OLH is low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #35: IF OLH is low, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very high. 
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Rule #36: IF OLH is average, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #37: IF OLH is average, CSH is moderate AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #38: IF OLH is average, CSH is critical AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #39: IF OLH is average, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #40: IF OLH is average, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #41: IF OLH is high, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #42: IF OLH is high, CSH is moderate AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #43: IF OLH is high, CSH is critical AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #44: IF OLH is high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #45: IF OLH is high, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very high. 
Rule #46: IF OLH is very high, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is 
very low. 
Rule #47: IF OLH is very high, CSH is moderate AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #48: IF OLH is very high, CSH is critical AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #49: IF OLH is very high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #50: IF OLH is very high, CSH is negligible AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #51: IF OLH is very low, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is 
very low. 
Rule #52: IF OLH is very low, CSH is critical AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #53: IF OLH is very low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #54: IF OLH is very low, CSH is negligible AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #55: IF OLH is very low, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
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Rule #56: IF OLH is low, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #57: IF OLH is low, CSH is critical AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #58: IF OLH is low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #59: IF OLH is low, CSH is negligible AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #60: IF OLH is low, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very high. 
Rule #61: IF OLH is average, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #62: IF OLH is average, CSH is critical AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #63: IF OLH is average, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #64: IF OLH is average, CSH is negligible AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #65: IF OLH is average, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #66: IF OLH is high, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #67: IF OLH is high, CSH is critical AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #68: IF OLH is high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #69: IF OLH is high, CSH is negligible AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #70: IF OLH is high, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very high. 
Rule #71: IF OLH is very high, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is 
very low. 
Rule #72: IF OLH is very high, CSH is critical AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #73: IF OLH is very high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH 
is moderate. 
Rule #74: IF OLH is very high, CSH is negligible AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #75: IF OLH is very high, CSH is marginal AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
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Rule #76: IF OLH is very low, CSH is critical AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #77: IF OLH is very low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #78: IF OLH is very low, CSH is negligible AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #79: IF OLH is very low, CSH is marginal AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #80: IF OLH is very low, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #81: IF OLH is low, CSH is critical AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very low. 
Rule #82: IF OLH is low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #83: IF OLH is low, CSH is negligible AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #84: IF OLH is low, CSH is marginal AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #85: IF OLH is low, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very high. 
Rule #86: IF OLH is average, CSH is critical AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #87: IF OLH is average, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #88: IF OLH is average, CSH is negligible AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #89: IF OLH is average, CSH is marginal AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #90: IF OLH is average, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #91: IF OLH is high, CSH is critical AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very low. 
Rule #92: IF OLH is high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #93: IF OLH is high, CSH is negligible AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #94: IF OLH is high, CSH is marginal AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #95: IF OLH is high, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very high. 
Rule #96: IF OLH is very high, CSH is critical AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #97: IF OLH is very high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
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Rule #98: IF OLH is very high, CSH is negligible AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #99: IF OLH is very high, CSH is marginal AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #100: IF OLH is very high, CSH is moderate AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #101: IF OLH is very low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is 
very low. 
Rule #102: IF OLH is very low, CSH is negligible AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #103: IF OLH is very low, CSH is marginal AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #104: IF OLH is very low, CSH is moderate AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #105: IF OLH is very low, CSH is critical AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #106: IF OLH is low, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #107: IF OLH is low, CSH is negligible AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #108: IF OLH is low, CSH is marginal AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #109: IF OLH is low, CSH is moderate AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #110: IF OLH is low, CSH is critical AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very high. 
Rule #111: IF OLH is average, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is 
very low. 
Rule #112: IF OLH is average, CSH is negligible AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #113: IF OLH is average, CSH is marginal AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #114: IF OLH is average, CSH is moderate AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #115: IF OLH is average, CSH is critical AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
Rule #116: IF OLH is high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is very 
low. 
Rule #117: IF OLH is high, CSH is negligible AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
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Rule #118: IF OLH is high, CSH is marginal AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #119: IF OLH is high, CSH is moderate AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #120: IF OLH is high, CSH is critical AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very high. 
Rule #121: IF OLH is very high, CSH is catastrophic AND DH is highly unlikely, THEN PAH is 
very low. 
Rule #122: IF OLH is very high, CSH is negligible AND DH is unlikely, THEN PAH is low. 
Rule #123: IF OLH is very high, CSH is marginal AND DH is reasonably likely, THEN PAH is 
moderate. 
Rule #124: IF OLH is very high, CSH is moderate AND DH is likely, THEN PAH is high. 
Rule #125: IF OLH is very high, CSH is critical AND DH is highly likely, THEN PAH is very 
high. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3B: Details of Experts #1, #2, #3, and #4 Judgement for the PAH Rank 
Estimation of Pipe Corrosion Protection System Failure in Tank Farm Operations under 
Uncertainty 
 
 
Experts Judgement in Fuzzy Environment 
 
 
Tables 3.1 - 3.3 and Equation 3.2 are adopted in estimation of fuzzy scale values for OLH, CSH 
and DH. Experts #1 - #4 used Table 3.1 to estimate occurrence likelihood of pipe corrosion 
protection system failure as low, low, low and low respectively. Numerical values for low, low, 
low and low is 1, 1, 1 and 1 respectively in Table 3.1. Using Equation 3.2, the fuzzy scale value 
for OLH denoted as 21A  is expressed as:  
 
2412423123221222112121 awawawawA   
 
125.0125.0125.0125.021 A  
 
      = 1 
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The fuzzy scale value for CSH denoted as 22A  can be estimated in a similar way. Experts #1 - #4 
rated consequence severity of pipe corrosion protection system failure as negligible. The 
numerical value of negligible is 1 as shown in Table 3.2. Therefore, 22A  can be calculated as 
follows: 
 
2422423223222122122122 awawawawA   
 
125.0125.0125.0125.022 A  
 
      = 1 
 
The ratings of Experts #1 - #4 on detectability of pipe corrosion protection system failure as 
highly unlikely with numerical value of 1 is used to calculate the hazard‟s fuzzy scale value, 23A  
as follows: 
 
2432423323223222132123 awawawawA   
 
125.0125.0125.0125.023 A  
 
      = 1 
 
Therefore, 1, 1 and 1 can be used to estimate the fuzzy membership function values of OLH, 
CSH and DH respectively as illustrated in Figures B3.1, B3.2 and B3.3.  Figures B3.1, B3.2 and 
B3.3 showed that the fuzzy membership function values of OLH, CSH and DH are as (0.85, 
“very low”; 0.15, “low”), (0.85, “marginal”; 0.15, “negligible”) and (0.85, “unlikely”; 0.15, 
“highly unlikely”) respectively. The fuzzy conclusions of experts are revealed by firing 8 
relevant rules (i.e. Rules #1, #2, #6, #7, #26, #31, #102 and #107) in the 125 rules of PAH of 
tank farm operations as follows: 
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Rule #1: IF OLH is (0.85, “very low”), CSH is (0.15, “negligible”) AND DH is (0.15, “highly 
unlikely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “very low”). 
Rule #2: IF OLH is (0.85, “very low”), CSH is (0.85, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.85, “unlikely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.85, “low”). 
Rule #6: IF OLH is (0.15, “low”), CSH is (0.15, “negligible”) AND DH is (0.15, “highly 
unlikely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “very low”). 
Rule #7: IF OLH is (0.15, “low”), CSH is (0.85, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.85, “unlikely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.15, “low”). 
Rule #26: IF OLH is (0.85, “very low”), CSH is (0.85, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.15, “highly 
unlikely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “very low”).  
Rule #31: IF OLH is (0.15, “low”), CSH is (0.85, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.15, “highly 
unlikely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “very low”). 
Rule #102: IF OLH is (0.85, “very low”), CSH is (0.15, “negligible”) AND DH is (0.85, 
“unlikely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “low”). 
Rule #107: IF OLH is (0.15, “low”), CSH is (0.15, “negligible”) AND DH is (0.85, “unlikely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.15, “low”). 
 
Using the same procedures in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.1, fuzzy conclusions of PAH of pipe 
corrosion protection system failure are found as (0.15, “very low”) and (0.85, “low”).  
 
  
  
                                     
Figure B3.1: A Membership Function for OLH of the Pipe Corrosion Protection System Failure 
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Figure B3.2: A Membership Function for CSH of the Pipe Corrosion Protection System Failure 
         
 
 
Figure B3.3: A Membership Function for DH of Pipe Corrosion Protection System Failure 
 
 
Therefore, the PAH belief degrees/fuzzy values of pipe corrosion protection system failure can 
be described as {(0.15, “very low”), (0.85, “low”), (0, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very 
high”)}.  
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Expected Utility Value for PAH of Pipe Corrosion Protection System Failure 
 
 
The PAH belief degrees/fuzzy values of pipe corrosion protection system failure is described as 
{(0.15, “very low”), (0.85, “low”), (0, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very high”)}. Therefore, 
0.15, 0.85, 0, 0 and 0 associated with the evaluation grades stands for 1 , 2 , 3 , 4  and 5  
respectively. Using procedures and methods adopted in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.2. The expected 
utility value denoted as   ESu  of pipe corrosion protection system failure can be revealed as 
follows: 
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             = 0.2125 
              
Therefore, PAH rank (i.e. crisp value) of pipe corrosion protection system failure in tank farm 
Operations is 0.2125. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3C: Details of Experts #1, #2, #3, and #4 Judgement for the PAH Rank 
Estimation of Automatic Tank Gauge System Failure in Tank Farm Operations under 
Uncertainty  
  
 
Experts Judgement in Fuzzy Environment 
 
 
The fuzzy scale value for OLH of automatic tank gauge system failure, denoted as 31A  is 2.25. 
This is revealed using experts judgement, Equation 3.2 and Table 3.1. The experts #1, #2, #3 and 
#4 estimated OLH as low, average, low and average respectively. Their respective numerical 
values in Table 3.1 are incorporated in Equation 3.2 to produce 31A  as follows:  
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3413433133321323113131 awawawawA   
 
225.0225.0325.0225.031 A  
 
      = 2.25 
 
In a similar way, the fuzzy scale value for CSH denoted as 32A  can be estimated. Experts #1, #2, 
#3 and #4 rated the CSH of automatic tank gauge system failure using Table 3.2. The ratings of 
the CSH by Experts #1 - #4 are used to calculate 32A  as follows: 
 
3423433233322323123132 awawawawA   
 
325.0225.0225.0225.032 A  
 
      = 2.25 
 
Similar approach is used in finding 33A . Experts #1 - #4 used Table 3.3 to rate the DH of 
automatic tank gauge system failure. The rating values are used in estimation of 33A  as follows: 
 
3433433333323323133133 awawawawA   
 
225.0225.0225.0225.033 A  
 
      = 2.0 
 
Therefore, 2.25, 2.25 and 2.0 are respectively used to estimate OLH, CSH and DH fuzzy 
membership function values as illustrated in Figures B3.4, B3.5 and B3.6. They are described as 
(0.2, “low”; 0.8, “average”), (0.2, “marginal”; 0.8, “moderate”) and (0.4, “unlikely”; 0.6, 
“reasonably likely”) for OLH, CSH and DH of automatic tank gauge system failure. This is used 
to fire 8 rules in the 125 rules of PAH of tank farm operations as follows: 
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Rule #7: IF OLH is (0.2, “low”), CSH is (0.2, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.4, “unlikely”), THEN 
PAH is (0.2, “low”). 
Rule #8: IF OLH is (0.2, “low”), CSH is (0.8, “moderate”) AND DH is (0.6, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.2, “moderate”). 
Rule #12: IF OLH is (0.8, “average”), CSH is (0.2, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.4, “unlikely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.2, “low”). 
Rule #13: IF OLH is (0.8, “average”), CSH is (0.8, “moderate”) AND DH is (0.6, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.6, “moderate”). 
Rule #32: IF OLH is (0.2, “low”), CSH is (0.8, “moderate”) AND DH is (0.4, “unlikely”), THEN 
PAH is (0.2, “low”). 
Rule #37: IF OLH is (0.8, “average”), CSH is (0.8, “moderate”) AND DH is (0.4, “unlikely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.4, “low”). 
Rule #108: IF OLH is (0.2 “low”), CSH is (0.2, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.6, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.2, “moderate”). 
Rule #113: IF OLH is (0.8, “average”), CSH is (0.2, “marginal”) AND DH is (0.6, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.2, “moderate”). 
 
Adopting the same procedures in Sub-section 3.6.1.1.1 and max-min method, Experts estimate 
the fuzzy conclusions of PAH of automatic tank gauge system failure as (0.4, “low”) and (0.6, 
“moderate”).            
                 
 
 Figure B3.4: A Membership Function for OLH of Automatic Tank Gauge System Failure 
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  Figure B3.5: A Membership Function for CSH of Automatic Tank Gauge System Failure    
  
        
 
 
Figure B3.6: A Membership Function for DH of Automatic Tank Gauge System Failure 
                    
 
 
Expected Utility Value for PAH of Automatic Tank Gauge System Failure 
 
 
The PAH belief degrees/fuzzy values of automatic tank gauge system failure is described as {(0, 
“very low”), (0.4, “low”), (0.6, “moderate”), (0, “high”), (0, “very high”)}. It means that 0, 0.4, 
0.6, 0 and 0 stands for 1 , 2 , 3 , 4  and 5  respectively. Using similar procedures and 
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methods in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.2. The expected utility value denoted as   ESu  of 
automatic tank gauge system failure are estimated as follows: 
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             = 0.4      
 
Therefore, PAH rank (i.e. crisp value) of automatic tank gauge system failure in tank farm 
operations is 0.4 
 
 
 
Appendix 3D: Details of Expert #1, #2, #3, and #4 Fuzzy Conclusions for the PAH Rank 
Estimation of Leak Detection Device/System in Tank Farm Operations. 
 
 
Experts Judgement in Fuzzy Environment 
 
 
Table 3.1 is used by Experts #1 - #4 to rate the OLH of leak detection device/system failure in 
order to estimate the fuzzy scale value for the OLH denoted as 41A . Equation 3.2 is used to carry 
out such exercise as follows:  
 
4414443143421424114141 awawawawA   
 
125.0125.0125.0125.041 A  
 
        = 1.0 
 
Similarly, 42A , which is the fuzzy scale value for CSH of leak detection device/system failure can 
be estimated. In view of this, Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 used Table 3.2 to rate the CSH of leak 
detection device/system failure. The results of the ratings are used to facilitate the calculation of 
42A . Therefore, Equation 3.2 is utilised in calculation of 42A  as follows: 
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4424443243422424124142 awawawawA   
 
425.0525.0525.0425.042 A  
 
        = 4.5 
 
Using similar approach above, the 43A  described as fuzzy scale value for DH of the leak 
detection device/system failure can be estimated. The rating values of the DH of the leak 
detection device/system failure by Experts #1 - #4 are revealed using Table 3.3. Therefore, these 
values are used to apply Equation 3.2 in order to find 43A  as follows: 
 
4434443343423424134143 awawawawA   
 
425.0325.0325.0425.042 A  
 
        = 3.5 
 
Therefore, 1, 4.5 and 3.5, can be used to estimate the fuzzy membership function values of OLH, 
CSH and DH of the leak detection device/system failure as shown in Figures B3.7, B3.8 and 
B3.9. Figures B3.7, B3.8 and B3.9 revealed that the fuzzy membership function values of OLH, 
CSH and DH of the leak detection device/system failure are (0.85, “low”; 0.15, “very low”), 
(0.55, “catastrophic”; 0.45, “critical”) and (0.18, “reasonably likely”; 0.82, “likely”) respectively 
in their corresponding B3.7, B3.8 and B3.9. The experts‟ fuzzy conclusion is revealed by firing 
relevant rules in the 125 rules of PAH of tank farm operations as follows: 
 
Rule #4: IF OLH is (0.15, “very low”), CSH is (0.45, “critical”) AND DH is (0.82, “likely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.15, “high”). 
Rule #9: IF OLH is (0.85, “low”), CSH is (0.45, “critical”) AND DH is (0.82, “likely”), THEN 
PAH is (0.45, “high”). 
Rule #28: IF OLH is (0.15, “very low”), CSH is (0.45, “critical”) AND DH is (0.18, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “moderate”). 
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Rule #29: IF OLH is (0.15, “very low”), CSH is (0.55, “catastrophic”) AND DH is (0.82, 
“likely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “high”). 
Rule #33: IF OLH is (0.85, “low”), CSH is (0.45, “critical”) AND DH is (0.18, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.45, “moderate”). 
Rule #34: IF OLH is (0.85, “low”), CSH is (0.55, “catastrophic”) AND DH is (0.82, “likely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.55, “high”). 
Rule #53: IF OLH is (0.15, “very low”), CS is (0.55, “catastrophic”) AND DH is (0.18, 
“reasonably likely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “moderate”). 
Rule #58: IF OLH is (0.85, “low”), CS is (0.55, “catastrophic”) AND DH is (0.18, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.18, “moderate”). 
 
Adopting the same procedures in Sub-section 3.6.1.1.1 and max-min method, Experts estimate 
the fuzzy conclusions of PAH of the leak detection device/system failure as (0.45, “moderate”) 
and (0.55, “high”).  
 
                        
Figure B3.7: A Membership Function for OLH of Leak Detection Device/System Failure 
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Figure B3.8: A Membership Function for CSH of Leak Detection Device/System Failure 
 
              
 
 
  Figure B3.9: A Membership Function for DH of Leak Detection Device/System Failure 
 
 
Expected Utility Value for PAH of Leak Detection Device/System Failure  
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0.45, 0.55 and 0 stands for 1 , 2 , 3 , 4  and 5  respectively. In a similar way to Sub-sub-
section 3.6.1.1.2, the expected utility value denoted as   ESu  of leak detection device/system 
failure are estimated as follows: 
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             = 0.6375      
 
Therefore, PAH rank (i.e. crisp value) of leak detection device/system failure farm operations is 
0.6375 
 
 
 
Appendix 3E: Details of Expert #1, #2, #3, and #4 Fuzzy Conclusions for the PAH Rank 
Estimation of Secondary Containment Monitoring System Failure in Tank Farm 
Operations. 
 
 
Experts Judgement in Fuzzy Environment 
 
 
The fuzzy scale values for OLH of secondary containment monitoring system failure denoted as
51A , can be estimated using Tables 3.1 and Equation 3.2. The Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 ratings 
of the OLH are used to calculate 51A  as follows:  
 
5415453153521525115151 awawawawA   
 
125.0125.0125.0125.051 A  
 
      = 1.0 
 
In a similar way, the fuzzy scale value for CSH of secondary containment monitoring system 
failure denoted as 52A  can be estimated. Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 used Table 3.2 for ratings of 
CSH of secondary containment monitoring system failure. Their ratings of CSH of secondary 
containment monitoring system failure are used to calculate 52A  as follows: 
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5425453253522525125152 awawawawA   
 
425.0425.0425.0425.052 A  
 
      = 4.0 
 
To know the fuzzy scale value of secondary containment monitoring system failure denoted as
53A , similar approach used above is adopted. Experts #1, #2, #3 and #4 used Table 3.3 to carry 
out ratings of DH of secondary containment monitoring system failure. These ratings are used to 
calculate 53A  as follows: 
 
5435453353523525135153 awawawawA   
 
125.0325.0325.0325.053 A  
 
      = 3.25 
 
Therefore, 1.0, 4.0 and 3.25 can be used to estimate the fuzzy membership function values as 
shown in Figures B3.10, B3.11 and B3.12. As evidenced in Figures B3.10, B3.11 and B3.12, the 
fuzzy membership function values of OLH, CSH and DH of secondary containment monitoring 
system failure are described as (0.85, “low”; 0.15, “very low”), (0.75, “critical”; 0.25, 
“catastrophic”) and (0.55, “reasonably likely”; 0.45, “likely”) respectively. This is used to 
estimate the fuzzy conclusions of the Experts. In view of this, relevant rules in the 125 rules of 
PAH of tank farm operations are fired as follows: 
 
Rule #4: IF OLH is (0.15, “very low”), CSH is (0.75, “critical”) AND DH is (0.45, “likely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.15, “high”). 
Rule #9: IF OLH is (0.85, “low”), CSH is (0.75, “critical”) AND DH (0.45, “likely”), THEN 
PAH is (0.45, “high”). 
Rule #28: IF OLH is (0.15, “very low”), CSH is (0.75, “critical”) AND DH is (0.55, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “moderate”). 
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Rule #29: IF OLH is (0.15, “very low”), CSH is (0.25, “catastrophic”) AND DH is (0.45, 
“likely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “high”). 
Rule #33: IF OLH is (0.85, “low”), CSH is (0.75, “critical”) AND DH is (0.55, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.55, “moderate”). 
Rule #34: IF OLH is (0.85, “low”), CSH is (0.25, “catastrophic”) AND DH is (0.45, “likely”), 
THEN PAH is (0.25, “high”). 
Rule #53: IF OLH is (0.15, “very low”), CSH is (0.25, “catastrophic”) AND DH is (0.55, 
“reasonably likely”), THEN PAH is (0.15, “moderate”).  
Rule #58: IF OLH is (0.85, “low”), CSH is (0.25, “catastrophic”) AND DH is (0.55, “reasonably 
likely”), THEN PAH is (0.25, “moderate”). 
 
Using the same procedures in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.1 and max-min method, Experts estimates 
the fuzzy conclusions of PAH of secondary containment monitoring system failure as (0.55, 
“moderate”) and (0.45, “high”).  
 
  
Figure B3.10: A Membership Function for OLH of Secondary Containment Monitoring System 
Failure                         
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Figure B3.11: A Membership Function for CSH of Secondary Containment Monitoring System 
Failure 
 
 
                             
 
Figure B3.12: A Membership Function for DH of Secondary Containment Monitoring System 
Failure 
  
 
Expected Utility Value for PAH of Secondary Containment Monitoring System Failure 
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   0                      1.25                    2.5                   3.75  4.0             5.0 
1.0 
             Negligible             Marginal                Moderate                  Critical            Catastrophic 
0.75 
0.25 
   0                      1.25                    2.5        3.25     3.75                    5.0 
1.0 
    Highly Unlikely              Unlikely         Reasonably Likely            Likely           Highly Likely 
0.55 
0.45 
191 
 
procedures in Sub-sub-section 3.6.1.1.2, the expected utility value of secondary containment 
monitoring system failure denoted as   ESu  can be calculated as follows: 
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             = 0.6125      
 
Therefore, PAH rank (i.e. crisp value) of secondary containment monitoring system failure in 
tank farm operations is 0.6125. 
 
 
 
 
Appendices of Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Appendix 4A: Aggregation of Experts’ Judgement on the Failure Possibility (FPs) of Each 
Basic Event (BE) of the Tank Farm Leak Detection System Operations. 
 
 
1. Human Sabotage 
 
2FPsBE  =        43242241242332322312322322222122213212211212 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)  0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)   
              = (0.20.25, 0.40.25, 0.60.25)   (0.20.25, 0.40.25, 0.60.25)   (0.20.25, 0.4
0.25, 0.60.25)  (00.25, 0.20.25, 0.40.25) 
              = (0.05, 0.1, 0.15) (0.05, 0.1, 0.15)  (0.05, 0.1, 0.15)   (0, 0.05, 0.1) 
              = (0.050.050.050, 0.10.1 0.1 0.05, 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.1) 
              = (0.15, 0.35, 0.55)    
   
2. Human Vandalization 
 
3FPsBE  =        43342341343333323313332332232132313312311313 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.4, 0.6, 0.8)  0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.4, 0.6, 0.8)   
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              = (0.35, 0.55, 0.75)     
  
3. Thermal Contraction 
 
4FPsBE  =        43442441444334324314342342242142413412411414 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)  0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)   0.25(0.8, 1.0, 1.0)   0.25(0.8, 1.0, 1.0)   
              = (0.7, 0.9, 1.0)      
 
4. Thermal Expansion 
 
5FPsBE  =        43542541545335325315352352252152513512511515 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.8, 1.0, 1.0)  0.25(0.8, 1.0, 1.0)   0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)   0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)   
              = (0.7, 0.9, 1.0) 
 
5. Check Valve Leaks 
 
6FPsBE  =        43642641646336326316362362262162613612611616 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.4, 0.6, 0.8)  0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)   0.25(0.4, 0.6, 0.8)   0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)   
              = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)      
 
6. Pressure Relief Valve Leaks 
 
7FPsBE  =        43742741747337327317372372272172713712711717 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)  0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   
              = (0.2, 0.4, 0.6)      
 
7. High Static Head Pressure 
 
8FPsBE  =        43842841848338328318382382282182813812811818 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.8, 1.0, 1.0)  0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)   0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)   0.25(0.6, 0.8, 1.0)   
              = (0.65, 0.85, 1.0)      
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8. Continuous Pump Run 
 
9FPsBE  =        43942941949339329319392392292192913912911919 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.4, 0.6, 0.8)  0.25(0.4, 0.6, 0.8)   0.25(0.4, 0.6, 0.8)   0.25(0.4, 0.6, 0.8)   
              = (0.4, 0.6, 0.8)      
 
9. Material Defects 
 
10FPsBE  =        431042104110410331032103110310231022102110210131012101110110 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)  0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   
              = (0.15, 0.35, 0.55)      
 
10. Vapour Pockets 
 
11FPsBE  =        431142114111411331132113111311231122112111211131112111111111 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)  0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   
              = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)      
 
11. Fuse Unit Failure 
 
12FPsBE  =        431242124112412331232123112312231222122112212131212121112112 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)  0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)   0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)   0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)   
              = (0, 0.2, 0.4)    
   
12. Power Supply Unit Failure 
 
13FPsBE  =        431342134113413331332133113313231322132113213131312131113113 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)  0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0, 0.2, 0.4)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   
              = (0.1, 0.3, 0.5)   
    
13. Switch Failure 
 
14FPsBE  =        431442144114414331432143114314231422142114214131412141114114 ,,,,,,,, aaawaaawaaawaaaw   
              = 0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)  0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   0.25(0.2, 0.4, 0.6)   
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              = (0.2, 0.4, 0.6)      
 
 
 
Appendix 4B: Defuzzification of the Aggregated Experts’ Opinion on the Failure 
Possibility (FPs) of Each Basic Event (BE) of Leak Detection System of Tank Farm.  
    
 
1. Human Sabotage 
 
2FPsBE  =  322212
3
1
aaa   
              =  55.035.015.0
3
1
  
              = 0.35      
 
2. Human Vandalization 
 
3FPsBE  =  332313
3
1
aaa   
              =  75.055.035.0
3
1
  
              = 0.55      
 
3. Thermal Contraction 
 
4FPsBE  =  342414
3
1
aaa   
              =  0.19.07.0
3
1
  
              = 0.867      
 
4. Thermal Expansion 
 
5FPsBE  =  352515
3
1
aaa   
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              =  0.19.07.0
3
1
  
              = 0.867      
 
 
5. Check Valve Leaks 
 
6FPsBE  =  362616
3
1
aaa   
              =  9.07.05.0
3
1
  
              = 0.7      
 
6. Pressure Relief Valve Leaks 
 
7FPsBE  =  372717
3
1
aaa   
              =  6.04.02.0
3
1
  
              = 0.4      
 
7. High Static Head Pressure 
 
8FPsBE  =  382818
3
1
aaa   
              =  0.185.065.0
3
1
  
              = 0.833     
 
8. Continuous Pump Run 
 
9FPsBE  =  392919
3
1
aaa   
              =  8.06.04.0
3
1
  
              = 0.6      
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9. Material Defects 
 
10FPsBE  =  310210110
3
1
aaa   
              =  55.035.015.0
3
1
  
              = 0.35      
 
10. Vapour Pockets 
 
11FPsBE  =  311211111
3
1
aaa   
              =  9.07.05.0
3
1
  
              = 0.7      
 
11. Fuse Unit Failure 
 
12FPsBE  =  312212112
3
1
aaa   
              =  4.02.00
3
1
  
              = 0.2      
 
12. Power Supply Unit Failure 
 
13FPsBE  =  313213113
3
1
aaa   
              =  5.03.01.0
3
1
  
              = 0.3      
 
13. Switch Failure 
 
14FPsBE  =  314214114
3
1
aaa   
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              =  6.04.02.0
3
1
  
              = 0.4  
 
 
Appendix 4C: Conversion of the Failure Possibility (FPs) of Each Basic Event (BE) of the 
Top Event (TE) to Failure Probability (FPr) 
 
 
1. Human Sabotage 
 
2Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
2
2
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
35.0
35.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.0015 
    
2. Human Vandalization 
 
3Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
3
3
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
55.0
55.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.007 
    
3. Thermal Contraction 
 
4Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
4
4
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
867.0
867.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.059 
    
4. Thermal Expansion 
 
5Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
5
5
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
867.0
867.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.059 
 
5. Check Valve Leaks 
 
6Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
6
6
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
7.0
7.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.018 
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6. Pressure Relief Valve Leaks 
 
7Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
7
7
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
4.0
4.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.002 
 
7. High Static Head Pressure 
 
8Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
8
8
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
833.0
833.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.045 
      
8. Continuous Pump Run 
 
9Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
9
9
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
6.0
6.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.01 
 
9. Material Defects 
 
10Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
10
10
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
35.0
35.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.0015 
 
10. Vapour Pockets 
 
11Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
11
11
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
7.0
7.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.018 
 
11. Fuse Unit Failure 
 
12Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
12
12
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
2.0
2.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.0002 
 
12. Power Supply Unit Failure 
 
13Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
13
13
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
3.0
3.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.001 
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13. Switch Failure 
 
14Pr BEF  = 
301.2
1 3
1
14
14
10
1





 
FPsBE
FPsBE
 = 
301.2
4.0
4.01 3
1
10
1





 
 = 0.002 
 
 
 
Appendix 4D: Verification of the Model of Chapter 4 using the Sensitivity Analysis  
 
 
Elimination of an Intermediate Event, HumanF Pr  resulted to reduction of TEFPr  as follows: 
 
TEF Pr =     PanelFMechanicalFHumanF Pr1Pr1Pr11                          
                                =     003.01196.01011   
                                =     997.0804.001  
                                = 0.198     
 
The result implies that elimination of HumanF Pr  reduced TEFPr  by 3.41%. 
 
Elimination of an Intermediate Event, MechanicalF Pr  resulted to reduction of TEFPr  as 
follows: 
 
TEF Pr =     PanelFMechanicalFHumanF Pr1Pr1Pr11                          
                                =     003.0101009.011   
                                =    997.0991.01  
                                = 0.012     
 
The result implies that elimination of MechanicalF Pr  reduced TEFPr  by 94.14%. 
 
Elimination of an Intermediate Event, PanelF Pr  resulted to reduction of TEFPr  as follows: 
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TEF Pr =     PanelFMechanicalFHumanF Pr1Pr1Pr11                          
                                =     01196.01009.011   
                                =    804.0991.01  
                                = 0.203     
 
The result implies that elimination of PanelF Pr  reduced TEFPr  by 0.98%. 
 
Elimination of all Intermediate Events, HumanF Pr , MechanicalF Pr and PanelF Pr  resulted 
to reduction of TEFPr  as follows: 
 
TEF Pr =     PanelFMechanicalFHumanF Pr1Pr1Pr11                          
             =     0101011   
             =     1111  
             = 0     
 
The result implies that elimination of all Intermediate Events, HumanF Pr , MechanicalF Pr  
and PanelF Pr  reduced TEFPr  by 100% . 
 
 
 
Appendices of Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Appendix 5A 
 
 
 
Expert #2 Opinion on Criteria  
 
 
The pairwise comparisons of the criteria are conducted in Table A5.1. Table A5.1 is used by 
Expert #2 to demonstrate the following: 
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 In Row 2 of Table A5.1, labour cost and Labour cost are compared, and the Expert #2 
revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 3 of Table A5.1, labour cost and Equipment cost are compared, and the Expert #2 
revealed that Equipment cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally Important” than 
Labour cost with numerical value of 2.  
 In Row 4 of Table A5.1, Labour cost and company organisational strategy are compared, 
and the Expert #2 revealed that labour cost is “Moderately more Important” than company 
organisational strategy with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 5 of Table A5.1, labour cost and company structure are compared, and the Expert #2 
revealed that labour cost are “Moderately more Important” than company structure with 
numerical value of 3.  
 In Row 6 of Table A5.1, labour cost and technology management are compared, and the 
Expert #2 revealed that labour cost is “Moderately more Important” than technology 
management with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 7 of Table A5.1, equipment cost and Equipment cost are compared, and the Expert 
#2 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 8 of Table A5.1, equipment cost and company organisational strategy are compared, 
and the Expert #2 revealed that Equipment cost is “Moderately more Important” than 
company organisational strategy with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 9 of Table A5.1, Equipment cost and company structure are compared, and the 
Expert #2 revealed that Equipment is “Moderately more Important” than company structure 
with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 10 of Table A5.1, equipment cost and technology management are compared, and 
the Expert #2 revealed that Equipment cost is “Between moderately more and strongly more 
important” than equipment cost with numerical value of 4. 
 In Row 11 of Table A5.1, company organisational strategy and company organisational 
strategy are compared, and the Expert #2 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with 
numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 12 of Table A5.1, company organisational strategy and company structure are 
compared, and the Expert #2 revealed that company organisational strategy is “Moderately 
more Important” than company structure with numerical value of 3. 
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 In Row 13 of Table A5.1, company organisational strategy and technology management are 
compared, and the Expert #2 revealed that company organisational strategy is “Between 
moderately more and strongly more important” than technology management with numerical 
value of 4. 
 In Row 14 of Table A5.1, company structure and company structure  are compared, and the 
Expert #2 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 15 of Table A5.1, company structure and technology management are compared, 
and the Expert #2 revealed that company structure is “Between moderately more and equally 
important” than technology management with numerical value of 2. 
 In Row 16 of Table A5.1, technology management and technology management are 
compared, and the Expert #2 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical 
value of 1. 
 
Expert #3 Opinion on Criteria  
 
The pairwise comparisons of the criteria are conducted in Table A5.2. Table A5.2 is used by 
Expert #3 to demonstrate the following: 
 
 In Row 2 of Table A5.2, labour cost and Labour cost are compared, and the Expert #3 
revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 3 of Table A5.2, labour cost and Equipment cost are compared, and the Expert #3 
revealed that Equipment cost is “Moderately more Important” than Labour cost with 
numerical value of 3.  
 In Row 4 of Table A5.2, labour cost and company organisational strategy are compared, and 
the Expert #3 revealed that Labour cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally 
Important” than company organisational strategy with numerical value of 2. 
 In Row 5 of Table A5.2, Labour cost and company structure are compared, and the Expert 
#3 revealed that Labour cost are “Between moderately more and strongly more important” 
than company structure with numerical value of 4.  
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 In Row 6 of Table A5.2, labour cost and technology management are compared, and the 
Expert #3 revealed that Labour cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally Important” 
than technology management with numerical value of 2. 
 
Table A5.1: Illustration of Conduction of Pairwise Comparison of the Criteria by Expert #2 
 
                        Pairwise Comparison Which Criterion is 
Important than the other? 
Details of level of 
Important 
Numerical 
Value 
Labour cost  Labour cost              None Equally Important        1 
Labour cost  Equipment cost  Equipment cost  Between 
Moderately more 
and Equally 
Important 
       2 
Labour cost  Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Labour cost  Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Labour cost  Company structure Labour cost  Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Labour cost  Technology 
management 
Labour cost  Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Equipment cost  Equipment cost              None Equally Important        1 
Equipment cost  Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Equipment cost  Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Equipment cost  Company structure Equipment cost  Moderately more 
Important 
       3  
Equipment cost  Technology 
management 
Equipment cost        4 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
            None Equally Important        1 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Company structure  Company organisational 
strategy  
Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Technology 
management  
Company organisational 
strategy  
Between moderately 
more and strongly 
more important 
       4 
Company structure Company structure            None Equally Important        1 
Company structure  Technology 
management  
Company structure  Between moderately 
more and equally 
important 
       2 
Technology 
management  
Technology 
management  
            None Equally Important        1 
 
 
 In Row 7 of Table A5.2, equipment cost and Equipment cost are compared, and the Expert 
#3 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
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 In Row 8 of Table A5.2, equipment cost and company organisational strategy are compared, 
and the Expert #3 revealed that Equipment cost is “Between moderately more and strongly 
more Important” than company organisational strategy with numerical value of 4. 
 In Row 9 of Table A5.2, equipment cost and company structure are compared, and the 
Expert #3 revealed that Equipment cost is “Moderately more Important” than company‟s 
structure with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 10 of Table A5.2, equipment cost and technology management are compared, and 
the Expert #3 revealed that Equipment cost is “Moderately more Important” than Equipment 
cost with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 11 of Table A5.2, company organisational strategy and company organisational 
strategy are compared, and the Expert #3 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with 
numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 12 of Table A5.2, company organisational strategy and company structure are 
compared, and the Expert #3 revealed that company organisational strategy is “Moderately 
more Important” than company structure with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 13 of Table A5.2, company organisational strategy and technology management are 
compared, and the Expert #3 revealed that company organisational strategy is “Moderately 
more Important” than technology management with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 14 of Table A5.2, company structure and company structure are compared, and the 
Expert #3 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 15 of Table A5.2, company structure and technology management are compared, 
and the Expert #3 revealed that company structure is “Moderately more Important” than 
technology management with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 16 of Table A5.2, technology management and technology management are 
compared, and the Expert #3 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical 
value of 1. 
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Table A5.2: Illustration of Conduction of Pairwise Comparison of the Criteria by Expert #3 
 
                        Pairwise Comparison Which Criterion is 
Important than the other? 
Details of level of 
Important 
Numerical 
Value 
Labour cost  Labour cost              None Equally Important        1 
Labour cost  Equipment cost  Equipment cost  Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Labour cost  Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Labour cost  Between Moderately 
more and Equally 
Important 
       2 
Labour cost  Company structure Labour cost  Between moderately 
more and strongly 
more Important 
       4 
Labour cost  Technology 
management 
Labour cost  Between Moderately 
more and Equally 
Important 
       2 
Equipment cost  Equipment cost              None Equally Important        1 
Equipment cost  Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Equipment cost  Between moderately 
more and strongly 
more Important 
       4 
Equipment cost  Company structure Equipment cost  Moderately more 
Important 
       3  
Equipment cost  Technology 
management 
Equipment cost  Moderately more 
Important 
     3 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
            None Equally Important        1 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Company structure  Company organisational 
strategy 
Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Technology 
management  
Company organisational 
strategy 
Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Company structure Company structure            None Equally Important        1 
Company structure  Technology 
management  
Company structure Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Technology 
management  
Technology 
management  
            None Equally Important        1 
 
 
Expert #4 Opinion on Criteria  
 
 
The pairwise comparisons of the criteria associated with SCD #1 is conducted in Table A5.3. 
Table A5.3 is used by Expert #4 to demonstrate the following: 
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 In Row 2 of Table A5.3, labour cost and Labour cost are compared, and the Expert #4 
revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 3 of Table A5.3, labour cost and Equipment cost are compared, and the Expert #4 
revealed that Equipment cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally Important” than 
Labour cost with numerical value of 2.  
 In Row 4 of Table A5.3, labour cost and company organisational strategy are compared, and 
the Expert #4 revealed that Labour cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally 
Important” than company organisational strategy with numerical value of 2. 
 In Row 5 of Table A5.3, labour cost and company structure are compared, and the Expert #4 
revealed that Labour cost are “Moderately more Important” than Effects of company 
structure with numerical value of 3.  
 In Row 6 of Table A5.3, labour cost and technology management are compared, and the 
Expert #4 revealed that Labour cost is “Between Moderately more and Equally Important” 
than technology management with numerical value of 2. 
 In Row 7 of Table A5.3, equipment cost and Equipment cost are compared, and the Expert 
#4 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 8 of Table A5.3, equipment cost and company organisational strategy are compared, 
and the Expert #4 revealed that Equipment cost is “Between moderately more and strongly 
more Important” than company organisational strategy with numerical value of 4. 
 In Row 9 of Table A5.3, equipment cost and company structure are compared, and the 
Expert #4 revealed that Equipment cost is “Between moderately more and strongly more 
Important” than company structure with numerical value of 4. 
 In Row 10 of Table A5.3, equipment cost and technology management are compared, and 
the Expert #4 revealed that Equipment cost is “Moderately more Important” than Equipment 
cost with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 11 of Table A5.3, company organisational strategy and company organisational 
strategy are compared, and the Expert #4 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with 
numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 12 of Table A5.3, company organisational strategy and company structure are 
compared, and the Expert #4 revealed that company organisational strategy is “Between 
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moderately more and strongly more Important” than company structure with numerical 
value of 4. 
  
Table A5.3: Illustration of Conduction of Pairwise Comparison of the Criteria  by Expert #4 
 
                        Pairwise Comparison Which Criterion is 
Important than the other? 
Details of level of 
Important 
Numerical 
Value 
Labour cost  Labour cost              None Equally Important        1 
Labour cost  Equipment cost  Equipment cost  Between Moderately 
more and Equally 
Important 
       2 
Labour cost  Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Labour cost  Between Moderately 
more and Equally 
Important 
       2 
Labour cost  Company structure Labour cost  Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Labour cost  Technology 
management 
Labour cost  Between Moderately 
more and Equally 
Important 
       2 
Equipment cost  Equipment cost              None Equally Important        1 
Equipment cost  Company 
organisational 
strategy 
Equipment cost  Between moderately 
more and strongly 
more Important 
       4 
Equipment cost  Company structure Equipment cost  Between moderately 
more and strongly 
more Important 
       4 
Equipment cost  Technology 
management 
Equipment cost  Moderately more 
Important 
     3 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Company 
organisational 
strategy 
            None Equally Important        1 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Company structure  Company organisational 
strategy 
Between moderately 
more and strongly 
more Important 
       4 
Company 
organisational 
strategy  
Technology 
management  
Company organisational 
strategy 
Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Company structure Company structure            None Equally Important        1 
Company structure  Technology 
management  
Company structure Moderately more 
Important 
       3 
Technology 
management  
Technology 
management  
            None Equally Important        1 
 
 
 In Row 13 of Table A5.3, company organisational strategy and technology management are 
compared, and the Expert #4 revealed that company organisational strategy is “Moderately 
more Important” than technology management with numerical value of 3. 
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 In Row 14 of Table A5.3, company structure and company structure are compared, and the 
Expert #4 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical value of 1. 
 In Row 15 of Table A5.3, company structure and technology management are compared, 
and the Expert #4 revealed that company structure on the use of SCD #1 is “Moderately 
more Important” than technology management with numerical value of 3. 
 In Row 16 of Table A5.3, technology management and technology management are 
compared, and the Expert #4 revealed that both are “Equally Important” with numerical 
value of 1. 
 
 
